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LABOR LAW
I. ORGANIZATIONAL AND REPRESENTATIONAL ACTIVITY
A. *Status of Nurses as "Supervisors" Under the National Labor
Relations Act: NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corporation of
America]
The National Labor Relations Act (the "Act") protects against
employers' unfair labor practices by enabling employees to form and
join labor organizations and engage in collective bargaining and other
concerted activities. 2 Congress amended the Act in 1947 to exclude
supervisors from the definition of "employee," thus removing supervi-
sors from its coverage.' Section 2(11) of the Act defines a "supervisor"
as an employee who has the authority to do any of twelve listed activities
"in the interest" of his or her employer. 4 Congress created this exclu-
sion to maintain a balance of power between unions and employers,
and to prevent certain inevitable conflict of interest situations from
arising.'
In contrast, section 2(12) of the Act specifically includes "profes-
sionals" within the definition of "employee" contained in section 2(3)
* By Christina M. Lyons, Staff Member, Bos•rox Cowe.c.y. LAW REVIEW.
1 114 S. Ct. 1778 (1994).
2 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 (1988).
3 Id. § 152(3).
4 Specifically, the Act defines supervisor as:
IAJny individual having the authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire,
transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, protium:, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline
other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or
effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the
exercise of such authority is riot of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires
thc use of independent judgment.
Id. § 152(11).
5 See NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461, 1465-66, 113 L.R.R.M. 2336, 2337-38 (1983).
Congress feared that aligning supervisors with the labor onions would result in an imbalance of
power between the unions and employers because employers could not be assured of the loyalty
of their own representatives. See id. Such an alliance could result in employers losing their work
forces to the unions, especially in strike situations, where often it is the supervisors who work to
ensure that the company does not shut down completely. See id. Congress further recognized that
allowing supervisors to join the same labor unions and enjoy the same protection of labor
activities as regular employees could create an additional conflict of interest for supervisors
between the interests of the unions and the interests of their employer. See id. For example,
supervisor union members could face conflicts in hiring anti tiring situations between the interest
of the employer in maintaining the highest quality work force and the interest of the union in
having its members employed. See id.
308	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 35:305
of the Act. 6 Both the courts and the National Labor Relations Board
(the "Board") have noted the difficulty in determining whether em-
ployees such as nurses and lawyers, who, in accordance with the norms
of their profession, perform activities that could be characterized as
both professional and supervisory, fit within the "professional" inclu-
sion of the Act, or the "supervisor" exclusion from the Act. 7
In 1980, in NLRB v. Yeshiva University, the United States Supreme
Court concluded that the professional interests of faculty members
could not be separated from the interests of the employer University,
and that faculty members were thus managerial employees excluded
from coverage under the Act.8 The University refused to bargain with
the Yeshiva University Faculty Association, which acted as a certified
bargaining agent for the faculty members of Yeshiva University. 9 The
University contended that the faculty members were supervisory or
managerial personnel, and thus not covered by the Act.w Among other
managerial powers, the faculty members at the University had the
authority to determine curriculum, grading, admission, matriculation
standards, academic calendars and course schedules, and to make
recommendations as to hiring, discharge and tenure of professors." In
unfair labor practice proceedings brought by the Yeshiva University
Faculty Association, the Board characterized the faculty members as
professional employees covered by the Act and ordered the University
to hargain.' 2 In analyzing the status of the faculty members, the Board
distinguished between the individual interests of the faculty members
as professional employees and the interests of the University in accom-
plishing educational goals." The Board sought enforcement in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which denied
6 29 U.S.C. § 152(12). In relevant part, section 2(12) of the Act defines 'professional" as:
(a) any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and varied in
character . . . (ii) involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in
its performance ... (iv) requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a field of
science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized
intellectual instruction and study in an institution of higher learning or a hospi-
tal....
Id.
7 See Children's Habilitation Center v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 130, 131, 132 L.R.R.M. 2780, 2781
(7th Cir. 1989).
A 444 U.S. 672, 688, 103 L.R.R.M. 2527, 2533 (1980). Managerial employees, like supervisors,
are excluded from protection of the Act. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275, 85
L.R.R.M. 2945, 2948 (1974). Unlike the statutory supervisor exclusion, the managerial exception
is judicially implied. See id.
9 Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 674-75, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2528.
I° Id. at 675, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2528.
II Id. at 676-77, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2528.
12 Id. at 678, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2529.
19 Id.
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the petition, stating that the extensive control possessed by the faculty
over academic and personnel decisions conferred managerial status
upon them."
The Supreme Court, in affirming the decision of the Second
Circuit, disagreed with the Board's interpretation of the statutory phrase
"in the interest of the employer" in determining the supervisory or
managerial status of faculty members. 15 The Supreme Court expressly
rejected the Board's distinction between the professional interests of
the faculty and the educational interests of the University, stating that
the two interests are inseparable because faculty members fulfill their
own interests in improving their academic standing by ensuring that
the academic goals of the University are met.L° Thus, the Court con-
cluded that the faculty members were managerial employees within the
meaning of the Act.' 7
In 1983, in NLRB a Beacon Light Christian Home, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that twenty licensed prac-
tical nurses ("LPNs") at a nursing home were supervisors within the
meaning of the Act's The United Furniture Workers of America (the
"Union") petitioned the Board in July, 1984, for certification of its
representation of workers at the nursing home, including the LPNs
and the nurse's aides.w The employer contested the Union's definition
of the bargaining unit in a hearing before an administrative law judge
("AI.J"), who determined that the unit properly included the LPNs. 2°
The Regional Director subsequently issued a complaint against the
employer for refusal to bargain, and the Board entered an order
against the employer. 2 '
The Sixth Circuit refused to enforce the Board's order, finding
that the LPNs were supervisors because they had the same authority
to supervise, instruct, evaluate and discipline aides as did the registered
nurses employed by the nursing home. 22 The court reasoned that even
though the LPNs did not have the absolute authority to discharge or
14 Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 679, 103 LARK at 2529.
15 Id, at 688, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2533.
Id,
17 Id. at 679, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2529.
18 825 F.2d 1076, 1077, 125 L.R.R.M. 3414, 3415 (6th Cir. 1987). The Sixth Circuit has
consistently ruled that nurses with some supervisory duties fall within the supervisor exclusion
of the Act. See, e.g., Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am. v. NLRB, 987 F.2d 1256, 1261, 142
L.R.R.M. 2728, 2731 (6th Cir. 1993), affil, 114 S. Ct. 1778 (1994); Beverly California Corp. v.
NLRB, 970 F.2d 1548, 1556, 140 L.R.R.M. 2961, 2967 (6th Cir, 1992).
1`J
	 Light, 825 F.2d at 1078, 125 L.R.R.M. at 3415.
20 ,rd.
21 Id.
22 See id. at 1077-78, 125 L.R.R.M. at 3415.
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promote nurse's aides, they possessed enough responsibility for evalu-
ation and discipline of the aides to require a finding of supervisory
status." The court additionally analyzed the ratio of supervisory per-
sonnel to nurse's aides on each shift, and determined that if the LPNs
were not characterized as supervisors, then the nursing home's sched-
ule would regularly permit nursing personnel to provide patient care
without supervision, an unreasonable conclusion for what the court
found to be a well-run nursing home. 24 Consequently, the court de-
clined to include the LPNs in the bargaining unit due to their status
as supervisors under the Act."
In contrast, in 1989, in Children's Habilitation Centel; Inc. v. NLRB,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that
charge nurses at a residential facility for ill and disabled youths were
not supervisors despite exercising some supervisory authority over
other employees. 28
 Following a Board election on September 29, 1987,
the Board certified the General Service Employees Union, Local 73,
AFL-CIO (the "Union") as the exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of the employees of Children's Habilitation Center (the "Cen-
ter"). 27
 Subsequently, the Center refused to bargain with the Union,
and the Union filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations
Board.28
 The Board found that the Center's refusal to bargain consti-
tuted unfair labor practices, and ordered the Center to bargain with
the Union. 29
In affirming the decision of the Board that the nurses were not
supervisors, the court similarly reasoned that the definition of "super-
visor" as contained in the Act allows an employee to do some supervi-
sion without becoming a supervisor, such as supervision exercised by
an employee as a professional acting in accordance with professional
norms.8° The court cited the purposes of the supervisor exclusion in
determining that the charge nurses' direction of aides did not consti-
tute supervision within the meaning of the Act. 81 The court concluded
23 See id, at 1079, 125 L.R.R.M. at 3416-17.
24 Beacon Light, 825 F.2d at 1078, 1080, 125 L.R.R.M. at 3415, 3417.
25 Id. at 1080, 125 L.R.R.M. at 3417.
21 887 F.2d 130, 134, 132 L.R.R.M. 2780, 2783 (7th Cir. 1989). Such nurses are designated
charge nurses because they are In charge" of their respective nursing station during their shift.
See Wright Memorial Hosp. v. NLRB, 771 F.2(1 400, 402 (8th Cir. 1985).
27
 Children's Habilitation Center, No. 13-CA-27423, 1988 NLRB LEXIS 311, at *1 (NLRB July
28, 1988).
28 Id.
29 Id. at *6.
.*) Children's Habilitation Center, 887 F.2d at 131, 132 L.R.R.M. at 2781.
51 Id. at 134, 132 L.R.R.M. at 2783.
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that because professional standards required such supervision, and not
the standards of the employer, the supervisory activities raised no issue
of conflicting loyalties. 32 The court further determined that if the
nurses were found to be employees, the ratio of supervisors to employ-
ees would be reasonable." Additionally, the court found that the charge
nurses had no effective authority to discipline personnel, because
although they had the ability to make recommendations, the conceded
supervisors had complete authority to make all disciplinary decisions. 34
The court thus concluded that the nurses were not supervisors within
the meaning of the Act."
In 1993, in Northcrest Nursing Home, the Board affirmed the deci-
sion of the Regional Director that licensed practical nurses at a nursing
home were not supervisors within the meaning of the Act." In August,
1992, the Health Care and Social Service Union, SEIUO, AFL-CIO,
filed a petition seeking representation of employees, including the
LPNs, at the Northcrest Nursing Home." The nursing home opposed
the petition, claiming that the LPNs' supervisor status rendered them
ineligible for representation: 38
The Board concluded that the statute requires the resolution of
three questions in considering whether an employee is a supervisor
under the Act: (1) whether the employee has the authority to engage
in any one of the twelve listed activities; (2) whether the exercise of
the authority requires the use of independent judgment on the part
of the employee; and (3) whether the employee holds the authority in
the interest of the employer. 39 In analyzing whether the nurses were
supervisors, the Board considered whether the nurses performed su-
pervisory duties in the interest of the employer, or in the interest of
the patients. 49 The Board reasoned that the LPNs were not supervisors
despite performing certain duties which involved the exercise of su-
pervisory authority, such as directing and evaluating aides, because the
supervisory authority was so closely related to the welfare of the pa-
tients that the nurses exercised such authority incidental to patient
care, and not "in the interest of the employer." 43 Thus, the Board
" See id.
33 See id. at 133, 132 L.R.R.M. at 2782,
34 See id.
Children's Habilitation Center, 887 F.2d at 134, 132 L.R.R.M, at 2783.
56 313 N.L.R.B. No. 54 at 19, 145 L.R.R.M. at 1233 (1993).
"Id. at 10, 145 L.R.R.M. at 1225.
18 Id. at 10-11, 145 L.R.R.M. at 1225-26.
" See id. at 3, 145 L.R.R.M. at 1218-19.
40 See id. at 2, 145 L.R.R.M. at 1217.
41 Northcrest Nursing Home, 313 N.L.R.B. No. 54 at 15, 145 L.R.R.M. at 1229.
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declined to characterize the nurses as supervisors within the meaning
of the Act, and affirmed the decision of the Regional Director. 42
During the Survey year, in NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp.
of America, the United States Supreme Court held that three LPNs who
exercised independent authority in supervising patient care were su-
pervisors under the Act. 45 The Court rejected the Board's distinction
between supervision exercised in the interest of the patient and super-
vision exercised in the interest of the employer." The Court concluded
that because the patients were customers of the employer, supervisory
authority exercised in connection with their care was in the interest of
the employer.45
A nursing home discharged the three LPNs, who then filed a
complaint with the Board alleging that their employer had committed
unfair labor practices.° The nurses claimed that their participation in
activities protected by the Act resulted in their discharge. 47 The Board
subsequently issued a complaint in May, 1989, accusing Health Care &
Retirement Corporation ("HCR") of disciplining the LPNs for engag-
ing in protected activities for the purposes of collective bargaining.°
At a hearing before an ALJ, HCR contended that the Act's pro-
tection did not extend to the nurses due to their status as supervisors 49
The ALJ found that the nurses were employees, and thus entitled to
the protection of the Act, but also found that HCR had not engaged
in any unfair labor practices. 5° Following the hearing before the ALJ,
the Board affirmed that the nurses were not supervisors within the
meaning of the Act because they did not exercise supervisory authority
in the interest of the employer, but rather engaged in supervisory
activities in the interests of the patients by ensuring that they received
quality care.'' The Board additionally found that HCR had committed
unfair labor practices. 52
HCR appealed the Board's decision to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which vacated the Board's order, finding
that the nurses' authority to assign and direct the duties of the nurses'
42 Id. at 19, 145 L.R.R.M. at 1233.
43 114 S. Ct. 1778, 1785 (1994).
44 Id. at 1782.
45 Id.
46
 Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am. a NLRB, 987 F.2d 1256, 1257-58, 142 L.R.R.M.
2728, 2728 (6th Cir. 1993), of 'd 114 S. Ct. 1778 (1994).




51 Health Care &' Retirement Corp., 987 F.2d at 1258, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2729.
52 id.
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aides granted them supervisory status under the Act." The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review Health Care & Re-
tirement Corp. to resolve the conflicts in the circuit courts over the
validity of the Board's test for determining whether nurses who per-
form some supervisory duties are supervisors within the meaning of
the Act."
In affirming the Sixth Circuit's reversal of the Board's decision,
the Court approved the Board's test for determining supervisor status,
but disagreed with the Board's interpretation of the statutory phrase
"in the interest of the employer." 55 The Court rejected the Board's
assertion that supervisory authority exercised in conjunction with pa-
tient care is not in the interest of the employer." In the present case,
the Court found that the Board had again created a false dichotomy
in attempting to distinguish between the interests of the patients and
the interests of the employer." The Court reasoned that because pa-
tient care is the business of a nursing home, the exercise of authority
in the interest of the welfare of the patient is in the interest of the
employer. 58
The Court further found that the test, as applied by the Board,
rendered portions of the definition of "supervisor" in section 2(11) of
the Act meaningless. 59 Section 2(11) of the Act states that an employee
who uses independent judgment to engage in any one of the twelve
listed activities is a supervisor." Under the Board's test, however, a
nurse who exercises independent judgment to engage in direction of
other employees might not be considered a supervisor.''' The Court
decided that the Board had limited the statutory definition in nurse
" Id. at 1261, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2731.
54 Health Care & Retirement cop., 114 S. Ct. at 1781. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has
rejected the Board's supervisory test as applied to nurses, See, e.g., Health Care & Retirement Cal.,
987 F.2d at 1261, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2751; Beverly California Corp. v. NLRB, 970 F.2d 1548, 1556,
140 L.R.R.M 2961, 2967 (6th Cir. 1992). The Second, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuit
Courts of Appeals have accepted the Board's test. See, e.g., Waverly-Cedar Falls Health Care Ctr.
v. NLRB, 933 I7.2d 626, 631, 137 L.R.R.M. 2393, 2397 (8th Cir. 1991); NLRB v. Walker County
Medical Ctr., Inc., 722 F.2d 1535, 1592, 115 L.R.R.M. 2553, 2559 (11th Cir. 1984); NLRB v.
Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461, 1472, 113 L.R.R.M. 2336, 2343 (7th Cir, 1983); Misericordia Hosp,
Medical Ctr. v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 808, 818, 104 L.R.R.M. 2666, 2674 (2d Cir. 1980); NLRB v. St.
Francis Hospital of Lynnwood, 601 F.2d 404, 422, 101 L.R.R.M. 2943, 2956 (9th Cir. 1979).
55 Health Care & Retirement Carp., 114 S. Ct. at 1780, 1782.
56 See id. at 1782. Previously, in NLRB v. Yeshiva University, the Court rejected the same
interpretation of the phrase as applied in a university setting. See 444 U.S, 672, 688, 103 L.R.R.M.
2527, 2533 (1980); see supra notes 8-17 and accompanying text,
57 Health Care & Retirement Col., 114 S. Ct. at 1782.
58 Id.
5•29 U.S.C. § 152(11); Health Care & Retirement Cusp., 114 S. Ct. at 1783.
10 29 U.S.C. § 152(11).
61 Health Care & Retirement Carp., 114 S. Ct. at 1783.
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cases to the extent that only nurses who exercised authority in relation
to another employee's job status or salary would be deemed supervi-
sors.° The Court found no justification for such limitation of the
statutory definition of "supervisor" in the health care field, and accord-
ingly found application of the test in this manner unacceptable. 63
The Court also rejected the Board's non-statutory arguments for
approval of its test." The Board first argued that the test should stand
because granting organizational rights to nurses who exercise supervi-
sory authority in relation to patient care would be consistent with the
purpose of the supervisor exception of avoiding conflicting loyalties.°
The Court reasoned that even in the absence of danger of divided
loyalty, the Board must enforce the Act according to its own terms, and
the Board cannot manipulate the language of the Act to serve its own
goals. 66
 The Court further rejected the assertion that granting organ-
izational rights to nurses would not result in undivided loyalty'' Be-
cause nursing homes may want to implement policies in the interest
of patient care that would be unfavorable to employees, the Court
deemed it important that the nursing home owners be assured of the
undivided loyalty of the nurse supervisors who direct the activities of
those employees.° Thus, the Court concluded that the LPNs were
supervisors within the meaning of the Act.°
Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices
Blackmun, Stevens and Souter joined." Justice Ginsburg accepted the
Board's test and concluded that the ALJ correctly characterized the
nurses as employees. 71
 She reasoned that the nurses did not attain
supervisory status because they spent an insignificant amount of time
exercising supervisory authority as part of their duties, and they did
not exercise supervisory authority with independent discretion, but in
a very routine manner. 72
 Justice Ginsburg approved of the Board's
case-by-case adjudication of nurse employees who, incidental to their
technical work, perform a limited supervisory role, and accepted the






 See Health Care & Retirement Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 1783
-84.
67 Id. at 1784.
as See id.
69 Id. at 1785.
7° Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
71
 Health Care & Retirement Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 1786 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
72 See id, at 1790 (Ginsburg, j., dissenting).
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the purposes of the Act." justice Ginsburg contended that the Board's
test correctly harmonizes the tension between the "supervisor" exclu-
sion and "professional" inclusion provisions by focusing on the policy
reasons behind the supervisor exclusion in determining whether a
nurse is a supervisor. 74 She stated that the application of this test will
result in a nurse being considered a supervisor only when his or her
supervisory duties reflect managerial authority exercised in the interest
of the employer, and not merely when a nurse exercises discretion
regarding the technical decisions required for patient care. 75
Justice Ginsburg further argued that construing the term "super-
visor" broadly, as the Court's holding requires, would result in most
professionals being deemed supervisors and denied protection under
the Act. 75 She reiterated that Congress specifically drafted the Act to
include professionals in its protections. 77 Thus, interpreting the term
supervisor to include all individuals who possess some supervisory
authority and exercise independent judgment would directly conflict
with congressional intent by eliminating most professional employees
from coverage under the Act.'s
Justice Ginsburg also stated that Congress intended the phrase "in
the interest of the employer" to narrow the category of employees who
are supervisors.7u She argued that the Court's interpretation of the
phrase will instead serve to expand that category so that virtually any
duty performed during working hours could be characterized as "in
the interest of the employer."80 Justice Ginsburg concluded by express-
ing her concern for the broad impact of the Court's decision, not only
on employees in the field of health care, but on individuals in all fields
of employment. 8 '
The Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Health Care & Retire-
ment COI. of America rejected the analysis of the "supervisor" provision
of the Act that has been accepted by a majority of the circuit courts,
and thus will greatly affect future cases involving nurses in those cir-
cuits.82 The Court rejected the Board's method of interpreting the
statutory provision by looking to the purpose of the provision, adopt-
"See id. at 1786 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
n See id. at 1788 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
75 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
76 See Health Care Co' Retirement Gotp., 114 S. Ct. at 1786 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
" See id. at 1786, 1788 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
78 See id. at 1786 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting),
79 See id. at 1791 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
S0 See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
81 Health Care & Retirement Corp.. 114 S. Ct. at 1792 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1785. The Court's decision rejects the interpretation of section 2(3) of the Act
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ing instead a rigid interpretation of the plain language of the statute. 85
This results in an interpretation of the statute that is clearly contrary
to congressional intent, in that the broad interpretation of the scope
of the "supervisor" exclusion provision will serve to greatly limit the
application of the "professional" inclusion provision.m Although the
two provisions are somewhat conflicting, by enacting the "professional"
provision, Congress unequivocally voiced its intent to grant profes-
sional employees protection under the Actg.' Since most professionals
exercise some supervisory authority incidental to performance of pro-
fessional duties, a broad interpretation of the "supervisor" provision,
as was adopted by the Court, will result in most professional employees
being denied coverage under the Act. 86
 That is clearly contrary to
Congress's intent in drafting the provision."
The majority opinion suggested that this decision will have no
effect outside of the health care field.88
 As Justice Ginsburg's dissenting
opinion indicated, however, this decision will likely affect professional
employees in all industries. 89
 The tension created by the "professional"
inclusion provision and the "supervisor" exclusion provision of the Act
is not limited to health care workers, but rather affects all fields that
employ professionals. 90
 Although the majority stated that interpreta-
tion of the phrase "in the interest of the employer" is limited to nurse
employee cases, it based much of its reasoning in Health Care &
Retirement Corp. on the Court's interpretation of that phrase in NLRB
v. Yeshiva University, a case involving professionals in the field of edu-
cation.91
 As such, it is unreasonable to suggest that an interpretation
of the phrase is necessary only in health care cases, and that the
holding of Health Care & Retirement Corp. extends only to cases involv-
ing the field of health care.
adopted by the Board, and by the Second, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuit Courts
of Appeals, and affirms the interpretation set forth by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. See
supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
83
 See Health Care & Retirement Corp., 114 S. CL at 1783-84.
84
 See id. at 1791 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
85
 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1988).
86 See NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461, 1465, 113 L.R.R.M. 2336, 2337 (7th Cir. 1983)
(most professional employees, i.e. lawyers, teachers, doctors, exercise some supervisory authority
incidental to performing professional duties).
87
 Health Care & Retirement Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 1786 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
88 1d. at 1785.
89 Id. at 1792-93 (Ginsburg,,]., dissenting).
9° Id. at 1781.
91 See id. at 1782; NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672, 688, 103 L.R.R.M. 2527, 2533
(1980).
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The Court restated the position taken by the Sixth Circuit that it
is up to Congress, and not the courts, to carve out an exception to the
supervisor provision for the health care field that would eliminate the
need for such an interpretation. 92 The Court itself recognized that its
interpretation may affect the professional provision of the Act, but
contends that the language of the Act cannot support the interpreta-
tion put forth by the Board." In 1974, the Senate Labor Committee
considered recommending enactment of such an exception, but failed
to carry out the recommendation." Thus, if the Court's interpretation
of the "supervisor" provision truly conflicts with congressional intent,
Congress may amend the Act to clarify the statutory language or
include an exception for the health care or other fields that would
eliminate the need for interpreting the phrase "in the interest of the
employer."
In sum, in NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America, the
United States Supreme Court rejected the Board's interpretation of
the phrase "in the interest of the employer" as set forth in section 2(3)
of the Act, concluding that supervisory authority exercised incidental
to patient care is "in the interest of the employer."" Relying on NLRB
v. Yeshiva University, the Court reasoned that supervisory authority that
is exercised within the range of authorized business of the employer is
exercised "in the interest of the employer."'" This decision serves to
broaden the scope of the provision for exclusion of supervisors from
the Act, and if followed rigidly, could effectively nullify the provision
for inclusion of professionals within the Act.
B. *Paid Union Organizers Are Not Protected as "Employees" Under the
National Labor Relations Act: Ultrasystems Western Constructors v.
NLRB' and Town & Country Electric v. NLRB 2
The National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") protects, among other
things, the rights of employees to bargain collectively and to join
unions for that purpose.' To that end, section 8(a) (3) of the NLRA
92 See Health Care &' Retirement Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 1781.
93 See id. at 1785.
94 See S. REP, No. 93-766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CA.N. 3946, 3951.
95 114 S. Ct. at 1785.
96 Id. at 1782; Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 688, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2533.
* By Douglas J. Nash, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 18 F.3d 251, 145 L.R.R.M. 2641 (4th Cir. 1994).
2 Nos. 92-3911, 93-1218, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 23696, 147 L.R.R.M. 2133 (8th Cir. Aug. 31,
1994).
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1991).
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prohibits employers from discriminating against employees who are
members of a union. 4 The protection of section 8(a) (3) extends only
to those employees who fall within the definition of "employee" as set
out in section 2(3) of the NLRA.5
Unions have often employed organizers to apply for positions
within non-union companies for the purposes of unionization.' Non-
union companies have historically opposed these efforts, and often fire
employees they discover to be paid union organizers.' Similarly, during
the application process, if a non-union employer discovered that an
applicant was a paid organizer, that employer often refused to hire that
applicant.' Consequently, the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"
or "Board") and the federal courts have had to decide whether paid
union organizers are "employees" as contemplated by section 2(3) of
the NLRA, and thus entitled to the protection contained in section
8(a) (3) of the NLRA.9
The NLRB and several circuits of the United States Courts of
Appeals have split over whether a paid union organizer is an "em-
ployee" as defined by section 2(3) of the NLRA. 1 ° In 1964, in NLRB v.
4 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1991). Section 8(a)(3) provides in relevant part: It shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer . . . by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership
in any labor organization." Id.
5 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1991). Section 2(3) defines employee, in relevant part: "The term
'employee' shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular
employer ... and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of .
or because of any unfair labor practice." Id. The United States Supreme Court in Phelps Dodge
v. NLRB held that job applicants were protected by the statute. See 313 U.S. 177, 186-89, 8
L.R.R.M. 439, 442 (1941). The Court reasoned, as judge Learned Hand had in the lower court
decision, that there is "no greater limitation in denying [the employer] the power to discriminate
in hiring, than in discharging." Id. at 187, 8 L.R.R.M. at 443.
6 See, e.g., Willmar Elec. Serv., lnc. v. NLRB, 968 F.2d 1327, 1328, 140 L.R.R.M. 2745, 2745-46
(D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1252, 142 L.R.R.M. 2584 (1993); H.B. Zachry Co. v. NLRB,
886 F.2d 70, 71, 132 L.R.R.M. 2377, '2377-78 (4th Cir. 1989); NLRB v. Henlopen Mfg. Co., Inc.,
599 F.2c1 26, 28, 101 L.R.R.M. 2247, '2248 (2d Cir. 1979); NLRB v, Elias Bros. Big Boy, 327 F.2d
421, 424, 55 L.R.R.M. 2403, 2404 (6th Cir. 1964).
7 See, e.g., Henlopen, 599 F.2d at 28-29, 101 L.R.R.M. at 2248-49; Big Boy, 327 F.2d at 424, 55
L.R.R.M. at 2404.
6 See, e.g., Willmar, 968 F.2d at 1328, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2746; Zachry, 886 F.2d at 71-72, 132
L.R.R.M. at 2378; Sunland Constr. Co„ Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 1224, 1224, 142 L.R.R.M. 1025, 1027
(1992).
See, e.g., Willmar, 968 F.2d at 1329, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2746; Zachry, 886 F.2d at 72, 132
L.R.R.M. at 2378; Big Boy, 327 F.2d at 423, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2403; Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. at 1225,
142 L.R.R.M. at 1028.
10 Compare Town & Country Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, Nos. 92-3911, 93-1218, 1994 U.S. App.
LEXIS 23696 at *11, 147 L.R.R.M. 2133, 2136 (8th Cir. Aug. 31, 1994) (holding that paid
organizers are not "employees" under NLRB) and Ultrasystems W. Constructors, Inc. v. NLRB,
18 F.3d 251, 255, 145 L.R.R.M. 2641, 2644 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that paid organizers are not
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Elias Bros. Big Boy, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit held that a paid union organizer was not a bona fide "em-
ployee" within the meaning of section 2(3) of the NLRA." Elias dis-
charged a waitress from her position at the Elias Brother's Big Boy
restaurant after the company discovered that a union was paying her
to organize.' 2 The waitress had met infrequently with the union's or-
ganization coordinator and earned fifteen dollars a week from the
union while working for Elias." The court considered the fact that the
waitress had worked for the union prior to, and during, her employ-
ment with Elias dispositive, and as a result concluded that she was not
a bona fide "employee" as defined by the NLRA,"
In the 1974 case of Dee Knitting Mills, the Board held that a union
organizer did not lose employee status by being paid to organize for
the union." Dee employed the organizer to clean and examine sweat-
ers made at the plant." During the period of her employment, the
International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union ("ILGWU") also paid
the organizer to organize her fellow employees: 7 Dee fired the organ-
izer three months after hiring her." The Board, finding no evidence
that the organizer took the job solely to organize, concluded that she
was a bona tide "employee" as defined by section 2(3). 19
One year later, in Oak Apparel, the Board again held that a paid
union organizer was an "employee" within the meaning of the NLRA. 21}
"employees" under NLRB) and Zachry, 886 F.2d at 71, 132 L.R.R.M. at 2377 (holding that paid
organizers are not "employees" under NLRB) and Big Boy, 327 F.2d at 427, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2407
(holding that paid organizers are not "employees" under NLRB) with Willmar, 968 F.2d at
1330-31, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2747 (holding that paid organizers are "employees" under NLRB) and
Ilenlopen, 599 F.2d at 30, 101 L.R.R.M. at 2250 (holding that paid organizers are "employees"
under NLRB) and Town & Country Elec., Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 1250, 1250, 142 L.R.R.M. 1036, 1040
(1992) (holding that paid organizers are "employees" tinder NLRB), enforcement denied sub. nom.
Town & Country Elec., Inc, v. NLRB, Nos. 92-3911, 93-1218, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 23696, 147
L.R.R.M. 2133 (8th Cir. Aug. 31, 1994) and Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. at 1224, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1026
(holding that paid organizers are "employees" under NLRB) and Oak Apparel, Inc., 218 N.L,R.B,
701, 701, 89 L.R.R.M. 1381, 1382 (1975) (holding that paid organizers are "employees" under
NLRB) and Dee Knitting Mills, Inc., 214 N.L.R.B. 1041, 1041, 88 L.R.R.M. 1273, 1274-75 (1974)
(holding that paid organizers are "employees" under NLRB), enforced, 538 F.2d 312, 93 L.R.R.M.
2336 (2d Cir. 1975).
ti Big Boy, 327 F.2d at 424-25, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2404-05.
12 Id. at 427, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2407.
13 Id. at 424, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2404.
14 Id. at 427, 55 L.R.R.M. at 240'3-07.
13 214 N.L.R.B. at 1041, 88 L.R.R.M. at 1274-75.
16 /d„ 88 L.R.R.M. at 1274.
17
is Id
12 Id., 88 L.R.R.M. at 1274-75.
20 218 N.L.R.B, at 701, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1382.
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In that case, the ILGWU sent two professional organizers to Oak
Apparel to assist the union in its efforts to organize the workers. 2 ' The
company fired the two women when, in the company's view, the organ-
izational efforts became disruptive to the other workers. 22 The Board
stated that the definition of "employee" in section 2(3) of the NLRA
should be interpreted broadly so as to include "the working class
generally."23 Because union organizers belong to the "working class,"
the Board concluded that the two organizers were "employees" and
thus entitled to protection under section 8(a) (3) of the NLRA.24
In 1979, in NLRB v. Henlopen Manufacturing Co., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit supported the Board's
interpretation of section 2(3) by holding that a paid union organizer
was an "employee" protected by the NLRA. 25 In Henlopen, the union
paid an assembly line worker fifty dollars a week to organize Hen-
lopen's employees. 26 Without explaining its reasoning, the court stated
that a "paid union infiltrator" was a bona fide "employee" under the
NLRA. 2'
In contrast, in the 1989 case H.B. Zachry Co. v. NLRB, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a paid union
organizer was not a bona fide "employee" under the terms of section
2(3) of the NLRA. 28 Barry Edwards worked for Zachry until 1980. 29 The
company fired Edwards, but the NLRB ordered the company to rein-
state him. 3° By the time the Board's ruling came down, however, the
work at the job site where Edwards was employed had been com-
pleted. 3 ' With no work at his previous job site, Edwards applied for
another job at a Zachry site, but the company refused to hire him. 32
The Zachry court reasoned that an "employee" is a person who,
while at work, is under the direction of a single employer." The court
concluded that Edwards was not a bona fide "employee" of Zachry
21 Id. at 702, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1382.
22 Id. at 708, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1385 (findings of administrative law judge adopted by NLRB).
23 Id. at 701, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1381.
24 See id., 89 L.R.R.M. at 1381-82.
25 599 F.2d 26, 30, 101 L.R.R.M. 2247, 2250 (2d Cir. 1979).
26 Id. at 28, 101 L.R.R.M. at 2248.
27 Id. at 30, 101 L.R.R.M. at 2250.
28 886 F.2d 70, 72, 132 L.R.R.M. 2377, 2378 (4th Cir. 1989).
29 See id. at 71, 132 L.R.R.M. at 2377.
3° Id.; see also H.B. Zachry Co., 261 N.L.R.B. 681, 686, 110 L.R.R.M. 1141, 1141 (1982) (NLRB
found that Zachry's dismissal of Edwards violated § 8(a) ( 1 ) of the NLRA).
31 Zachry, 886 F.2d at 71, 132 L.R.R.M. at 2377.
32 Id., 132 L.R.R.M. at 2377-78.
33 M. at 73, 132 L.R.R.M. at 2379.
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because he worked for the company only to fulfill his duties to the
union.34 For Edwards, the Zachry job was a means to the end of
performing his union job." Using the same line of reasoning, the court
concluded that Edwards was also not a bona fide applicant for employ-
ment, because Edwards was not in search of a job.36 The court reasoned
that he already had and would continue to have a job with the union. 37
In addition, the Zachry court concluded that granting paid union
organizers protection as "employees" under the NLRA would upset the
careful balance struck by Congress in the NLRA.38 The court cited to
NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., where the Supreme Court held that,
under the NLRA, employers do not have to provide their facilities for
unionization purposes." The Zachry court reasoned that requiring a
company to permit union organizers onto company property for or-
ganizational purposes because they are "applicants" or "employees"
would render ineffective the protection offered to employers in the
Babcock decision.40 Additionally, the court stated that employees have
a right to self-determination when deciding whether to unionize. 4 I The
court reasoned that forcing employers to hire union organizers, essen-
tially paid by the union to vote in favor of unionization, would interfere
with the employees' right to independently decide whether to unionize. 42
Finally, the Zachry court noted that section 8(a) (2) of the NLRA
makes it an unfair labor practice for a company to contribute finan-
cially to unions." Because the salaries paid by the companies to the
union organizers often relieve the union of some or all of its obligation
to pay the organizer, the court reasoned that salaries paid to the
organizers would subsidize the union in violation of section 8(a) (2) of
the NLRA. 44 The Zachry court concluded that paid union organizers
are not bona fide "employees" or "applicants" under the NLRA, 43
In the three years following the Zachry decision, the Board and
the United States Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia and
" Id.
" See id. at 74, 132 L.R.R.M. at 2379.
" Zachry, 886 F.2d at 73, 132 L.R.R.M. at 2379.
37 Id.
" Id. at 74, 132 L.R.R.M. at 2380.
39 Id. (citing NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 114, 38 L.R.R.M. 2001, 2004-05
(1956)).
40 Id.
41 Zachry, 886 F.2d at 74, 132 L.R.R.M. at 2380.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 75, 132 L.R.R.M. at 2380.
44 Id.
45 Id.
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Third Circuit held that paid union organizers were "employees" as
defined by section 2(3) of the NLRA." In 1992, in Willmar Electric
Service v. NLRB, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia upheld the NLRB's ruling that a paid union organizer was
an "employee" for the purposes of section 2(3). 47 The organizer, a
journeyman electrician, had just begun working as an organizer for
the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers when he applied
to Willmar in 1988, 48 Willmar refused to consider his application."
The court reasoned that under common law, a person may be the
servant of two masters." Additionally, the court dismissed Willmar's
argument that a union organizer would be disloyal to the company. 5 '
The court stated that a company may discharge an employee for
disloyalty under the NLRA, but only after that employee has actually
been disloyal." The court, therefore, concluded that a person simulta-
neously employed by a union and a company was an "employee" under
section 2(3) of the NLRA, "leaving to another day" the issue of when
employment by a union establishes such a risk of disloyalty that a
non-union company can refuse to hire, or can choose to fire the union
employee on that basis."
Similarly in 1992, in Sunland Construction Co., the NLRB held that
paid union organizers were "employees" within the meaning of section
2(3) of the NLRA. 54 In Sunland, two union organizers applied, along
46 See Escada (USA), Inc. v. NLRB, 970 F.2d 898, 140 L.R.R.M. 2872 (3d Cir. 1992), enforcing
304 N.L.R.B. 845, 846, 139 L.R.R.M. 1131, 1131 (1991); Willmar Elec. Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 968
F.2d 1327, 1328, 140 L.R.R.M. 2745, 2745 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1252, 142
L.R.R.M. 2584 (1993); Town & Country Elec., 309 N.L.R.B. 1250, 1250, 142 L.R.R.M. 1036, 1038
(1992), enforcement denied sub. nom. Town & Country Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, Nos. 92-3911, 93-1218,
1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 23696, 147 L.R.R.M. 2133 (8th Cir. Aug. 31, 1994); Sunland Constr. Co.,
309 N.L.R.B. 1224, 1225, 142 L.R.R.M, 1025, 1027-28 (1992).
47 968 F.2d at 1328, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2745.
48 Id.
49 Id., 140 L.R.R.M. at 2746.
56 Id. at 1329-30, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2747 (employee can be servant of two masters, but service
of one cannot involve abandonment of or conflict with service to other) (citing RESTATEMEIstT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 226 (1958)).
51 Id. at 1330, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2747.
52 Willmar, 968 F.2d at 1330, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2747.
5'1
	 at 1330-31, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2747. During the same year the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Escada (USA), Inc. v. NLRB, upheld, without written opinion,
an NLRB order that recognized paid union organizers as "employees" under § 2(3) of the NLRA.
970 F.2d 898, 140 L.R.R.M. 2872 (3d Cir. 1992), enforcing 304 N.L.R.B. 845, 846, 139 L.R.R.M.
1131, 1131 (1991).
54 309 N.L.R.B. 1224, 1226, 142 L.R.R.M. 1025, IO28 (1992). The Board heard Sunland
concurrently with Town & Country, and issued a similarly reasoned concurring decision. See id.
at 1224 n.1, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1026 n.1; Town & Country Elec., 309 N.L.R.B. 1250, 1250 142
L.R.R.M. 1036, 1038 (1992), enforcement denied sub. nom. Town & Country Elec., Inc. v. NLRB,
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with approximately ninety other union members, for pipefitter/welder
positions at Sunland." The company failed to hire any of the union
members, including the two organizers." Nevertheless, the company
did hire non-union welders and pipefitters. 57
The Board reasoned that the definition of "employee" in section
2(3) of the NLRA is "sufficiently expansive to encompass paid union
organizers."" The Board cited the United States Supreme Court decision
in Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, where the Court stated that the section 2(3)
definition should be interpreted broadly to include any employee.•
Because the Board had already decided that union organizers did not
fall within one of the statutory exceptions, it concluded that union
organizers were "employees" under section 2(3) of the NLRA." The
Board rejected the policy concerns raised in Zachry and accordingly
embraced the D.C. Circuit's view of employee loyalty in Willmar with
one exception."' Concerned with potential conflicts of interest and
issues of disloyalty, the Board in Sunland reasoned that during a strike
a paid union organizer is not an "employee" within the meaning of
section 2(3) of the NLRA, and thus stated that an employer may refuse
to hire a union organizer during a strike." 2 In all other situations, the
Board concluded, paid union organizers are "employees" within the
meaning of the NLRA."3
During the Survey year, in Ultrasystems Western Constructors, Inc. v.
NLRB and Town & Country Electric, Inc. v. NLRB, the United States
Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Eighth Circuits held that paid
union organizers are not "employees" as defined by section 2(3) of the
NLRA and therefore do not merit the protection of section 8(a) (3). 64
Nos. 92-3911, 93-1218, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 23696, 147 L.R.R.M. 2133 (8th Cir. Aug. 31, 1994).
Because the appeal of Town & Country was decided during the Survey year, it will be discussed
along with the other Survey year case. See infra notes 85-104 and accompanying text.
55 309 N.L.R.B. at 1224, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1027. Creeden's and Yakomowicz's qualifications
were not in dispute. Id. at n.5, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1027 n.5.
Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 1226, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1028.
"Id. at 1227, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1029 (citing Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 89!, 116
L.R.R.M. 2857, 2860 (1984)).
Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. at 1226, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1028.
51 See id. at 1228-30, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1030-32. In Willmar the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit acknowledged that under the common law an employee can
be the servant of two masters, and left questions of loyalty to be decided at a later date. 968 F.2d
at 1329-31, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2747.
6!309 N.L.R.B. at 1230-31, 142 L.R.R.M, at 1052-33.
" See id. at 1224, 142 L.R.R,M. at 1026.
54
 Town & Country Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, Nos. 92-3911, 93-1218, 1994 U.S, App. LEXIS 23696,
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In Ultrasystems, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit upheld its earlier ruling in Zachry by holding that Ultrasystems
did not violate the NLRA in refusing to hire a full-time paid union
organizer because, in the court's view, a union organizer is not a bona
fide applicant for employment." In Town & Country, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit adopted the reasoning in
Zachry by holding that Town & Country did not violate the NLRA by
refusing to hire two paid union organizers, and by later firing a union
member who announced his intentions to organize for the union."
In Ultrasystems, the Boilermakers Union along with the United
States Association of Journeymen targeted Ultrasystems Western Con-
structors, Inc. ("Ultrasystems") for unionization. 67 The Union assigned
William Creeden, a full time union employee, to organize the effort. 68
He sent sixty-six applications to Ultrasystems, including his own and
thirteen others for a job site in Rocklin, California, and fifty-two for a
job site in Bakersfield, California. 69
 Ultrasystems needed welders, yet
hired none of the sixty-six union applicants. 70
In Ultrasystems, the Fourth Circuit upheld its earlier ruling in
Zachry by holding that a union organizer cannot be considered a bona
fide applicant for employment." Specifically adopting its definitional
reasoning in Zachry, the court stated that an application from an
organizer is "qualitatively different" than that of a bona fide applicant
because the union organizer was not in search of a job with the usual
expectations of employment. 72 The court explained that because a
union organizer would work for and be paid by the union during the
same hours that he or she worked for the company, his or her expec-
tations of employment differed from that of a bona fide applicant."
According to the court, a bona fide applicant has the expectation of
financial compensation from his or her employment with the company,
while union organizers are not as dependant on those wages because
the union will compensate them whether or not they are hired. 74 The
at *11, 147 L.R.R.M. 2133, 2136 (8th Cir. Aug. 31, 1994); Ultrasystems W. Constructors, Inc. v.
NLRB, 18 F.3d 251, 255, 145 L.R.R.M. 2641, 2644 (4th Cir. 1994).
66 18 F.3d at 255, 145 L.R.R.M. at 2644.
66 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 23696, at *8-9, 11, 147 L.R.R.M. at 2135-36.
67 18 F.3d at 253, 145 L.R.R.M. at 2642.
" Id. William Creeden was also the paid union organizer who was at issue in the Board's
decision in Sunland. See Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B. at 1224, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1027.
Ultrasysterns, 18 F.3d at 253, 145 L.R.R.M. at 2642.
7° Id.
71 Id. at 254-55, 145 L.R.R.M. at 2643-44.
714 Id. at 254, 145 L.R.R.M. at 2643; see also H.B. Zachry Co. v. NLRB, 886 F.2d 70, 72-74, 132
L.R.R.M. 2377, 2378-79 (4th Cir. 1989).
Ultrasystems, 18 F.3d at 254, 145 L.R.R.M. at 2643.
74
 Id. at 254, 145 L.R.R.M. at 2642.
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court added that a bona fide applicant expects to have the terms of
his or her employment determined by the needs and wishes of the
employer." Conversely, the court explained that the organizational
effort and the union would determine the nature and duration of a
paid union organizer's employment."
The court in Ultrasystems also restated the policy concerns set out
in the Zachry decision." The court asserted once again that permitting
a paid union organizer to obtain the protection of the NLRA as an
"employee" would upset the balance struck by Congress in the rela-
tionships between employers and unions." Additionally, the court re-
stated its concern that granting paid union organizers "employee"
status would interfere with employees' rights to decide for themselves
whether to join the union."
The court went on to state that the "factual prerequisites" for the
holding in Zachry were present in Ultrasystems. 8° The court first noted
that Creeden was, at the time he applied, employed by the union and
intended to remain so employed if and when he got a job from Ultra-
systems, 81 Secondly, the court emphasized that the union intended to
continue Creeden's employment, notwithstanding his potential em-
ployment with Ultrasystems. 82 Based on these facts, and the court's
reasoning, the Fourth Circuit refused to revisit its holding in Zachry,
and held that a paid union organizer is not an "employee" as defined
by section 2(3) of the NLRA, and thus not entitled to the protection
of section 8(a) (3) of the NLRA. 85
In Town & Country, the Electricians' Union authorized its mem-
bers to work at non-union job sites for the purposes of organization. 84
At the same time, Town & Country Electric ("Town & Country"), a
Wisconsin company, won a contract in International Falls, Minnesota.85
Minnesota law required Town & Country to hire one electrician li-
censed in Minnesota for every two non-Minnesota licensed electricians
75 Id
76
77 Id. at 254, 145 L.R.R.M. at 2643; see also Zachry, 886 F.2d at 74-75, 132 L.R.R,M. at 2379-80
(under NLRA employers do not have to provide their facilities for unionization purposes).
Ultrasystems, 18 F.3d at 254, 145 L.R.R.M. at 2643.
78 Id.
H° Id. at 254-55, 115 1..R.R.M. at 2643; see also Zachry, 886 F.2d at 74-75, 132 L.R.R.M. at
2379-80.
81 Ultrasystems, 18 F.3d at 254-55, 145 L.R.R.M. at 2643.
82 Id. The court also noted that, because of Zachry, the Ag was not convinced that Creeden
was a bona fide applicant. Id.
85 Id. at 255, 195 L.R.R.M. at 2644.
" Town & Country Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, Nos. 92-3911, 93-1218, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 23696,
at *3, 147 L.R.R.M. 2133, 2135-36 (8th Cir. Aug. 31, 1994).
85 Id. at *1, 147 L.R.R.M. at 2134.
326	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 35:305
on the job site." Since it had no electricians licensed in Minnesota on
staff, Town & Country enlisted the services of Ameristaff, a temporary
employment agency. 87
 Several union members arrived at the interviews
arranged by Ameristaff, but Town & Country only interviewed two of
the union members. 88
 Town & Country hired one of the two members,
Malcolm Hansen, as a temporary employee, 89
 Once on the job site,
Hansen announced to his fellow employees that his purpose was to
organize for the union and actively began to recruit new members."
After hiring Hansen, Town & Country learned that temporary employ-
ees did not satisfy the Minnesota licensing requirement, and as a result,
they fired Hansen and also refused to hire him on a permanent basis.°'
The refusal to re-hire Hansen and the refusal to consider the nine
other union members that attended the Ameristaff interviews provided
the basis for the claim against Town & Country. 92
In Town & Country, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit adopted the Fourth Circuit's reasoning stated in Zachry."
The Eighth Circuit court reasoned that an organizer is not in search
of a job when he or she makes an application, because he or she
already has a job with the union." The court stated that the organizers
wanted to work for Town & Country not for financial gain, but to
organize its workers." This fundamental difference in expectations
between bona fide applicants and union organizers caused the court
to conclude that union organizers are not "employees" under the
NLRA. 96
 The court also stated that a union organizer will follow the
mandates of the union even in cases where following union mandates
puts the organizer in conflict with the company-employer. 97 The court
stated that although an employee can be the servant of two masters,
the service of one can not involve abandonment of or conflict with
service to the other." To grant paid union organizers protection under
the terms of the NLRA would, in the Eighth Circuit's view, violate this
widely held common law principle."
88 Id. at *1-2, 147 L.R.R.M. at 2134.
87 Id. at *2, 147 L.R.R.M. at 2134.
B8 Id. at *2-3, 147 L.R.R.M. at 2134.
89 Town & Country, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 23696, at *3, 147 L.R.R.M. at 2134.
" Id. at *4, 147 L.R.R.M. at 2134.
91 Id.
92 See id. at *4-5, 147 L.R.R.M. at 2134-35.
98 Id. at *8-9, 147 L.R.R.M. at 2135-36; see also Zachry, 886 F.2d at 72, 132 L.R.R.M. at '2378.
94 Town & Country, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 23696 at *10-11, 147 L.R.R.M. at 2136.
95 Id. at *11, 147 L.R.R.M. at 2136.
96 See id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at *10, 147 L.R.R.M. 2136 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or AGENCY § 226 (1958)).
99 See Town &' Country, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 23696, at *10-11, 147 L.R.R.M. at 2136.
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As an example, the court stated that a union organizer has re-
duced incentive to be a good employee, because if fired, he or she can
simply return to a full time position with the union.m The court noted
that the organizer may actually "relish being discharged," because then
the union can bring a suit against the employer alleging discrimination
based on the organizational efforts.'°' This caused the Town. & Country
court to conclude that paid union organizers were not "employees"
under the NLRA, and thus not protected against discrimination based
on union membership)°2 Based on the same reasoning, the court
further held that the unpaid and part-time union organizers that
attended the interviews, including Hansen, did not merit the NLRA's
protection because the union controlled them, and they only attempted
to work for Town & Country for organizational purposes. 103
The Survey cases represent what continues to be an unsettled and
divisive issue among the United States Courts of Appeals. Last year, the
Boston College Law Review Annual Survey of Labor and Employment Law
analyzed this issue by looking at both the Sunland and Town & Country
Board decisions.'" The 1993 Survey noted that, although the Board
reaffirmed its rulings that paid organizers are "employees" under the
NLRA, the split among the circuits made this a critical and uncertain
issue in labor law practice. 105 As indicated in last year's Survey, without
specific guidance from the Supreme Court to the contrary, the Board
and the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third and
District of Columbia Circuits will probably continue to hold that paid
union organizers are "employees" as defined by section 2(3) of the
NLRA)" Likewise, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth,
Sixth and Eighth Circuits will almost certainly continue to hold the
exact opposite.'°7
10° Id.
1 ° 1 Id.
102 Ard.
105 1d. at *11-12, 147 L.R.R.M. at 2136.
104 Malcolm A.14. Stewart, Case Note, Status of Paid Union-Organizers as "Employees" Under
the National Labor Relations Ad: Sunland Construction Co. and Town & Country Electric, 35 B.C.
L. Ray. 351, 363-65 (1994).
1 °5 Id.
mAiment direction from the Supreme Court to the contrary, it seems likely that the following
circuits and the Board will continue to hold that paid organizers are "employees" under the
NLRA. See generally Escada (USA), Inc. v. NLRB, 970 F.2d 898, 140 L.R.R.M. 2872 (3d Cir. 1992),
enforcing M4 N.L.R.B. 845, 139 L.R.R.M. 1131 (1991); Willmar Elec. Serv. v. NLRB, 968 F.2d 1327,
140 L.R.R.M. 2745 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1252, 142 L.R.R.M. 2584 (1993); NLRB
v. Henlopen Mfg. Co., 599 F.2d 26, 101 L.R.R.M. 2297 (2d Cir. 1979); Sunland Constr. Co., 309
N.L.R.B. 1224, 142 L.R.R.M. 1025, 1027 (1992).
I"Absent direction from the Supreme Court to the contrary, it seems likely that the following
circuits will continue to hold that paid organizers are not "employees" under the NLRA. See
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The two Survey cases have not added any new arguments to the
debate over this issue. Nevertheless they have clarified and reinforced
the reasoning used by the coalition of the circuits that have repeatedly
found that paid union organizers are not "employees" under the NLRA."
After the Board's decisions in Sunland and Town & Country, some
predicted that the circuits that traditionally opposed categorizing paid
organizers as "employees" would reverse their positions and align them-
selves with the Board and similarly reasoned circuits." This did not
occur."° As a result, a legitimate need for clarification of the issue by
the Supreme Court has now arisen.
Additionally, the Eighth Circuit's holding in Town & Country
increases the number of circuits opposed to considering paid organiz-
ers as "employees."'" Thus, there is no clear majority or minority view
on this issue.' 12
 Further, the Eighth Circuit went beyond any past
decision by holding that paid as well as unpaid and part-time organiz-
ers were not "employees" under the NLRA.'" This may represent a
generally Ultrasystems W, Constructors, Inc. v. NLRB, 18 F.3d 251, 145 L.R.R.M. 2641 (4th Cir.
1994); Town & Country Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, Nos. 92-3911, 93-1218, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 23696,
147 L.R.R.M. 2133 (8th Cir. Aug. 31, 1994); H.& Zachry Co. v. NLRB, 886 F.2d 70, 132 L.R.R.M.
2377 (4th Cir. 1989); NLRB v. Elias Bros. Big Boy, 327 F.2d 421, 55 L.R.R.M. 2403 (6th Cir. 1964).
1 °R See Town & Country, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 23696, at *11-12, 147 L.R.R.M. at 2136;
Ultrasystems, 18 F.3d at 255, 145 L.R.R.M. at 2644; Zachry, 886 F.2cl at 72, 132 L.R.R.M. at 2378;
Big Boy, 327 F.2d at 427, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2407.
ImStewart, supra note 104, at 364.
"See Town & Country, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 23696 at *11-12, 147 L.R.R.M. at 2136;
Ultrasystems, 18 F.3d at 255, 145 L.R.R.M. at 2644.
tilSee supra note 107 for the circuits that hold that a paid union organizer is not an
"employee" under the NLRA.
"2
 See Town & Country, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 23696, at *11-12, 147 L.R.R.M. at 2136
(Eighth Circuit held that a paid organizer is not protected by the NLRA); Ultrasystems, 18 F.3d
at 255, 145 L.R.R.M. at 2644 (Fourth Circuit held that a paid organizer is not protected by the
NLRA); Escada (USA), Inc. v. NLRB, 970 F.2d 898, 898, 140 L.R.R.M. 2872, 2872 (3d Cir. 1992),
enforcing304 N.L.R.B. 845, 846, 139 L.R.R.M. 1131, 1131 (1991) (Third Circuit, enforcing a Board
ruling without opinion, held that a paid organizer is protected by the NLRA); Willmar Elec. Serv.,
Inc. v. NLRB, 968 E2d 1327, 1328, 140 L.R.R.M. 2745, 2745 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 1252, 142 L.R.R.M. 2584 (1993) (D.C. Circuit held that a paid organizer is protected by the
NLRA); Zachry, 886 F.2d at 72, 132 L.R.R.M. at 2378 (Fourth Circuit held that a paid organizer
is not protected by the NLRA); NLRB v. Henlopen Mfg. Co., Inc., 599 F.2d 26, 30, 101 L.R.R.M.
2247, 2249 (2d Cir. 1979) (Second Circuit held that a paid organizer is protected by the NLRA);
Big Boy, 327 E2d at 427, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2407 (Sixth Circuit held that a paid organizer is not
protected by the NLRA). This breakdown amounts to three circuits that include paid organizers
in the protected class of "employees" as defined by section 2(3) of the NLRA, and three circuits
that do not. Only the Board's repeated findings that paid organizers are protected by the NLRA
breaks the stalemate to create some semblance of a majority view. See, e.g., Sunland, 309 N.L.R.B.
at 1224, 142 L.R.R.M. at 1026; Dee Knitting Mills, Inc., 214 N.L.R.B. 1041, 1041, 88 L.R.R.M.
1273, 1274 (1974), enforced, 538 E2d 312, 93 L.R.R.M. 2336 (2d Cir. 1975).
113 See Town &' Country, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 23696, at *11-12, 147 L.R.R.M. at 2136.
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swing in the conventional wisdom on this issue, and may also indicate
an increased willingness on the part of the circuits to exclude groups
of "employees" from the class protected by the NLRA." 4
 Such a swing
in the traditional approach to this issue may attract the attention of
the Supreme Court and provide it with added incentive to grant cer-
tiorari to an appeal involving this issue.
If the Supreme Court were to hear an appeal on this issue it is
difficult to predict how the Court would decide. Nevertheless, in Sure-
Tan and Phelps Dodge the Court showed its willingness to interpret the
definition of "employee" in section 2(3) of the NLRA very broadly.'"
If the Court continued that approach on this issue, it is quite conceiv-
able that it would support the inclusion of paid organizers into the
section 2(3) definition of "employee." Nevertheless, Ultrasystems and
Town & Country may represent a pro-employer shift in the federal
judiciary resulting from the Reagan/Bush appointments. 16
 This shift
may have reached the Supreme Court, and could result in Supreme
Court support for the view that paid organizers do not fall within the
protected class of "employees" as defined by the NLRA. 17
To conclude, in Ultrasystems and Town & Country, the United
States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Eighth Circuits held that
paid union organizers are not protected by the NLRA because they do
not fall within the protected class of "employees" as defined by section
114 See id.; Ultrasystems, 18 F.3d at 255, 145 L.R.R.M. at '2644.
115 See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891, 116 L.R.R.M. 2857, 2860 (1984); Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 186-87, 8 L.R.R.M. 439, 442-43 (1941).
"6
 See Thum & Country, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 23696, at *11-12, 147 L.R.R.M. at 2136;
Ultrasystems, 18 F.3d at 255, 145 L.R.R.M. at 2644. The Sure
-Tan and Phelps Dodge cases originated
from a Supreme Court that was decidedly more pro-labor than the current Court. The Rea-
gan/Bush Court, crafted in the 1980s and 1990s, is more conservative and pro-employer than
the Court in 1984 in Sure-Tan and 1941 in Phelps Dodge.
117 A recent Supreme Court decision in Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs,
Dept of Labor v. Greenwhich Collieries highlighted the Court's more pro-employer tendency when
it abandoned a long standing pro•labor approach to an entire class of employer/employee
disputes. See No. 93-744, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 4669, at *18-21 (U.S. June 20, 1994). In Greenwhich,
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Ginsburg, reex-
amined the burden of proof standard that should be applied to employee's claims under the
Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA). Id. The Court ruled that the claimant-employee bears the
burden of proof. Id. Although not unusual, this ruling did reject the Supreme Court's previous
holding that employers bore the burden of proof. Id.; see also NLRB v. Transportation Manage-
ment Corp., 462 U.S. 363, 363 (1983). The holding in Greenwhich makes claims brought by
employees under the BLBA much more difficult to win, and thus the case represents a pro-em-
ployer outlook. See 1994 U.S. LEXIS 4669, at *18-21. With the Supreme Court abandoning its
old pro-labor precedent, and with several lower federal courts (also dominated by Reagan/Bush
appointees) taking a pro-employer position by excluding paid organizers from the definition of
"employees" in the NLRA, it is possible that when the Supreme Court is confronted with the
organizer issue, it may hold that paid organizers are not "employees" as defined by the NLRA.
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2(3) of the NLRA. 118 Both courts reasoned that including paid organ-
izers within the definition would subvert congressional intent as well
as sound public policy expressed by the common law. 19 These holdings
continue a long-standing split within the circuits, and thus necessitate
clarification by the Supreme Court.
PREEMPTION
A. *Section 301 of the LMRA Does Not Require Preemption of a
Minimum State Labor Standard if the Legal Character of the Claim is
Independent of the Rights in a Collective Bargaining Agreement: Livadas
v. Bradshaw'
Federal labor law, under both the National Labor Relations Act of
1935 ("NLRA") and the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947
("LMRA"), protects the rights of employees to engage in collective
bargaining and encourages reliance on economic self-help in resolving
labor disputes by both employees and employers.' Federal labor law
also provides protection for employees and employers from state inter-
ference in labor relationships. 3 This protection arose through the ju-
dicial development of preemption principles in the interpretation and
application of congressional intent in drafting federal labor law. 4
118 See Town & Country, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 23696, at *11-12, 147 L.R.R.M. at 2136;
Ultrasysterns, 18 F.3d at 255, 145 L.R.R.M. at 2644.
119 See Thum & Country, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 23696, at *11-12, 147 L.R.R.M. at 2136;
Ultrasysterns, 18 F.Sd at 255, 145 LRAM. at 2644.
* By Kirsten M. Nelson, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
114 S. Ct. 2068, 146 L.R.R.M. 2513 (1994).
2 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1988) (in particular, § 157 pertains to rights of employees); see
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 24, 1 L.R.R.M. 703, 704 (1937).
3 See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 619, 121 L.R.R.M. 3233,
3238 (1985) (hereinafter Golden State I) (city conditioned franchise renewal on resolution of
settlement dispute, and Court found city's action preempted by NLRA because condition inter-
fered with bargaining positions); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 246,
43 L.R.R.M. 2838, 2842 (1956) (state was enjoined from blocking union picket).
4 See Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104, 49 L.R.R.M. 2717, 2721 (1962).
Federal labor preemption jurisprudence falls into two main categories: § 301 of the LMRA, and
preemption of state interference with the policies of the NLRA. See International Ass'n of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132,
148-49, 92 L.R.R.M. 2881, 2887 (1976); Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. at 104, 49 L.R.R.M. at 2721;
Garmon, 359 U.S. at 246-47, 43 L.R.R.M. at 2842. Section 301 preemption requires consistency
in the interpretation and application of collective bargaining agreements and therefore precludes
state interpretation of the agreements. See 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988); Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. at
104, 49 L.R.R.M. at 2721. The second category of preemption principles under federal labor law
seeks to limit state interference with the goals and objectives of the NLRA as laid out in § 7 and
§ 8 of the Act. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-58 (1988). Federal law preempts state action that interferes
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One preemption principle of federal labor law ensures the exist-
ence of state minimum labor standards.5 The United States Supreme
Court has held that Congress did not intend for federal labor law to
remove minimum state labor protections from employees who choose
to bargain collectively.° Rather, according to the Supreme Court, Con-
gress envisioned that federal labor law would coexist with minimum
state labor rights.' Therefore, federal labor law does not preempt
minimum state labor standards that do not interfere with collective
bargaining.8
 In addition, the Supreme Court has held that denying
employees covered by collective bargaining agreements rights that all
other citizens in the state enjoy obstructs the ability to bargain collec-
tively and rely on economic self-help.° For that reason, federal labor
law preempts this type of state action because it subverts Congress's
intent of protecting such employees.m
The enforcement of minimum state labor standards occasionally
conflicts with another federal labor law preemption principal, section
301 of the LMRA." Under section 301 preemption jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court has recognized the need for consistency and uniform-
ity in the interpretation and application of collective bargaining agree-
ments.' 2
 In order to ensure this consistency, the Supreme Court has
with the right to bargain collectively or the use of economic weapons of self-help under these
principles. See Machinists, 427 U.S. at 149, 92 L.R.R.M. at 2887; Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n,
389 U.S. 235, 239, 66 L.R.R.M. 2625, 2626 (1967); Gannon, 359 U.S. at 245, 43 L.R.R.M. at 2842.
5 See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 409, 128 L.R.R.M. 2521, 2525
(1988); Fort Halifax Packing Co. v Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 7, 125 L.R.R.M. 2455, 2457 (1987);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 754-55, 119 L.R.R.M. 2569, 2581 (1985);
Nash, 389 U.S. at 239, 66 L.R.R.M. at 2626.
6 Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 21, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2463; Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 754-55,
119 L.R.R.M. at '2581.
7 Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 756, 119 L.R.R.M. at 2582.
8 Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 7, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2457; Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 757, 119
L.R.R.M. at 2582.
' See Livadas v. Bradshaw, 114 S. Ct. 2068, 2074, 146 L.R.R.M. '2513, 2517 (1994); Nash, 389
U.S. at 239, 66 L.R.R.M. at 2626.
1 ° See Livadas, 114 S. Ct. at 2074, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2517; Nash, 389 U.S. at 239, 66 L.R.R.M.
at 2626.
" Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 408 n.7, 128 L.R.R.M. 2521, 2525
11.7 (1988); seeAllis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220, 118 L.R.R.M. 3345, 3352 (1985).
12 Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103, 49 L.R,R.M. 2717, 2721 (1962).
Section 301 of the LMRA provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chap-
ter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court
of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount
in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185.
332	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 35:305
interpreted section 301 to require the development of a federal corn-
mon law with respect to collective bargaining agreements.' 5 Therefore,
section 301 requires preemption of a state claim that requires state
court interpretation or application of a collective bargaining agree-
ment.' 4 Preemption of these state claims may run counter to the rights
and duties created by minimum state labor standards.'' Because of this
conflict, the Supreme Court has struggled with striking a balance
between these two important principles.' 6
In 1967, in Nash v. Florida Industrial Commission, the United States
Supreme Court unanimously held that federal labor law prevented a
state from discriminating against employees protected by collective
bargaining agreements with respect to a state substantive right. 17 The
Court determined that federal labor policy preempted a Florida un-
employment compensation law that disqualified an individual from
receiving benefits for unemployment resulting from a labor dispute.'s
The Florida law, the Court reasoned, left a party with a choice between
the ability to collect unemployment compensation or bargain collec-
tively.' 9
 The Court asserted that the result of this "choice" interfered
with the policies behind the NLRA because it deterred reliance on the
NLRA and impeded the use of economic self-help in labor disputes. 2°
For that reason, the Court held that federal policy preempted the
Florida unemployment compensation law.2 '
In 1985, in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, the
United States Supreme Court held that minimum state labor standards
exist independently of collective bargaining agreements and the NLRA
does not preempt these standards unless they are inconsistent with its
goals and hence frustrate its purpose. 22 In Metropolitan Life, a Massa-
13 See Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. at 104, 49 L.R.R.M. at 2721. In that case, a union called a
strike to force an employer to rehire an employee. Id. at 97, 49 L.R.R.M. at 2719. The Supreme
Court determined that incompatible doctrines of local law must yield to an emerging federal
common law with respect to collective bargaining agreements. M. at 104, 49 L.R.R.M. at 2721.
Therefore, the Court held that the strike violated federal labor law as contrary to the collective
bargaining agreement. Id. at 106, 49 L.R.R.M. at 2722.
14 See Lueck, 471 U.S. at 220, 118 L.R.R.M. at 3352-53; Lucas Flour Go., 369 U.S. at 104, 49
L.R.R.M. at 2721.
15 Lingle, 486 U.S. at 408 n.7, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2525 n.7; see Lueck, 471 U.S. at 220, 118
L.R.R.M. at 3352.
16 See Lingle, 486 U.S. at 408 n.7, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2525 n.7.
17 389 U.S. 235, 259, 66 L.R.R.M. 2625, 2626 (1967).
18 Id. at 236, 237, 239, 66 L.R.R.M. at 2625, 2626.
19 M at 239, 66 L.R.R.M. at 2626.
20 Id.
21 Id., 66 L.R.R.M. at 2626-27.
22 471 U.S. 724, 757, 758, 119 L.R.R.M. 2569, 2582, 2583 (1985).
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chusetts law required that employers provide minimum mental health
benefits to employees covered under a health insurance policy." The
Court determined that this law did not interfere with the parties' right
and ability to bargain collectively or the economic balance of power
between the parties. 24
 Rather, this law was a minimum term of employ-
ment that was independent of the collective bargaining process." The
Court asserted that Congress did not intend for the NLRA to replace
or disturb state laws that set minimum labor standards unless they were
inconsistent with its purposes." The Court held therefore, that the
NLRA did not preempt the Massachusetts law. 27
Also in 1985, in Allis- Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, the Supreme Court
held that section 301 of the LMRA required preemption of a state tort
claim." The plaintiff in Lueck filed a state tort claim alleging a bad-faith
handling of an insurance disability claim." The Court reasoned that
the state tort claim was "inextricably intertwined" with the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement.'" Resolving the tort claim would rely
in large measure on the interpretation of the duties owed under the
collective bargaining agreements' In addition, the Court reasoned that
the duties and rights alleged in the state tort claim arose through the
parties' obligations under the labor contract.s 2
 Therefore, the Court
held that section 301 of the LMRA required preemption of this tort
claim because it was "tightly bound" to the interpretation of the labor
contract."
The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed its position in 1987,
in Fart Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, holding that the NLRA does not
preempt a minimum state labor requirement that does not interfere
with equitable collective bargaining. 34 In Fort Halifax, a Maine statute
required employers to pay a severance benefit to their employees in
the event that the plant in which they worked closed." The Court
reasoned that the NLRA did not intend to abolish all the minimum
2"Id. at 730, 119 L.R.R.M. at 2571.
24 Id. at 758, 119	 at 2583.
25 Id. at 755, 119 L.R.R.M. at 2582.
211 Id. at 756, 119 I-.R.R.M. at 2582.
27 Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 758, 119 L.R.R.M. at 2583.
28
 471 U.S. 202, 220, 118 L.R.R.M. 3345, 3352-53 (1985).
29 Id. at 206, 118 L.R.R.M. at 3347.
30 Id. at 213, 218, 118 L.R.R.M. at 3350, 3352.
31 Id. at 218, 118 L.R.R.M. at 3351.
92 Id. at 217, 118 L.R.R.M. at 3351.
" Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 216, 220, 118 L.R.R.M. at 3351, 3352-53.
34
 482 U.S. 1, 7, 125 L.R.R.M. 2455, 2457 (1987).
95 Id. at 5, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2457.
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protections of state labor law." Rather, the Court stated, Congress
understood that employees would come to the bargaining table with
guaranteed minimum rights under state law. 37 Therefore, the Court
held that the NLRA does not preempt state labor standards unless the
state law obstructs the collective bargaining arrangement protected
under the Act."
Continuing with its reasoning that Congress intended to maintain
minimum state labor standards after the passage of federal labor law,
the Supreme Court in the 1988 case of Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic
Chef Inc., held that section 301 of the LMRA did not preempt a state
claim of retaliatory discharge." In Lingle, a collective bargaining agree-
ment allowed termination only for just cause.° The plaintiff, a termi-
nated employee, filed a suit for retaliatory discharge rather than pur-
sue the grievance and arbitration process provided for in the collective
bargaining agreement. 4' The Court reasoned that even though the
employee had access to arbitration through the collective bargaining
agreement, it did not preclude the employee from enforcing her
minimum state substantive rights. 42 Because the state law remedy re-
quired its own objective standards for resolution, the Court held that
federal law did not preempt the employee's "independent" state claim
because the state court would not have to interpret the collective
bargaining agreement.'"
These cases demonstrate two important and occasionally conflict-
ing principles of federal labor preemption." First, the Supreme Court
has consistently held that state minimum labor standards should exist
and apply equally to all employees in the state so long as they do not
interfere with the collective bargaining process. 45 Second, the Court
has recognized that situations may arise when section 301 of the LMRA
36 See id. at 21, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2463.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 23, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2464.
91 486 U.S. 399, 413, 128 L.R.R.M. 2521, 2526 (1988).
4° Id. at 401, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2522.
41 Id. at 404, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2522.
42 Id. at 411, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2526.
43 Id. at 413, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2526.
44 See Lingle, 486 U.S. at 413, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2526; Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 7, 125 L.R.R.M.
at 2457; Luerk, 471 U.S. at 220, 118 L.R.R.M. at 3352-53; Nash, 389 U.S. at 239, 66 L.R.R.M. at
2626; see also Stephanie R. Marcus, Note, The Need for a New Approach to Federal Preemption of
Union Members' State Law Claims, 99 YALE L.J. 209, 229 (1989).
4° Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 7, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2457; Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 754-55, 119
L.R.R.M. at 2581; Nash, 389 U.S. at 239, 66 L.R.R.M. at 2626.
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requires preemption of a state claim that derives from a state substan-
tive right.46
During the Survey year, in Livadas v. Bradshaw, the United States
Supreme Court reinforced and attempted to clarify its position on
these potentially conflicting areas of preemption jurisprudence, hold-
ing that federal labor law preempted the California Labor Commis-
sioner's ("the Commissioner") policy of denying enforcement of state
wage and penalty laws to individuals protected by a collective bargain-
ing agreement. 41
 This decision reinforced the Court's position of en-
suring minimum state labor standards as a foundation of the system
created by the federal labor statutes." In addition, the Court declared
that states cannot rely on section 301 of the LMRA to bypass the
application of minimum state labor standards to all employees in the
state when the legal character of the state right proves independent of
the rights under the collective bargaining agreement. 46
The plaintiff in Livadas worked for the Safeway supermarket chain."
A collective bargaining agreement between Safeway and plaintiff's
representative, United Food and Commercial Workers, AFL-CIO, gov-
erned plaintiff's employment relationship. 5 ' Safeway terminated the
plaintiff on January 2, 1990. 52
 Upon termination, plaintiff demanded
immediate payment of all compensation due her pursuant to Califor-
nia law." Safeway refused to compensate plaintiff immediately and
instead mailed a check which plaintiff received on January 5, 1990. 54
On January 9, 1990, the plaintiff in Livadas filed a claim with the
California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement ("the Division")
for wages and penalties resulting from the delay in payment. 55
 The
45
 Lingle, 486 U.S. at 408 n.7, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2525 n.7; see Lila11, 471 U.S. at 220, 118
L.R.R.M. at 3352-53.
47 114 S. Ct.. 2068, 2075, 146 L.R.R.M. 2513, 2517 (1994).
" See Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 23, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2464; Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 754-55,
119 L.R.R.M. at 2581; Nash, 389 U.S. at 239, 66 L.R.R.M. at 2626.
49 Livadas, 114 S. Ct. at 2078, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2520.
5" Id. at 2071, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2515.
"
52 Id.
55 Id. at 2071-72, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2515. CAL. LAB. CODE § 201 (West 1989) provides: "If an
employer discharges an employee, the wages earned and unpaid at the time of discharge are due
and payable immediately."
Livadas, 114 S. Ct. at 2072, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2515.
55 1d. CAL. LAB. CODE § 203 (West 1989) provides: "Mlle wages of such employee shall
continue as a penalty from the due date thereof at the same rate until paid or until an action
therefor is commenced; but such wages shall not continue for more than 30 days." Id. at 2072
n.4, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2515 n.4.
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Division notified plaintiff that it would not take action on her com-
plaint because the California Labor Code prohibited interpretation or
application of a collective bargaining agreement. 56 Based on the policy
of its Commissioner, the Division denied enforcement of these provi-
sions of the California Labor Code to individuals covered by collective
bargaining agreements that contained arbitration clauses. 57
The plaintiff in Livadas brought an action in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 arguing that federal labor law preempted the Commissioner's
policy because it violated her right to bargain collectively.58 The district
court granted summary judgment for plaintiff holding that federal law
preempted the Commissioner's policy.59 The court further reasoned
that the NLRA created a right to work under a collective bargaining
agreement. 6° The Commissioner's refusal to enforce California's Labor
Code on behalf of those employees covered by a collective bargaining
agreement infringed on that right. 61 The district court therefore held
that federal labor law preempted the policy because the right to im-
mediate payment was a state minimum labor standard and the Com-
missioner's policy of denying that minimum standard interfered with
the balance of economic power in collective bargaining. 62
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed
the district court's decision and held the Commissioner's policy con-
sistent with the dictates of federal preemption policy under section 301
of the LMRA. 68 The Ninth Circuit noted that the Commissioner's
policy was premised on the condition that California law could not
apply or interpret a collective bargaining agreement. 64 The court de-
56 Livadas, 114 S. Ct. at 2072, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2515. The letter stated:
The provisions of Labor Code Section 229 preclude this Division from adjudicating
any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of any collective bargain-
ing agreement containing an arbitration clause.
Labor Code Section 203 requires that the wages continue at the 'same rate" until
paid. In order to establish what the "same rate" was, it is necessary to look to the
collective bargaining agreement and 'apply' that agreement.
Id., 146 L.R.R.M. at 2515-16.
57 Id. at 2073, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2516.
ra Livadas v. Aubry, 749 F. Supp. 1526, 1528, 135 L.R.R.M. 2954, 2955 (N.D. Cal. 1990), rev'd,
987 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd sub nom. Livadas v. Bradshaw, 114 S. Ct. 2068, 146 L.R.R.M.
2513 (1994).
59 Id. at 1540, 135 L.R.R.M. at 2965.
6" Id. at 1533, 135 L.R.R.M. at 2960.
61 Id. at 1534, 135 L.R.R.M. at 2961.
62 Id. at 1540, 135 L.R.R.M. at 2965.
63 Livadas v. Aubry, 987 F.2d 552, 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd sub nom. Livadas v. Bradshaw,
114 S. Ct. 2069, 146 L.R.R.M. 2513 (1994).
" Id. at 558.
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termined that plaintiff's claim was actually a claim against the Division
for erroneously applying its policy to plaintiff because the Division did
not need to interpret the collective bargaining agreement to enforce
this provision of the California Labor Code. 6' The Ninth Circuit rea-
soned that plaintiff's claim was therefore a state action, and that plain-
tiff should have sought a writ compelling the Commissioner to change
the eligibility determination of her ability to enforce the Labor Cocle. 66
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court because it saw no depri-
vation of plaintiff's right to bargain collectively.°
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and
held that federal labor law preempted the California Labor Commis-
sioner's policy. 68 The Court reasoned that, under the Nash rationale,
federal law and policy preempt a state rule that interferes with a
protected right, here the right to bargain collectively. 69 The Court
further reasoned that the Commissioner's policy left the plaintiff with
an "unappetizing choice?" The plaintiff had to choose either to en-
force her minimum state labor rights under the California Labor Code
or enter a collective bargaining agreement. 71 This, the Court held, sub-
verted the congressional intent behind the enactment of the NLRA
and, therefore, the NLRA must preempt the Commissioner's policy
under the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution because the
policy created an obstacle to the purposes and objectives of federal law. 72
The Court rejected the Commissioner's argument that federal law
required the policy of denying enforcement to employees covered by
collective bargaining agreements." The Commissioner argued that
section 301 of the LMRA precludes states from interpreting collective
bargaining agreements and therefore the policy did not contravene
federal preemption jurisprudence. 74 The Court noted that section 301
preemption jurisprudence assures that a state's interpretation of col-
lective bargaining agreements will not frustrate the purposes of federal
labor law. 75 The Court continued, however, by stating that preemption
jurisprudence clearly establishes that states may not read section 301
65 a at 559.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 560.
68 Livadas v. Bradshaw, 114 S. Ct. 2068, 2074, 196 L.R.R.M. 2513, 2517 (1904).
69 Id.
70 Id. at 2075, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2517.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 2074, 2076, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2517, 2518.
73 Livadas, 114 S. Ct. at 2077, 2078, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2519, 2520.
74 Id. at 2077, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2519.
75 Id. at 2078, 196 L.R.R.M. at 2519.
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so broadly as to require preemption of "non-negotiable" rights that do
not require application or interpretation of a collective bargaining
agreement in their resolution. 76 In addition, the Court concluded that
in this dispute, the Commissioner did not need to interpret the collec-
tive bargaining agreement." As such, federal law did not compel the
Commissioner's action. 78
The Court also rejected the Commissioner's argument that the
policy reflected a "conscious decision" of encouraging parties to in-
clude their own terms in collective bargaining agreements." The Court
noted that requiring employees to bargain for what they are otherwise
entitled to does not further labor law policies." Indeed, the Court
stated, Congress intended to guarantee certain minimum protections
offered to workers by their state as a backdrop to federal labor law. 8'
For that reason, the Court rejected the notion that employees should
have to bargain for minimum state rights. 82
Upon concluding that federal labor law preempted the Commis-
sioner's policy and rejecting the Commissioner's arguments in support
of her policy, the Court concluded that the employee properly sought
relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." The Court determined that the right
to bargain collectively is fundamental to the NLRA. 84 Therefore, a
deprivation of that right gives rise to a cause of action under section
1983. 85 The Court concluded that plaintiff had a valid cause of action
for the deprivation of her federally protected right. 86
7" Id., 146 L.R.R.M. at 2520.
77 Id. at 2079, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2520. The Court stated that there was no dispute in this case
over the amount of the penalty and therefore, consistent with Lingle, the "mere need to 'look to'
the collective bargaining agreement for damage computation is no reason to hold the slate law
claim defeated by § 301." Id.
Livadas, 114 S. Ct. at 2078, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2520.
79 Id. at 2079, 2080, 2081, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2521, 2522.
'8) hi. at 2081, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2522.
81 Id.
82 Id,
ss Livadas, 114 S. Ct. at 2082-83, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2523. Section 1993 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory of the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
84 Livadas, 114 S. Ct. at 2083, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2524.
85 Id.
at Id. at 2084, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2524.
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The Livadas Court reaffirmed the importance of ensuring that
state minimum labor standards apply equally to all employees in the
state." The Court made clear that state rules that encourage refraining
from conduct protected by federal law directly interfere with congres-
sional objectives." In addition, the Livadas opinion makes it clear that
states may not arbitrarily rely on section 301 of the LMRA as a Means
of bypassing the requirement that state minimum labor standards
apply to all employees in the state."
The standard the Supreme Court used in determining that section
301 did not require preemption of the state right in Livadas moved
away from the Court's previous focus on strict contract interpretation."
The Court instead stated that the legal character of the state right or
claim must be "independent" of the rights under the collective bar-
gaining agreement if it is to survive section 301 preemption."' This
standard shifts the focus from the state's need to interpret a collective
bargaining agreement as the central issue of section 301, to the source
of the claimed rights and duties asserted in the state claim." Under
this standard, if the rights and duties asserted in the state claim arise
out of the contractual obligation of the collective bargaining agree-
ment, section 301 preempts the state claim."
The balance between minimum state rights and section 301 prin-
ciples remains unclear under this vague standard. State minimum
labor standards will presumably prevail unless their "legal character"
depends on a collective bargaining agreement." In Livadas, the collec-
tive bargaining agreement created the right to payment of salary, but
the state legislature established the "independent" rights to a penalty
and to payment immediately upon termination." This made it "clear
beyond preadventure" to the Court that section 301 did not require
preemption of this minimum state right." 6 The Court noted, however,
87 See id. at 2074-75, 146 L.R.R.M. at '2517.
88 id at 2074, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2517.
89 114 S. Ct. at 2078, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2520.
9(1 See id. Previously, in Lueck and Lingle, the Supreme Court centered its analysis around the
idea that states could not interpret collective bargaining agreements. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic
Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 413, 128 L.R.R.M. 2521, 2527 (1988); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471
U.S, '202, 220, 118 L.R.R.M. 3345, 3352-53 (1985).
' i Livadns, 119 S. CL at 2078, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2520.
'12 See id.; Lingle, 486 U.S. at 413, 128 L.R.R.M. at '1527; Lueck, 471 U.S. at 220, 118 L.R.R.M.
at 3352-53.
"See Livadds, 114 S. Ct. at 2078, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2520; Lueck, 471 U.S. at 217, 118 L.R.R.M.
at 3351.
94 See Livadas, 114 S. Ct. at '2078, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2520.
• 5 Id. at 2079, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2520.
96 Id. at 2078 n, l8, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2520 n.18. 'the Supreme Court stated that § 301 has not
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that section 301 may preempt application of this provision in other
factual circumstances.97 Rather than create a workable standard for
states and lower courts to use in determining whether section 301
preempts a minimum state right, however, the Court created the need
for ad hoc judicial determinations of the "independence" of the state
right."
Examination of Lingle and Lueck provides slight insight into the
direction of the Court's analysis with respect to determining whether
the legal character of a state claim or right is "independent" from a
collective bargaining agreement. 99 In Lueck, the Court focused on the
need to interpret the labor contract as the test of section 301 preemp-
tion.'" The Lingle Court focused on the independence of the claim
and defined "independence" by the need for the state to interpret the
labor contract.''' The Supreme Court in Livadas adopted the Lingle
focus on the "independence" of the claim, and the dicta in Lueck
regarding the sources of the duties and obligations of the state right
in the standard for determining section 301 preemption." In addition,
the Supreme Court clarified that the strict contract interpretation
model is not the appropriate test by recognizing that states may "look"
at collective bargaining agreements in resolving these disputes without
triggering section 301 preemption.'"
Even though Lingle and Lueck provide general guidance as to the
Court's principal concerns in this area, the potential still remains for
become a "sufficiently 'mighty oak'" to require preemption in this case. Id. at 2077, 146 L.R.R.M.
at 2519.
97 See id. at 2079 n.19, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2520 n.19.
9H See id. at 2078, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2520.
" See Lingle, 486 U.S. at 413, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2526; Lueck, 471 U.S. at 220, 118 L.R.R.M. at
3352-53. The Court in Livadas recognized that the application of the Lueck and Lingle decisions
has lacked uniformity in lower courts. Livadas, 114 S. Ct. at 2078 n.18, 121 L.R.R.M. at 252011.18.
The Court did not feel compelled however, to clarify the standard of those decisions in this case.
Id.
100 471 U.S. at 220, 118 L.R.R.M. at 3352-53. The Lueck Court also discussed the origins of
the duties and obligations under the state claim as a potential factor in § 301 preemption. Id. at
217, 118 L.R.R.M. at 3351.
i° 1 486 U.S. at 410, 413, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2525, 2526.
I92 See Livadas, 114 S. CL at 2078, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2520; Lingle, 486 U.S. at 410, 128 L.R.R.M.
at 2525; Lueck, 471 U.S. at 217, 118 L.R.R.M. at 3351.
IUS Livadas, 114 S. Ct. at 2079, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2520. These ideas were first expressed in
Lingle where the Court stated:
A collective-bargaining agreement may, of course, contain information such as rate
of pay and other economic benefits that might be helpful in determining the
damages to which a worker prevailing in a state-law suit is entitled . . . . Although
federal law would govern the interpretation of the agreement to determine the
proper damages, the underlying state-law claim, not otherwise pre-empted, would
stand.
486 U.S. at 413 n.12, 128 L.RR.M. at 2526 n.12.
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continued inconsistent interpretation.'" The Supreme Court has moved
away from a strict contract interpretation test in section 301 analysis to
the independent legal character test.'° 5 Lower courts need a clearer
standard for consistent results in the application of the independent
legal character test. As evidenced in Livadas, the Court is attempting
to shift the focus to the legal character test while continuing to recog-
nize the importance of avoiding contract interpretation by states. 1 °° A
clear, two step analysis would aid states and lower courts in balancing
section 301 against minimum state rights. The first step would require
a determination of whether the state right or a portion of that right
relies on an obligation or duty created by a collective bargaining agree-
ment.'°7 The second step would require an examination of whether the
portion of the collective bargaining agreement relied on in the state
right is central to the state right or merely collateral (i.e., used for the
calculation of damages).ms This two prong inquiry, consistent with the
Court's reasoning, would clarify section 301 preemption of state rights
for states and lower courts.
In summary, Livadas reinforced the Court's position that state
minimum labor standards need to coexist with federal labor law and
that states cannot discriminate in their application.m The Court also
declared that states cannot use section 301 preemption as a means of
circumventing this requirement."° The Court failed, however, to pro-
vide a workable standard on which states can rely in determining where
to draw the line between minimum state substantive rights and the
preclusion of state interpretation of collective bargaining agreements.
B. *The Railway Labor Act Does Not Preempt Aggrieved Workers from
Litigating a Claim Based on State Law: Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v.
Norrisl
Congress enacted the Railway Labor Act ("RLA") in 1926 to pre-
vent strikes in vital transportation industries by providing a compre-
1 °4 See Livadas, 114 S. Ct. at 2078 n.18, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2520 n.18.
1 °5 See id. at 2078, 2079, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2520; Lingle, 486 U.S. at 413, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2526;
Luerk, 471 U.S. at 220, 118 L.R.R.M. at 3352-53.
106 114 S. Ct. at 2078, 2079, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2520. Even though the Court focuses on the
independence of the legal character of the right, the opinion still discusses that the "mere" need
to look to the agreement is not, sufficient for preemption. Id. at 2079, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2520.
107 See breech, 471 U.S. at 217, 118 L.R.R.M. at 3351.
1 °8 See Livadas, 114 S. Ct. at 2079, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2520; Lingle, 486 U.S. at 413 n.12, 128
L.R.R.M. at 2526 n.12.
E09 See 114 S. Ct. at 2074-75, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2517.
n° See id. at 2077, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2519.
* By Lauder W. Beaupre, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAw
1 114 S. Ct, 2239, 146 L.R.R.M. 2577 (1994).
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hensive framework for resolving labor disputes. 2
 To achieve this goal,
the RLA mandates that parties resolve "minor disputes," worker griev-
ances that can be resolved conclusively by interpreting terms in an
existing Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA"), through an admin-
istrative rather than judicial process.' Specifically, the RLA requires
that aggrieved workers follow the dispute resolution system outlined
in their CBAs. 4
 Upon failure to reach a satisfactory settlement, either
party may appeal to an outside Adjustment Board as a forum of last
resort.' Not surprisingly, litigants who would prefer litigation to an
adjustment board have asked the courts to define exactly when the
RLA preempts court action.'
Initially, the United States Supreme Court did not interpret the
RLA as preempting aggrieved workers from turning to the courts.? In
a 1941 case, Moore v. Illinois Central KR., the Court held that an
employee could file a wrongful discharge claim in state court in place
of appealing his case to the Adjustment Board.' Moore claimed wrong-
ful discharge in violation of the CBA then in force with his employer.'
2
 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1988). Congress expanded the RLA to cover the airline industry in
1936. 45 U.S.C. § 184. The overarching purpose of the Railway Labor Act is "to avoid any
interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier engaged therein." 45 U.S.C.
§ 151(a) (I ); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 562, 124 L.R.R.M. 2953, 2955 (1987)
(RLA provides comprehensive framework for resolution of labor disputes in transportation
industry).
3
 45 U.S.C. § 153. The Court adopted the terms "major disputes" and "minor disputes" from
traditional railway labor nomenclature to describe the two types of work force actions covered by
the RLA. Elgin,,]. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723-24, 16 L.R.R.M. 749, 754-55 (1945). The
terms do not actually appear in the text of the statute. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188. Minor disputes
"grow() out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates
of pay, rules, or working conditions." 45 U.S.C. § 151(a)(5); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway
Labor Executives Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299, 305, 131 L.R.R.M. 2601, 2603 (1990) (distinguishing feature
of minor dispute is that grievance may be conclusively resolved by interpreting existing CBA).
4
 Minor dispute "shall be handled in the usual manner up to and including the chief
operating officer of the carrier designated to handle such disputes." 45 U.S.C. § 153(i).
5
 The RLA establishes a 34-member National Railway Adjustment Board to adjudicate minor
disputes, with 17 members selected by the carriers and 17 by the unions. 45 U.S.C. § 153(a).
Section 184 compels each airline and its employees to establish an adjustment board pursuant
to the guidelines set forth in § 153, 45 U.S.C. § 184. Parties who fail to reach agreement using
internal arbitration procedures may refer the unresolved grievance "by petition of the parties or
by either party to the appropriate division of the Adjustment Board." 45 U.S.C. § 153(i). Board
decisions are "final and binding." 45 U.S.C. § 153(m).
6 E.g., Hawaiian Airlines, inc., v. Norris, 114 S. Ct. 2239, 2241, 146 L.R.R.M. 2577, 2578 (1994)
(does RLA preempt suit filed pursuant to state whistle blowers protection statute); Buell, 480 U.S.
at 559, 124 L.R.R.M. at 2953 (does RLA preempt suit filed pursuant to Federal Employee Labor
Act); Andrews v. Louisville & N. R.R., 406 U.S. 320, 321, 80 L.R.R.M. 2240 (1972) (does RLA
preempt wrongful discharge suit brought in state court).
7
 Moore v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 312 U.S. 630, 634, 8 L.R.R.M. 455, 456 (1941).
8 Id.
9 Id. at 632, 8 L.R.R.M. at 455.
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The Court interpreted RLA § 153(i), which provides that disputes "may
be referred to the Adjustment Board," as reducing administrative re-
view to just one option Moore could pursue.'' If Congress had intended
the RLA to preclude judicial remedies, the Court reasoned, Congress
would have chosen obviously preclusive wording rather than the word
"may."" Accordingly, the Court held that Moore could pursue his
wrongful discharge claim in the courts. 12
The Court overruled Moore in 1972 with its decision in Andrews v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R. 19 The Court held holding that an aggrieved
worker could pursue a claim of wrongful discharge in violation of an
existing CBA only under RLA administrative procedures.' 4 As in Moore,
the plaintiff claimed wrongful discharge in violation of his rights under
the CBA and brought suit in state court.'"' Rather than simply relying
on a statutory construction analysis, however, the Andrews Court con-
sulted the Congressional Record to divine the lawmakers' intent.' 6 The
Court observed that during congressional debate both proponents and
opponents of the bill understood administrative review to be an ag-
grieved worker's only remedy.° Accordingly, the Court held that the
plaintiff had no recourse to state court.'s
In 1987, however, in Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Buell, the
Supreme Court carved out an exception to the potentially broad pre-
emption envisioned by Andrews.'9 The Buell Court held that an injured
worker could sue for damages under the Federal Employees Liability
Act ("FELA"), even though he could also have pursued the claim
under an existing CBA." Buell had filed a FELA claim in United States
District Court for the Eastern District of California, claiming that his
R) Id. at 635, 8 L.R.R.M. at 457 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 153(i)) (emphasis added).
11 Id. The Court also noted that Congress replaced the word "shall" with "may" when
amending § 153 in 1934. Id.
12 Moore, 312 U.S. at 654, 8 L.R.R.M. at 456.
13 406 U.S. 320, 324, 326, BO L.R.R.M. 2240, 2241, 2242 (1972).
11 Id.
15 Id. at 320-21, BO L.R.R.M. at 2240.
Ili Id. at 322, 80 L.R,R.M. at. 2240 (citing Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago, R. & I.
R.R., 353 U.S. 30, 39, 39 L.R.R.M. 2578, 2581 (1957)). The Court in Brotherhood (pa?. Trainmen
analyzed in detail the Congressional Record for 1932 amendments to the RLA. 353 U.S. at 39,
39 L.R.R.M. at 2581 (citing Hearings on J.R. 7650 Before House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 73d. Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1932)).
17 Andrews, 406 U.S. at 322, 80 L.R.R.M. at 2240 (citing Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 353
U.S. at 29, 39 L.R.R.M. at 2581).
18 1d. at 325, 80 L.R.R.M. 2242.
"48(1 U.S. 557, 564, 124 L.R.R.M. 2953, 2955-56 (1987).
29 Id, at 564, 124 L.R.R.M. at 2955-56; see 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988). FHA provides in
pertinent part that "[e]very common carrier by railroad ... shall be liable in damages to any
person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier." 45 U.S.C. § 51.
344	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 35:305
employer had condoned harassment by fellow employees that caused
him to suffer an emotional breakdown. 2 ' The Court found it inconceiv-
able that Congress had intended the RLA to prevent injured workers
from pursuing rights of redress it had expressly created under FELA. 22
Accordingly, the Court held that Buell could pursue his FELA claim in
federal court, even though he could also press his grievance following
RLA guidelines. 23
Moreover, in Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef Inc., decided
in 1988, the Supreme Court held that an aggrieved employee could
sue for damages under state law when the claim did not require
interpreting a CBA. 24
 In Lingle, the Court defined the preemptive
scope envisioned by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act ("LMRA"), which states that an aggrieved worker alleging breach
of a CBA must pursue her claim according to federal law. 25
 Lingle had
filed a state law retaliatory discharge action, claiming she had been
terminated for pursuing her rights under Illinois' workers compensa-
tion laws.26
 The Court concluded, however, that Lingle's wrongful dis-
charge claim was independent of her CRA, because it required factual
analysis of her employer's motives when firing her. 21
 Accordingly, the
Court held that Lingle could pursue a retaliatory discharge claim
based on state law.28
In 1989, in Consolidated Rail v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, the
Court articulated a test for identifying minor disputes. 29 In Consolidated
Rail, the Court defined a minor dispute as one conclusively resolvable
through interpreting an existing CBA. 3° Unions representing employ-
21 Buell, 480 U.S. at 559, 124 L.R.R.M. at 2953-54.
22 Id. at 565, 124 L.R.R.M. at 2956.
25 Id. at 564, 124 L.R.R.M. at 2955-56.
24 486 U.S. 399, 409-10, 128 L.R.R.M. 2521, 2525 (1988).
25 Id. at 404, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2532; see Labor Management Relations Act § 301, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 185-188 (1988). 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) provides in pertinent part "suits for violation of contracts
between an employer and a labor organization representing employees ... may be brought in
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties . . . ." The Court had
previously interpreted § 185(a) as compelling employees to pursue claims wider to federal rather
than state law to fulfill Congress's intent to achieve uniform interpretation of existing CBAs.
Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-04 (1962).
21i
 Lingle, 486 U.S. at 402, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2522.
27 Id. at 407, 128 L.R.R.M. 2524.
28 Id. at 409-10, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2525.
29 491 U.S. 299, 305, 131 L.R.R.M. 2601, 2603 (1990).
38 Id. In Consolidated Rail, the Court refined the definition of a minor grievance it had
previously promulgated in Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723, 16 L.R.R.M. 749, 754-55
(1945). In Burley, the Court characterized minor grievances as disputes "contemplat[ing) the
existence of a collective agreement already concluded or, at any rate, a situation in which no
eflOrt is made to bring about a formal change in terms or to create a new one.' Id.
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ees of Consolidated Rail Corporation ("Conrail") sought an injunction
to prevent Conrail from imposing mandatory drug testing without first
negotiating with the unions. 31 Conrail argued that the unions were
pressing a minor dispute and therefore could not ask the courts for
assistance." In examining the existing CBA, the Court found it con-
tained implied terms that arguably could permit the testing." Thus,
the Court held the union's grievance to be minor because it could be
resolved by interpreting an existing CBA."
Following Andrews and its progeny, aggrieved railroad and airline
workers wishing to bring suit over minor disputes stood precluded
from the courts, provided their CBAs contained express or implied
terms relating to their causes of action." Only one exception to broad
RLA preemption prevailed: when a federal law provided independent
grounds upon which the aggrieved worker could litigate his claim."
Although the Court in Lingle permitted aggrieved workers to escape
preemption when a state as well as federal law provided independent
grounds, this decision interpreted only the LMRA, not the RLA."
St Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 845 E2d 1187, 1189, 128
L.R.R.M. 2168, 2169 (3d Cir. 1988), rev'd, 491 U.S. '299 (1989).
32 Consolidated Rail, 491 U.S. at 301, 131 L.R.R.M. at 2602.
" Id. at 320, 131 L.R.R.M. at 2609. Implied terms are not actually written in the CBA, but
are practices and customs that exist in the employment relationship nonetheless. Id. at 311, 131
L.R.R.M. at 2606. Collective bargaining agreements may contain implied as well as express terms.
Id.
" Id.
" Id. at 305, 311, 131 L.R.R.M. at 2603, 2600; Andrews v. Louisville & N. R.R., 406 U.S. 557,
325, 80 L.R.R.M. 2240, 2242 (1972).
36- Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 564, 124 L.R.R.M. 2953, 2956 (1987). The
circuits split, however, over how broadly to interpret Buell. The Second Circuit held that an
employment discrimination claim brought under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was not subject
to RLA preemption. Bates v. Long Island R.R., 997 F.2d 1028, 1034, 143 L.R.R.M. 2767, 2771 (2d
Cir,), cert, denied, 114 S. Ct. 550 (1993). Echoing Buell's reasoning, the Second Circuit concluded
that an employee should not be constrained to arbitration in civil rights cases unless Congress
so specified. Id. The Fifth Circuit, however, expressly criticized the Second Circuit when holding
that the RLA preempted an aggrieved worker from filing a Title VII employment discrimination
claim. Hirras v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 10 F.3d 1142, 1148, 145 L.R.R.M. 2137, 2141 (5th
Cir. 1993), judgement vacated by 114 S. Ct. 2732, 146 L.R.R.M. 2704 (1994). The court noted that
Congress in Title VII, unlike in FELA, encouraged aggrieved parties to settle discrimination
disputes through arbitration. Id.
37 Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef; Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 401, 128 L.R.R,M. '2521, 2522 (1988).
In the six years after the Lingle decision, federal courts declined on several occasions to apply to
RLA cases the relaxed preemption standard applied to § 301 of the LMRA. E.g., /Bows, 10 F.3d
at 1149, 145 L.R.R.M. at 2142 (state law claim for emotional distress preempted by RLA); Grote
v. Trans World Airlines, 905 F.2d 1307, 1311, 139 L.R.R.M. 2583, 2586 (9th Cir. 1990) (state law
claims of breach of covenant of good faith, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
defatnation preempted by RLA); Espinoza v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 750 F. Supp. 819, 827, 57 Empl.
Prac. Dec. (CCH) P41,170, 69,262 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (state law claim of wrongful termination
based on handicap preempted by RLA).
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During the Survey year, however, the United States Supreme Court
in Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris held that an aggrieved railroad or
airline employee could turn to the courts as when the worker's griev-
ance rested on state law grounds independent of an existing CBA. 38 In
Hawaiian Airlines, an aircraft mechanic was terminated for insubordi-
nation for refusing to sign a maintenance log and subsequently alert-
ing the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") of alleged unsafe
repairs." The mechanic filed a retaliatory discharge claim in state
court, claiming he had been fired for "whistle blowing" in violation of
Hawaii's Whistlerblowers' Protection Act. 4° The Court adopted its rea-
soning in Buell and Lingle to conclude that Congress never intended
the RLA to deny a litigant the protections other labor laws provided
when the worker's cause of action existed independent of a CBA. 41
Therefore, the Court held that Norris could litigate a retaliatory dis-
charge claim based on state law. 42
Hawaiian Airlines hired Grant Norris as aircraft mechanic on
February 2, 1987.43 A CBA between the airline and the International
Association of Aerospace Workers included provisions prohibiting dis-
charge without just cause and discipline for refusal to perform work
in violation of health or safety laws. 44 The dispute in question arose six
months later, when Norris discovered a scarred and grooved axle sleeve
on one of the airline's DC-9 passenger aircraft. 45 Norris recommended
replacement of the sleeve, but his supervisor instead ordered it sanded
smooth and returned to the plane. 48 Norris subsequently refused to
sign a maintenance record certifying the plane was safe to fly, and his
supervisor immediately suspended him for insubordination, pending
a termination hearing. 47 Norris returned home and telephoned the
FAA to report the problem with the sleeve.48
38 Hawaiian Airlines, 114 S. Ct. at 2251, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2586.
39 Id. at 2242, 146 L.R.R.M. 2579.
4° Id. The Hawaii Whistleblowers' Protection Act, § 378-61 provides in pertinent part "an
employer shall not discharge ... an employee because [he] reports . . . to a public body ... a
violation or a suspected violation of a law or rule adopted pursuant to the law of this State ...
or the United States." Haw. REv. STAT. § 378-62 (1994).
41 Hawaiian Airlines, 114 S. Ct. at 2249, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2584.
42 Id. at 2251, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2586.
43 Hawaiian Airlines, 114 S. Ct. at 2242, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2579.
44 Id.
45 Id. A DC-9 axle sleeve in safe operating condition should have a mirror-smooth surface to
permit the aircraft wheels to rotate freely. Id.; telephone interview with Ronald Kuphal, Aircraft
Mechanic, Bradley Intl Airport (Oct. 1994).
41 ' Hawaiian Arilines, 114 S. Ct. at 2242, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2579.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 2242, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2579.
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Norris instituted grievance procedures pursuant to his CBA and
was terminated for insubordination following a hearing on July 31,
1987. 49 Rather than appealing the hearing result through the CBA's
grievance procedures, Norris filed a wrongful discharge suit in state
court alleging that (1) he had been discharged in violation of Hawaii's
Whistleblowers' Protection Act, (2) he had been discharged in viola-
tion of public policy expressed in the Federal Aviation Act, and (3)
Hawaiian Airlines breached the CBA provision prohibiting discharge
except for just cause. 5°
Hawaiian Airlines removed to the United States District Court for
the District of Hawaii, which dismissed Norris' breach of contract claim
as preempted by the RLA and remanded his other two claims back to
state trial court-5 ' The state court dismissed Norris' other two claims,
reasoning that the RLA preempted them as wel1. 52 Norris appealed the
adverse ruling to the Hawaii Supreme Court."
In Norris v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., the Hawaii Supreme Court
reversed, holding that Congress intended RLA preemption to apply
only to disputes that the parties could resolve conclusively by interpret-
ing a CBA." The court based its decision on the Consolidated Rail
definition restricting minor disputes subject to RLA preemption to
grievances that involved interpretation of an existing CBA." The Ha-
waii court then cited Lingle for the proposition that a retaliatory dis-
charge claim rests on the employer's motive, not on any terms in a
CBA. 56 Thus, the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that Norris could allege
retaliatory discharge in state court."
In affirming the Hawaii Supreme Court decision, the United States
Supreme Court probed congressional intent by examining the exact
statutory language used." Specifically, the Court considered the first
"or" in the phrase describing minor disputes as "growing out of griev-
ances or out of the interpretation or application of [CBAs]."" Hawaiian
49 Id.
5° Hawaiian Airlines, 114 S. Ct. at 2242-43, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2579; see Whistleblowers' Protec-
tion Act, HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 378-61 to 378-69.
51 Hawaiian Airlines, 114 S. Ct. at 2243, 146 1-R.R.M. at 2579.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 842 P.2d 634, 645, 142 L.R.R.M. 2201, 2207-08 (Flaw. 1992).
w Id. at 641-42, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2205; sec Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Libor Executives
Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299, 305, 131 L.R.R.M. 2601, 2603 (1990).
55 Nam's, 842 P.2d at 642-43, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2206; see Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef,
Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 407, 128 L.R.R.M. 2521, 2524 (1988).
57 Norris, 842 1' 2d at 645, 142 L.R.R.M. at 2207-08.
58 Hawaiian Airlines, 114 S. Gt. at 2244, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2580.
59 Id. (citing 45 U.S.C. § 151(a)).
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Airlines argued that the first "or" indicated Congress had two broad
categories of disputes it intended to preempt: "grievances," which
include all types of employment-related disputes, and disputes requir-
ing interpretation of CBA employment terms." Otherwise, they ar-
gued, use of the word "grievance" in the statute is merely superfluous."
The Court disagreed, noting that such a broad definition of griev-
ance would render the rest of the sentence superfluous; disputes
grounded in the interpretation of existing CBAs would already have
been addressed as grievances." The Court instead interpreted griev-
ances as synonymous for disputes grounded in the interpretation of an
existing CBA, pointing out that "or" can be used in statutory construc-
tion to indicate that two phrases serve merely as substitutes for one
another." The Court further bolstered its reasoning by citing National
Railroad Adjustment Board ("NRAB") opinions indicating that the
NRAB understood its jurisdiction as limited to cases involving the
interpretation of an existing CBA.64
The Court also examined prior decisions to confirm that the RLA
preempted only minor disputes that involved interpretation of an
existing CBA. 65 The Court began by distinguishing Andrews, reasoning
that Congress intended the strict preemption standard to apply only
when a litigant's case rested solely on interpreting an existing CBA. 66
The plaintiff in Andrews alleged only a breach of the wrongful dis-
charge clause contained in his CBA. 67
Subsequently, the Court pointed to Buell as precedent for an
aggrieved worker's right to file a lawsuit when grounded on a claim
independent of a CBA." In Buell, however, the Court established only
that federal law could provide such an independent cause of action."
As precedent that state law could provide independent grounds as well,
the Court turned to its holding in Lingle. 7° By analogy, the Court
applied the Lingle decision, originally applicable only to workers sub-




63 Hawaiian Airlines, 114 S. Ct. at 2245, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2581.
64 Id. at 2244, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2580 (citing cases).
65 Id. at 2245-49, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2581-84 (citing cases).
66 Id. at 2246, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2582,
67 1d.
68 Hawaiian Airlines, 114 S. Ct. at 2247, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2583.
°Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 564, 124 L.R.R.M. 2953, 2956 (1987).
7° Hawaiian Airlines, 114 S. Ct. at 2249, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2584.
71 See id.
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Finally, the Court rejected Hawaiian Airlines' argument that per-
mitting Norris' state law claim would run counter to Consolidated Rail,
in which the Court defined a minor dispute as one resolvable by
interpreting existing CBA terms. 72 Hawaiian Airlines pointed out that
Norris' CBA contained terms that permitted termination for just cause."
The Court discounted Consolidated Rail, however, as merely defining
what constitutes a minor dispute, not when the RLA would preempt
it." The Court further noted that if an aggrieved worker had a state
law claim existing independent of the CBA, it by definition could not
be resolved merely by interpreting CBA terms." Accordingly, the Court
held that an aggrieved employee could file a claim when the worker's
grievance rested on state law grounds independent of an existing
CBA. 76
The Court in Hawaiian Airlines made it clear that airline and
railroad workers can turn to the courts when they have a cause of
action based on a state or federal law enacted to preserve workers'
rights. Because such a claim cannot be resolved conclusively by inter-
preting an existing CBA, the RLA will not preempt it based on the
Consolidated Rail definition of a minor dispute. In contrast, synthesiz-
ing Hawaiian Airlines and Consolidated Rail yields a working definition
of when the RLA will preempt a minor dispute: railroad and airline
workers may not litigate a dispute with their employer when interpret-
ing express or implied terms in an existing CBA conclusively resolves
the grievance and no independent cause of action exists under federal
or state law. Previous lower court decisions adopting a broader defini-
tion of RLA preemption no longer can be considered good law."
In Hawaiian Airlines, Buell and Lingle, the Court has established
a clear pecking order between conflicting policy goals. congressional
and state goals of protecting workers' rights trump Congress's goal of
ensuring expediently decided labor disputes. Because the Court was
fully aware of Congress's intent in passing the RLA, one can conclude
that the Justices reached a conscious decision."
72 Id. at 2249-50, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2584-85.
"Id. at 2250, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2585.
74 Id.
75 Hawaiian Airlines, 114 S. Ct. at 2250, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2585.
76 Id. at 2249, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2584.
" See Hirras v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 114 S. Ct. 2732, 146 L.R.R.M. 2704 (1994). In
light of the Hawaiian Airlines decision, the Court vacated a Fifth Circuit decision that a railroad
worker's federal and state law claims were preempted by the RLA. Id.
78 In the Hawaiian Airlines opinion, the Court specifically noted that Congress's objective in
passing the RLA was "to promote stability in labor-management relations by providing a compre-
hensive framework for resolving labor disputes. To realize this goal, the [RLA] establishes a
mandatory arbitral mechanism for 'the prompt and orderly settlement' of . . . disputes." 114 S.
Ct. at 2243, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2580 (citations omitted) (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 151(a)).
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Moreover, this ranking of competing objectives is not likely to
change in the foreseeable future. Hawaiian Airlines, Buell and Lingle all
were decided unanimously. Traditionally conservative justices, includ-
ing Chief Justice Rehnquist, who wrote the broadly preemptive An-
drews opinion, joined with their more centrist and liberal colleagues.
The question remains, however, of how far the Court might fur-
ther restrain the RLA's preemptive effect. No authority exists, for
example, as to whether an affront to public policy would serve as
sufficient grounds to avoid RLA preemption. The Hawaiian Airlines
Court focused on Norris' retaliatory discharge claim and did not rule
on his second claim of termination in disregard of FAA policy." Yet,
public policy concerns clearly can exist independent of any terms in
an existing CBA. Moreover, ensuring safe air travel presents a policy
goal perhaps every bit as compelling as protecting workers' rights.
However, the Court probably has gone as far as it is willing to go.
Liberating claims based on public policy from RLA preemption could
open up a pandora's box of opportunity for creative would-be litigants.
Such a result would not just subordinate Congress's goal of ensuring
quick settlement of labor disputes. Such a result could gut it entirely.
The Court's refusal to even discuss whether a claim based on public
policy liberates an aggrieved worker from RLA preemption probably
heralds judicial reluctance to take such a step. For this reason, the
Court will probably decline to endorse RLA preemption for minor
disputes not grounded firmly in a federal or state statute.
In sum, in Hawaiian Airlines, a unanimous United States Supreme
Court affirmed the right of aggrieved railroad and airline employees
to file suit when their claims rest on a federal or state statute enacted
to protect workers' rights. Because such statutes provide a cause of
action independent of an existing CBA, the RLA will not preempt the
litigation. In doing so, the Court implicitly overturned prior lower
court decisions that declined to exempt state law causes of action from
RLA preemption. In addition, the Court forestalled any attempt to
narrowly construe the Buell holding as applicable only to causes of
action based on FELA. The Court left unanswered the question of
whether a cause of action based on violation of public policy would
escape RLA preemption. Due to the flood of litigation possibilities an
affirmative holding could spawn, the Court would probably decline to
take such as step in the foreseeable future.
79 The Court granted certiorari only to determine if Norris' state law wrongful discharge
claims were preempted by the RLA. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v, Norris, 114 S. Ct. 908 (1994).
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III. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT
A. *Punitive and Compensatory Damages in Occupational Safety and
Health Act Retaliatory Discharge Suits: Reich v. Cambridgeport Air
Systems, Inc.'
Section 11(c) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSHA")
grants federal courts jurisdiction to order "all appropriate relief' in
suits brought by the Secretary of Labor against employers who dis-
charge employees in retaliation for exercising rights protected by OSHA. 2
OSHA does not state exactly what forms of remedies the phrase "all
appropriate relief" incorporates. 3 The United States Supreme Court
has consistently ruled in similar situations, where Congress expressly
created a statutory right without delineating available remedies, that
federal courts may use all normally available remedies to grant neces-
sary relief.' Recently, the Supreme Court stated the general rule that,
* By R. Daniel O'Connor, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 26 F.3d 1187 (1st Cir. 1994).
2 Occupational Safety and Health Act § 11(c), 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1988), Section 11(c)
provides in relevant part:
(1) No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee
because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be
instituted any proceeding under or related to this Act ... or because of the exercise
by such employee on behalf of himself or others of any right afforded by this Act.
(2) Any employee who believes that he has been discharged or otherwise discrimi-
nated against by any person in violation of this subsection may 	 file a complaint
with the Secretary alleging such discrimination .... ... 0pon such investigation, the
Secretary determines that the provisions of this subsection have been violated, he
shall bring an action in any appropriate United States district court against such
person. In my such action the United States district courts shall have jurisdiction,
for cause shown to restrain violations ... and order all appropriate relief including
rehearing or reinstatement of the employee to his former position with back pay.
Id.
3 Id. Section 11(c) (2) of 051.1A provides a partial list of possible remedies (rehiring or
reinstatement with back pay). Id. § 660(c)(2). This listing, however, does not limit the availability
of other forms of remedies for claims arising under this subsection. See id. § 660(c), and discus-
sion infra note 49.
4 See,	 Case Co. v. Barak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) (II] t is the duty of the courts to
be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose.");
Texas & N.O. R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. and S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 569-70 (1930) ("The
creation of a legal right by [statutory] language suitable to that end does not require ... the
imposition of statutory penalties . . . . The right is created and the remedy exists."); Dooley v.
United States, 182 U.S. 222, 229 (1901) ("[A] liability created by statute without a remedy may
be enforced by a common-law action."). This longstanding tenet of American jurisprudence was
first stated in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). In Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall
stated that our government made of laws, and not of men, would cease to exist if the courts could
not grant a remedy for a violation of a vested right. Id.; see also Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S.
524, 624 (1838) ("Mt will present . . . a monstrous absurdity in a well organized government,
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absent clear congressional intent to the contrary, federal courts may
grant all appropriate remedies even in cases brought pursuant to a
right only implicitly granted by congressional statute. 5
In 1964, iny Case Co. v. Borak, the United States Supreme Court
held that where a federal statute creates a cause of action without
addressing available remedies, federal courts must provide any neces-
sary remedy to protect the federally created right. 6 In J.1. Case, ag-
grieved stockholders sued their board members for money damages
arising out of the board members' issuance of fraudulent proxy solici-
tation material.? The stockholders brought their claim pursuant to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Act"), which prohibited issuance
of fraudulent proxies.5 The Court reasoned that Congress intended to
protect investors by prohibiting issuance of fraudulent proxy materials,
but did not delineate what remedies courts could employ to effectuate
their protection.' The Court stated that the possibility of civil damages
or injunctive relief accomplished the most effective prohibition of
fraudulent proxies.m The J.I. Case Court concluded, therefore, that
where a statute provided for a federally protected right, such as the
right to receive non-fraudulent proxies, but did not address the issue
of remedies, a federal court may provide whatever remedies, including
monetary damages, necessary to achieve the congressional purpose."
In 1992, in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, the United
States Supreme Court held that, absent clear direction to the contrary
from Congress, federal courts may grant all appropriate remedies in a
cause of action brought pursuant to a right, explicitly or implicitly
granted by a federal statute.' 2 In Franklin, a high school student sued
her school district for its failure to take action to halt a teacher's known
sexual harassment of the student.'s The student sought money darn-
that there should be no remedy, although a clear and undeniable right should be shown to exist.
And if the remedy cannot be applied by the circuit court of this district, it exists nowhere.").
5 Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1035, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
213, 217 (1992).
VI Case, 377 U.S. at 433.
7 Id. at 427. The stockholders alleged that a merger with another company would not have
happened but for the fraudulent proxy statements, and that the stockholders were injured by the
merger. Id. at 429-30.
g Id. at 427, 429-30. Section 14(a) of the Act prohibited the issuance of fraudulent proxy
statements. See id. at 428 n.1. Section 27 of the Act granted federal district courts exclusive
jurisdiction to hear any suits at law or equity brought to enforce any liability or duty created by
the Act. Id. at 428 n.2.
9 Id. at 432.
1 ° Id.
11 .J.I. Case, 377 U.S. at 433.
12 1 12 S. Ct. 1028, 1035, 1036, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 213, 217, 218 (1992).
13 1d. at 1031, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 214.
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ages for infringement of an implied right arising under Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972 ("Title IX")." In reaching its holding,
the Court looked at the state of the law on the availability of remedies
prior to Congress's enactment of Title IX in 1972.' 5 Additionally, the
Court evaluated congressional intent as connoted by the 1986 and
1988 amendments to Title IX, enacted by a Congress aware of the
Court's 1979 Cannon v. University of Chicago" decision, which created
an implied right of action under Title 1X.' 7 The Court reasoned that
Congress was cognizant of the traditional presumption of a federal
court's ability to use all available remedies, both when Congress first
enacted and later amended Title IX. 18 The Court concluded, therefore,
that Congress's silence regarding remedies in these legislative actions
indicated no desire to remove the traditional presumption, even where
the cause of action arose from an implied statutory right.' 9
During the Survey year, in Reich v. Cambridgeport Air Systems, Inc.,
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the
authority of a district court under section 11(c) of OSHA to order "all
appropriate relief" in a retaliatory discharge action embraced both
compensatory and punitive damages. 2° The court applied this holding
to affirm the district court's double back pay award to employees fired
in retaliation for conduct protected by OSHA. 21 The court noted that
the United States Supreme Court, in Franklin, presumed that federal
courts had authority to grant "all appropriate remedies" where Con-
gress had not spoken to the contrary, and defined the phrase to
141 Id. Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972 provides in pertinent part: "No person
in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of; or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance...." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (Supp. 1993),
15 Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1035-36, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 217.
1 °441 U.S. 667, 669 (1979).
17 Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1036, 59 Fair Env!. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 217-18. In the ten years
immediately prior to the passage of Title IX in 1972, the Court found an implied right of action
in six different cases, and awarded money damages in three of those cases. Id. at 1036, 59 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 217. In the time period after the Court's 1979 creation of the implied
right of action in Cannon, Congress twice amended Title IX, in 1986 and 1988. Id. at 1036, 59
Fair Ernpl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 217-18.
ig Id. at 1036, 59 Fair Env]. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 217-18. The Supreme Court stated that the
weight of previous authority created a presumption that federal courts could use any available
remedy to enforce a federally protected right. Id. at 1032-33, 1034, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 215, 216.
19 Id. at 1036-37, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 218.
20 26 F.3d 1187, 1194 (1st Cir. 1994); see also supra note 2 for text of § 11(c)(2) of OSHA.
Additionally, the First Circuit held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the
discharge of an employee because of his close connection to another employee previously fired
in retaliation for activities protected by OSHA was in and of itself a retaliatory discharge.
Cambridgeport, 26 F.3d at 1189.
21 Cambridgeport, 26 F.3d at 1194-95.
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include monetary and other damages normally available according to
the particular case. 22 The First Circuit reasoned, therefore, that be-
cause the Supreme Court used the phrase "all appropriate remedies"
to describe a wide scope of available damages, the Court would not
likely construe Congress's explicit use of the phrase "all appropriate
relief' within OSHA any less generously." Additionally, the court con-
ducted a detailed analysis of the legislative history of section 11(c) of
OSHA to identify an absence of "clear direction" that Congress in-
tended to deny the courts remedial powers to award compensatory and
punitive damages.24 The First Circuit concluded, therefore, that the
statutory authority to grant "all appropriate relief' gave the district
court the power, in necessary circumstances, to award compensatory
damages and other traditional forms of relief, such as punitive dam-
ages.29
The controversy in Cambridgeport arose from a complaint brought
by the Secretary of Labor (the "Secretary"), alleging that Cambridge-
port Air Systems discharged two employees, Richardson and Roche, in
retaliation for conduct protected by OSHA. 28 The Secretary requested
damages for both employees in the amount of double the back pay
over a stipulated period to compensate the loss of wages and other
expenses associated with the discharge. 27 The United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts found that Cambridgeport Air
Systems discharged Richardson in retaliation for making an admission
to his employer that he had reported potential workplace health vio-
lations to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. 28 The
district court concluded, therefore, that Cambridgeport Air Systems'
firing of Richardson violated section 11(c) (1) of OSHA. 29
With respect to Roche's discharge, the district court found that
the employer fired Roche not because of his protected activities, but
because of his close relationship with Richardson. 8° The court noted
that evidence proved the employer knew of Roche's and Richardson's
22 Id. at 1191.
23 Id.
24 1d. at 1192-94.
23 Id. at 1194.
26
 Reich v. Cambridgeport Air Sys., No. Civ. A. 90-11628-MAA, 1993 WL 525605, at *I (D.
Mass. Aug. 25, 1993) [hereinafter Cambridgeport I]. See supra note 2 for a discussion of the
complaint process under § 660(c).
27 Cambridgeport, 26 F.3d at 1190.
28 Id. at 1188. Richardson admitted during testimony that he did not actually report any
violations, but felt that he needed to assert his rights. See Cambridgeport I, 1993 WL 525605, at Si.
22 Cambridgeport, 26 F.3d at 1188.
30 1d. at 1189.
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close friendship. 31 The court reasoned that the employer fired Roche
in an effort to clean house and found that the employer acted to set
an example for other employees not to raise OSHA concerns. 32 The
court concluded that Cambridgeport Air Systems' discharge of Roche
also violated section 1 1 (c) of OSHA, because it sought to limit conduct
protected by OSHA."
The district court characterized the employer's conduct, both in
and out of court, as consistently brash and as displaying a flaunting
disregard for the statutory prohibition." Additionally, the court found
that the employees would have remained employed over a stipulated
period of time, such that their damages included back pay from this
period, prejudgment interest and other non-specific additional dam-
ages." The district court concluded, therefore, that the employer vio-
lated section 1 1 (c) of OSHA, and awarded the employees damages
equal to double their back pay."
The employer appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit, claiming that the district court erred in finding Ro-
che's discharge retaliatory. 37 The employer also appealed the damages
award, stating that the district court lacked authorization to award what
amounted to punitive damages under OSHA." The Secretary con-
tested Cambridgeport Air Systems' characterization of the damages as
punitive, and although conceding that the award of double damages
in an OSHA retaliatory discharge claim was unprecedented, insisted
that the case represented the first time the Secretary actually requested
such a remedy."
31 Cambridgeport I, 1993 WL 525605, at *6.
32 id.
33 See id.
3.4 Cambridgeport, 26 F.3d at 1190.
35 Cambridgeport I, 1995 WL 525605, at *5, *6. The district court was vague as to what
constituted "additional damages," but implied that these damages were awarded to compensate
for losses beyond back pay, and were not punitive. See id. at *5.
se Cambridi,Yeport, 26 F.3c1 at 1188. Both parties stipulated that the time period in question
was from the employee's discharge in June, 1989, until December 12, 1991 (the filing of the suit).
Id. at 1189. The district court reviewed the evidence, which included contradictory testimony
from several witnesses, and concluded that the employees would not have been laid off during
this time period. Id.
37 Id. at 1188. The employer did not appeal the district court's finding that Richardson's
discharge was retaliatory. Id.
3's Id. at 1190. Additionally, the employer appealed the district court's finding that the
employees would not have been laid off during the time period relevant to this action (the parties
had previously stipulated to the relevant time period). Id. at 1189. The First Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision on this issue, giving broad deference to the district court's findings of
fact. Id.
39 Id. at 1190.
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The First Circuit affirmed the district court's characterization of
Roche's discharge as retaliatory.° The court noted that Roche's termi-
nation followed closely on the heels of Richardson's, and that the
evidence supported the finding that the employer knew of the employ-
ees' close relationship,'" The court found the district court's view of
the evidence plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety. 42
The First Circuit, therefore, affirmed the district court's decision, hold-
ing that the district court's finding that Cambridgeport Air Systems'
termination of Roche violated section 1 1 (c) of OSHA was not clearly
erroneous."
Next, the First Circuit addressed whether the district court had
the power to grant punitive damages in general, and then if whether
they were warranted in this specific case." The court reasoned that
even though Franklin dealt with an implied right of action, as opposed
to the explicit right granted by Congress to the Secretary by section
1 1 (c) of OSHA, the Franklin general rule controlled.° The Franklin
general rule states that, absent clear congressional direction to the
contrary, the federal courts may award any appropriate relief in a case
brought pursuant to a right created either implicitly or explicitly by
federal statute.° The First Circuit noted that the Franklin Court used
the phrase "all appropriate remedies" when describing the authority
of federal courts to grant monetary and other normal remedies, in-
cluding punitive damages where dictated. 47
 The First Circuit concluded
that the Supreme Court, therefore, would not likely construe Con-
gress's similar phrase, "all appropriate relief," in section 1 1 (c) of OSHA
any less generously. 48
Concluding that the phrase "all appropriate relief' within OSHA
implied the availability of monetary as well as punitive damages, the
court then examined several sources for contrary congressional in-
tent.49
 The court compared OSHA to several analogous statutes pro-
40 Id. at 1189.
41
 Cambridgepart, 26 F.3d at 1189. Additionally, there was evidence that Roche had been
specifically warned about raising safety concerns. Id. The First Circuit also concluded that there




 Id. at 1190, 1194.
45 Id. at 1191.
46
 Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1035, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 213, 217 (1992).
47 Cambridgeport, 26 F.3d at 1191.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 1191-94. The court rejected the employer's contention that the statute's listing of
March 1995]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 357
tecting whistleblowers." These later statutes explicitly included punitive
and compensatory damages within the list of examples that followed
the phrase "all appropriate relief, including but not limited to." 51 The
court dismissed the argument that express inclusion of punitive dam-
ages provisions in later statutes meant Congress intended to exclude
authorization for punitive damages in OSHA causes of action." The
court reasoned that giving this simple omission such credence did not
comport with the Franklin Court's broad language, requiring "clear
direction" to the contrary.53
 Conversely, the court concluded that the
wording of these statutes indicated that Congress itself deemed the
phrase "all appropriate relief' to encompass punitive and compensa-
tory damages."
Additionally, the court considered OSHA's legislative history to
determine if Congress provided any guidance as to available reme-
dies." The court first analyzed the language in the Senate's initial
version of the bill, which used the phrase "such affirmative action" to
describe available remedies. 55 The court noted that as early as 1938,
the United States Supreme Court interpreted the phrase "such affirma-
several examples of relief indicated congressional intent to limit available remedies. Id. at 1191.
The court cited to the Franklin decision to hold that the mere mention of included remedies is
not a "clear direction" that other remedies are not available. Id. In support of this, the court
noted that in 1941, the United States Supreme Court stated "the term 'including' is not one of
all embracing definition, but connotes simply an illustrative application of the general principle."
Id. (citing Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95,100 (1941) (failure
of federal statute exempting federal land banks from state taxes to note "sales tax," in listing of
several specific classes of tax exemption after terns "including," did not preclude exemption from
local sales tax)).
5° Id. at 1191-92. For example, the court noted that 42 U.S.C. § 5851 protects whistleblowers
in nuclear facilities from retaliatory discharge and discrimination. Id. at 1191. The jurisdiction
provision of § 5851 provides in relevant part: "In actions brought under this subsection, the
district courts shall have jurisdiction to grant all appropriate relief including, but not limited to,
injunctive relief, compensatory relief, and exemplary damages." 42 U.S.C. § 5851(d) (Supp.
1993). Additionally, the court looked at three other analogous whistleblower protection statutes,
which included similar language. Cambridgeport, 26 F.Scl at 1191-92; see also 15 U.S.C. § 2622(d)
(Supp. 1993) (toxic substances) ("In actions brought under this subsection, the district courts
shall have jurisdiction to grant all appropriate relief, including injunctive relief and compensatory
and exemplary darnages."); 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i)(4) (Supp. 1993) (safety of public water systems)
(courts may "grant all appropriate relief including, but not limited to, injunctive relief, compen-
satory, and exemplary damages"); 42 U.S.C. § 7622(d) (1988) (air pollution) (courts may "grant
all appropriate relief including, but not limited to, injunctive relief, compensatory, and exemplary
damages").
51 Cambridgeport, 26 F.3d at 1191-92.
52 1d. at 1192.
55 1d. at 1191,1192.
54 Id. at 1191-92.
55 1d. at 1192-94.
Cambridgeport, 26 F.3d at 1192.
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tive action" to exclude punitive damages. 57 In contrast, the court noted
that the House of Representative's initial version of OSHA authorized
the use of stringent civil and criminal penalties." The court stated that
if the language from the Senate's bill had been allowed to stand, it
would have served as an indication of Congress's desire to prohibit
punitive damages." The court reasoned that the congressional com-
promise version used the intermediary "all appropriate relief" lan-
guage because Congress wished to avoid similarities with earlier stat-
utes which did not provide for punitive damages, but did not desire to
authorize criminal penalties. 6°
Furthermore, the court stated that "all appropriate relief" more
closely approximated the language of the Labor-Management Report-
ing and Disclosure Act of 1954 ("LMRDA" ). 11 The court noted that
analogous language in LMRDA, "such relief . as may be appropri-
ate," had been interpreted to authorize courts to grant punitive dam-
ages, prior to OSHA's passage. 62 The court reasoned that Congress
worded OSHA's jurisdiction section cognizant of the court's interpre-
tation of the analogous language in the LMRDA, and thus intended
to grant the same remedial powers to the courts. 65 The court deter-
mined, therefore, that nowhere in the legislative history of OSHA did
Congress provide any "clear direction" of an intent for the phrase "all
appropriate relief" to limit courts' power to grant compensatory and
punitive damages. 64 Thus, the First Circuit concluded that the district
court had the power to grant punitive and compensatory damages in
an OSHA retaliatory discharge action.6"
57 Id. at 1193. The Senate's version stated that the Secretary in an administrative proceeding
was to order "the person committing such violation to take such affirmative action to abate the
violation as the Secretary deems appropriate, including but not limited to the rehiring or
reinstatement of the employee to his former position with back pay." Id. at 1192 (emphasis
added). The court also noted that "such affirmative action" was similar to the language of the
National Labor Relations Act (the "NRLA"). Id.
58 Id. at 1193.
59 Id. The court noted that other courts interpreting statutes with language analogous to that
of the NLRA had held that punitive damages were not allowed. Id. at 1193-94.
6° Id. at 1193.
Cambridgeport, 26 F.3d at 1194. Section 412 of the LMRDA, which describes the jurisdiction
of federal courts in a LMRDA action, states in relevant part: "Any person whose rights secured
by the provision of this subchapter have been infringed by any violation of this subchapter may
bring a civil action in a district court of the United States for such relief (including injunctions)
as may be appropriate." 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1988).
62
 Cambridgeport, 26 F.3d at 1194 (citing International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Braswell, 388
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Having addressed and rejected the employer's claim that the dis-
trict court did not have the authority to grant punitive damages, the
First Circuit considered whether the decision to grant punitive dam-
ages in this specific case was clearly erroneous. 66
 The First Circuit noted
that courts traditionally possess the power in tort cases, such as retali-
atory discharge cases, to award punitive damages where the defendant
engaged in intentional or reckless conduct.° The court stated that the
evidence supported a finding that the employees had suffered com-
pensable losses because of their discharges in addition to lost wages,
and that Cambridgeport Air Systems owed up to thirty-five percent of
the back wages in prejudgment interest. 68
 Additionally, the court found
sufficient evidence that the employer's conduct was consistently brash
and intentionally harmful to support punitive damages above these
compensatory damages. 89
 Thus, the First Circuit held that the district
court's award of compensatory and punitive damages was not clearly
erroneous." The First Circuit concluded, therefore, that federal courts
have the authority to grant compensatory and, when warranted, puni-
tive damages, where an employer fires employees in retaliation for
conduct protected by OSHA, or in an attempt to dissuade others from
exercising their OSHA rights."
The First Circuit's bold, well-reasoned proclamation that punitive
damages are available in OSHA retaliatory discharge actions forms the
most significant component of the Cambridgeport decision. Both the
Secretary of Labor and the district court attempted to justify the dou-
ble back wages award as purely non-punitive, and the First Circuit's
66 Id. at 1194-95. The First Circuit stated that as to the determination of the amount of
damages great deference would be given to the judgment and discretion of the factfinder, Id. at
1195.
Cambridgeport, 26 F.3d at 1192, 1194. The court relied upon a Seventh Circuit decision,
Travis v. Gary Community Mental Health Center, which held that retaliatory discharge is an
intentional tort. Id. at 1192 (citing Travis v. Gary Community Mental Health Center, 921 F.2d
108, 111-12 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 60 (1991)). In Travis, the plaintiff alleged that she
was fired for conducting actions protected by the Fair Labor Standards Act, which, similar to
OSHA, provided a retaliatory discharge cause of action but did not explicitly prescribe available
remedies. Travis, 921 F.2d at 111-12, Judge Easterhrook held, after conducting statutory inter-
pretation similar to the Cambridgepart court, that punitive damages were available in a retaliatory
discharge action because a retaliatory discharge was at its heart an intentional tort. Id. at 112.
68 Cambridgepart, 26 F.3d at 1195.
69 Id. The First Circuit cited several instances that the district court listed as indicative of the
employer's egregious behavior: a possible bribe offered by the employer to a Labor Deparnnent
investigator, the employer's strong witness supervision, questionable employer witness testimony,
and the very rapid manner in which the employer discharged the first employee (less than six
hours later in the same day). Id.
76 Id.
71 Id. at 1194-95.
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decision renders such legal gymnastics unnecessary. 72 The First Cir-
cuit's careful and detailed analysis proves conclusively that punitive, as
well as compensatory, damages are available weapons in the Secretary's
arsenal for use in OSHA retaliatory discharge actions." This is sig-
nificant because during the past twenty-two years in which section
11(c) has been in place, the Secretary of Labor never sought punitive
damages in OSHA retaliatory discharge actions. 74 This prior policy
limited employers' potential liability for violating section 11(c) to typi-
cally meager back pay claims. Allowing the courts to grant punitive
damages, however, turns section 11(c) into a potent force for punish-
ing employers who discriminate against employees for engaging in
conduct protected by OSHA. Additionally, the potentially unpredict-
able liability for punitive damages serves as a key deterrent against
employer intervention in an employee's quest for a safe work place."
Practitioners and employers should be aware that other courts will
probably follow the First Circuit's analysis on the availability of punitive
damages in OSHA retaliatory discharge actions. The First Circuit ap-
plied a rigorous statutory interpretation methodology that builds upon
the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Franklin. 76 The
court's in-depth analysis provides considerable insight into the reason-
ing behind the court's holding, which, because of its inclusiveness,
seemingly forecloses any possible avenues of attack. Additionally, in
light of the Cambridgeport decision, the Department of Labor has
instituted a policy of seeking compensatory and punitive damages in
all appropriate OSHA retaliatory discharge actions. 77 Assuming that a
facial challenge to the availability of punitive damages in an OSHA
72 Sec id. at 1190; see also Cambridgeport I, No. Civ. A. 90-11628-MAA, 1993 WL 525605, at *5
(D. Mass. Aug. 25, 1993). The district court was vague as to what constituted "additional damages,"
but implied that these damages were awarded to compensate for losses beyond back pay, and
were not punitive. See Gambridgeporg I, 1993 WL 525605, at *5.
75 Cambridgeport, 26 F.3d at 1190-95.
74
 See id.
75 This may be especially true given the media attention surrounding a recent California
sexual harassment claim, in which a jury awarded an employee, who worked at a firm for only
25 days, $7.2 million in punitive damages and $50,000 in compensatory damages. See Mark v.
Boennighausen, $7.2 Million Secretary, AM. LAW., Oc t. 1994, at 76,
7s See Cambeidgeport, 26 F.3d at 1190-94; see also Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 112
S. Ct. 1028, 1032-37, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Ca.s. (BNA) 213, 214-18 (1992). Additionally, the
detailed statutory interpretation methodology applied by the First Circuit serves as an excellent
guide for practitioners to use when attempting to discern what remedies are available in other
statutory landscapes.
77 Telephone Interview with Mark Lerner, Attorney, Division of Occupational Safety and
Health, Office of the Solicitor, United States Department of Labor (Nov. 1, 1994).
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retaliatory discharge suit is unlikely to succeed, employers are there-
fore left to challenge punitive damages only on an "as applied" basis."
In sum, the First Circuit in Cambridgeport held conclusively that
punitive and compensatory damages were available in OSHA retali-
atory discharge actions." This decision followed naturally from the
Franklin general rule that, absent congressional direction to the con-
trary, courts may utilize whatever remedies are appropriate to enforce
an explicit or implicit statutorily created right." Practitioners can ex-
pect that other courts will follow the First Circuit's detailed reasoning
in awarding punitive and compensatory damages in section 11(c)
retaliatory discharge actions, and that the Secretary of Labor will
utilize this precedent to its maximum potential in furthering the policy
concerns of OSHA.
IV. CONTEMPT FINES
A. * The Distinction Between Civil and Criminal Contempt of Court:
International Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell'
In the context of labor disputes, court orders or injunctions are
powerful weapons for an employer attempting to control a striking
union. 2
 When a union violates a court order or injunction, courts
categorize the violation as an "indirect" contempt of court because the
violating actions usually occur outside the courtroom.' Over the years
the United States Supreme Court has attempted to set standards that
distinguish between criminal and civil contempt of court and the
procedural treatment accorded each.'
The United States Supreme Court began its analysis of civil and
criminal contempt law by following the precedent set forth in English
common law.5
 This law has evolved such that civil and criminal con-
78
 See generally Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 35 (1983) (detailed discussion as to what standard
should generally be applied to determine when punitive damages are available).
Cambridgepon, 26 ESd at 1194.
8°
 See Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1034-35, 59 Fair Empl. Prac, Cas. (BNA) at 215-16,
* By Jennifer M. Motley, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 114 S. Ct. 2552, 146 L.R.R.M. 2641 (1994).
2 See, e.g., id. at 2555, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2642; United States v. United Mine Workers of America,
330 U.S. 258, 266-67, 19 L.R.R.M. 2346, 2348-49 (1947); Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell,
245 U.S. 229, 234-35 (1917); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 571 (1895).
3 Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. at 2557 n.2, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2643 n.2.
4 Id. at 2557-59, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2643-44.
5
 Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Getting Beyond the Civil/Criminal Distinction: A New Approach to the
Regulation of Indirect Gontempts, 79 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1035 (1993).
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tempt require different procedural processes.6 If a court determines
that a contempt is civil in nature, the court may act summarily; how-
ever, a court must grant a defendant the rights afforded in all criminal
proceedings under the Sixth Amendmene before it may convict a
defendant of criminal contempt. 8 Although such a distinction may
appear easy to apply, the Supreme Court has experienced considerable
difficulty in defining civil and criminal contempt in a manner that
helps lower courts to evaluate and apply the correct procedures in each
ins tan ce.'
The United States Supreme Court, in the 1910 case Gompers v.
Bucks Stove & Range Co., held that contempt of court for the violation
of an injunction that was punished by a fixed prison sentence was
criminal in nature.'' In this case, three individuals who were members
of the American Federation of Labor and publishers of a widely-read
newspaper, the American Federationist, had initiated a boycott of the
Bucks Stove and Range Company by publishing information regarding
the company's alleged unfair labor practices." The boycott caused the
business irreparable harm. 12 Bucks Stove sought and received an in-
junction from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia ordering
the unionists to cease their actions in furthering the boycott." Some
months later the company filed a petition alleging violations of the
injunction,' 4 and thereafter, the judge found the three individuals
guilty of contempt of court and sentenced them to fixed prison terms
of six, nine and twelve months according to their degree of involve-
ment." The defendants applied for and obtained a writ of certiorari.' 6
The United States Supreme Court held that the distinction be-
tween criminal and civil contempt turned on the "character and pur-
pose" of the punishment prescribed. 17 The Court reasoned that a civil
contempt order is remedial in that the judge intends to coerce the
6 See Bagwell, 114 S, Ct. at 2559,146 L.R.R.M. at 2645.
7 U.S. CONST. amend. Vi.
8 Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194,198-200 (1968).
9 See, e.g., Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. at 2561,146 L.R.R.M. at 2646-47; Shillitani v. United States,
384 U.S. 364,369-70 (1966); United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258,
303-04,19 L.R.R.M. 2346,2364-65 (1947); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418,
441-42 (1910).
10 221 U.S. at 444.
" Id. at 419-20.
12 Id. at 420.
15 Id. at 421-22 & n.l.
14 Id. at 436.
15 Gompers, 221 U.S. at 424-25.
16 1d. at 427.
17 1d. at 441.
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defendant to comply with the order for the benefit of the complain-
anti' With a criminal contempt order, on the other hand, the judge
attempts to vindicate the authority of the court, and therefore, the
sanction is punitive.' 9
 The Court noted that although coercive sanc-
tions may have the incidental effect of being punitive, and vice versa,
these indirect consequences do not affect the nature of the punish-
ment.26
 Applying this rationale to the specific facts of Gompers, the
Court held that the fixed prison terms punished the defendants, and
thus the contempt was criminal in nature. 2 '
Similarly, in 1947, the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. United Mine Workers of America, held that a definite flat fine of
$700,000 and a purgeable contempt fine of $2,800,000 for violation of
an injunction restraining the United Mine Workers of America from
interfering with the operation of certain coal mines were criminal and
civil, respectively. 22 The Court ordered the union to pay $700,000 for
past violations of the injunctions against work stoppages and to pay
$2,800,000 in the event that the union did not, within five days of the
decision, completely comply with the terms of the restraining order. 25
The United Mine Workers Court brought the Gompers distinction be-
tween coercive and punitive imprisonment to the context of contempt
fines. 24
 The Court held that civil contempt fines either (i) coerce the
defendant into compliance with the court's order, or (ii) compensate
the complainant for losses sustained. 25
 The Court also noted that pu-
nitive fines are necessarily criminal in nature. 26
 The Supreme Court
classified the flat and purgeable fines issued to the union and its
president as punitive and coercive, respectively, and thus held that
their contempt was both criminal and civi1. 27
In the 1966 case, Shillitani v. United States, the United States
Supreme Court held that any sentence that the court conditions upon
the contemnor's willingness to comply with the court order is neces-
19 Id.
19 Id.
20 Gompers, 221 U.S. at 443.
21 Id. at 444.
22 See 330 U.S. 258, 304-05, 19 L.R.R.M. 2346, 2364 (1947).
23 Id.
24 Id. at 302-04, 19 L.R.R.M. at 2363.
25 Id. at 303-04, 19 L.R.R.M. at 2363.
26 Id. at 302, 19 L.R.R.M. at 2363.
27 United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 304-05, 19 L.R.R.M. at 2364. The Court also stated that
as long as the defendant was not asked to testify and the court used the "reasonable doubt"
standard to determine the defendant's guilt, civil and criminal sanctions could be heard in the
same proceeding. Dudley, supra note 5, at 1057.
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sarily civi1. 28 In this case, the court found two men guilty of contempt
of court for refusing to testify in front of a grand jury after the judge
had granted them immunity. 29 The Court imposed a two-year prison
sentence with the provision that if either defendant agreed to testify
before that time, he would be released." Stressing the conditional
nature of the sentencing which allowed the defendants to "carry the
keys of their prison in their own pockets," the Supreme Court catego-
rized the punishment as coercive rather than punitive." Therefore,
because in this case the court clearly intended to coerce the defendants
to testify, the Supreme Court found the contempt action to be civi1. 32
Further developing this area of the law, in 1968, the United States
Supreme Court in Bloom v. Illinois held that a defendant in a criminal
contempt proceeding has the right to a jury trial." In this case, the
court convicted the defendant of criminal contempt for attempting to
admit a falsely prepared and executed will to probate after the death
of the testator." The Supreme Court reasoned that criminal contempt
was no less a crime than any other criminal action." Thus, the Court
concluded, courts must accord defendants in criminal contempt ac-
tions the same procedural due process as defendants in other criminal
actions." The Court in Bloom brought criminal contempt proceedings
directly within the ambit of the Sixth Amendment" and expressly applied
the Amendment's requirements to both state and federal criminal
contempt proceedings." In so doing, the Court guaranteed the right
to a jury trial for criminal contempt in all but petty offenses." In this
case, the Court held that the defendant had the right to a jury trial
because his act of forgery was a non-petty offense carrying a statutory
sentence of one to fourteen years."
28 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966).
29
 Id. at 365.
" Id.
3] See id. at 368.
32 Id.
"391 U.S. 194,201-02 (1968).
34 Id. at 195.
35 Id. at 201-02.
" Id. at 202.
sr U,S. CoNsr. amend. VI,
514 Bloom, 391 U.S. at 198-200.
" See id. at 210. This long-recognized exception to the right to a jury trial, when applied to
contempt proceedings, allows a judge to maintain control of his courtroom by punishing petty
criminal contempt summarily, while also protecting the constitutional rights of those whose
conduct outside the courtroom is more egregious. See id. at 209-10.
40 See id. at 211.
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In Hicks v. Feiock, a 1988 case, the United States Supreme Court
held that a contempt sentence that includes a probationary period with
a suspended but determinate prison sentence is criminal unless the
court conditions the prison sentence on compliance with court order."
The defendant in Hicks owed past-due court-ordered child support
payments.42 In his contempt hearing, the California state court sanc-
tioned the defendant in two ways." The court ordered the defendant
to begin paying his arrearages on a monthly basis during a three-year
probationary period, after which he was ordered to serve a twenty-five-
day prison sentence.'" On appeal the United States Supreme Court
reasoned that a probation period with a suspended determinate sen-
tence is not the same as a conditional sentence that allows the contem-
nor to purge the sanctions." To the contrary, the Court noted that
during such a probationary period, a contemnor suffers numerous
disabilities that compliance with previous court orders cannot purge. 4°
The Court reasoned that if, on remand, the lower court held that the
defendant could purge his prison sentence by repaying all arrearages
during his probation, then the contempt order was civil in nature
because allowing the defendant to hold the key to his prison makes a
sanction coercive. 47 On the other hand, the Court explained that if the
lower court sanctioned the defendant with a straight probationary
period plus suspended determinate sentence, the contempt was crimi-
nal because these two sanctions were punitive in nature. 48
During the Survey year, in International Union, United Mine Workers
of America v. Bagwell, the United States Supreme Court reversed a
Virginia Supreme Court decision that held $52,000,000 in fines payable
to the state of Virginia to be civil contempt fines.° The United States
Supreme Court held that in determining the criminal or civil nature
of a contempt action, a court must look beyond the standards estab-
lished historically by Gompers and its progeny.50 In addition, a court
must look at the objective need for a jury trial to ensure disinterested
fact finding and even-handed adjudication. 5 ' Accordingly, the Court
41 485 U.S, 624, 641 (1988).
42 See id. at 627.
45 Id. at 639.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 639 n.11.
45 Hicks, 485 U.S. at 639 n.11,
47 See id. at 640-41.
48 See id. at 659 0.11.
49 114 S. Ct. 2552, 2563, 146 L.R.R.M. 2641, 2648 (1994).
5° See id. at 2562, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2647.
51 Id.
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held that the contempt was criminal and the union had a constitu-
tional right to a jury trial. 52
The International Union, United Mine Workers of America and
the United Mine Workers of America, District 28 ("the union") were
involved in a lengthy labor dispute with the Clinchfield Coal Company
and Sea "B" Mining Company ("the companies") over alleged unfair
labor practices. 53 In April of 1989 the companies filed suit to enjoin
the union from certain strike-related activities. 54 The Circuit Court for
Russell County, Virginia, entered an injunction that prohibited the
union from picketing near the entrance and exit of the companies,
from throwing objects at and physically threatening company employ-
ees and from placing damaging laclu-ocks" under the tires of company
vehicles. 55 The court also limited the number of employees who could
simultaneously picket and required the union to provide supervisors
on the picket lines to ensure that the strikers adhered to the court
order. 56
At a hearing on May 16, 1989, the Russell County Circuit Court
found that the union had committed 72 violations of the April injunc-
tion. 57 The court fined the union $642,000 58 and stated that it would
fine the union $100,000 for each future violent violation and $20,000
for each non-violent violation." Subsequently, the court conducted seven
contempt hearings and held the union in contempt for over 400 vio-
lations of the injunction." Based on its assertion that the fines were
civil in nature, the court conducted each hearing as a civil proceeding
before the judge.6 ' In each case, although the judge required the com-
panies to prove the union's violations beyond a reasonable doubt, it did
not provide the union with a jury trial.62 In total, the Virginia judge fined
the union over $64,000,000, $12,000,000 of which the court ordered
the union to pay to the companies and approximately $52,000,000 of
52 Id. at 2563, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2648.
53 Id. at 2555, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2642.




58 Id. at 2555 & n.1, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2642 & n.1. The Russell County Circuit Court suspended
a portion of these fines, conditioning them on the union's future compliance with the injunction,
and later vacated these lines when it concluded that they were criminal in nature. Id.
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which the court ordered the union to pay to the State of Virginia, and
to Russell and Dickenson Counties."
During the union's appeal, the companies settled the dispute with
the union and agreed to vacate the contempt fines. 64 Moreover, the parties
mutually moved to drop the case." The State of Virginia and the county
governments supported the motion to vacate the fines, but the Circuit
Court, after dismissing the case and vacating the $12,000,000 owed to
the companies, refused to vacate the fines owed to the state and county
governments." The court reiterated its earlier statements regarding
the civil and coercive nature of the fines and stated that the fines were
"payable in effect to the public" for the excessive law enforcement
necessitated by the strike.°
The State of Virginia appointed John Bagwell as special commis-
sioner to collect the unpaid contempt fines because the companies
withdrew and refused to pursue the issue any further." On appeal, the
Virginia Court of Appeals reversed and held that the district court
lacked the discretion to refuse to vacate the fines once the civil case
settled because the court had ordered the fines for civil contempt."
The Virginia Supreme Court, however, reversed this decision, holding
that the public policy of Virginia disfavored the rule articulated by the
Court of Appeals because it damaged public respect for the judiciary?
Furthermore, the Virginia Supreme Court subsequently rejected the
union's plea for a jury trial based on the union's contention that the
fines were criminal. 71 The court reasoned that because the judge had
articulated the schedule of fines at the first hearing, the union could
have minimized its own penalty." Thus, the Virginia Supreme Court
found the fines to be coercive and civil in nature."
The United States Supreme Court disagreed with the Virginia
Supreme Court and reversed. 74 The Court held that because the fines
were criminal in nature, only a jury could impose them." In so con-
63 /d. at 2556, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2642.




68 Id. The attorneys for the counties also withdrew. Id.
69 Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. at 2556, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2642.
76 See id., 146 L.R.R.M. at 2642-43,
71 Id., 146 L.R.R.M, at 2643.
72 See id.
73 Id., 146 L.R.R.M. at 2642-43.
74 Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. at 2563, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2648.
75 1d. at 2555, 146 L.R.R.M. at. 2641.
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chiding, the Court drew a distinction between fixed, determinate and
retrospective criminal fines, and purgeable per diem fines. 76 The fines
at issue more closely resembled fixed, determinate fines and thus
compelled categorization as criminal. 77 The Court further reasoned
that the breadth and complexity of the lower court's injunction regu-
lating out-of-court conduct, and the severity of the fines imposed,
necessitated the extensive even-handed fact finding of a jury trial. 78
The Court began its discussion by reiterating the standard defini-
tions of civil and criminal contempt sanctions as established in Gompers
and its progeny. 7° The Court first acknowledged the punitive nature of
criminal contempt fines." It then re-stated the United States v. United
Mine Workers of America definition of a civil contempt fine as one that
either coerces a defendant into compliance with a court order, or
compensates the complainant for losses sustained.'" The Court further
explained that a non-compensatory contempt fine is only civil if the
contemnor has the ability to purge the fine as in the case of a per diem
or fixed, suspended fine."
The Supreme Court explained that most contempt sanctions share
punitive and coercive aspects, and therefore the question underlying
the distinction between civil and criminal contempt focuses on the
degree of process due for the imposition of any particular contempt
sanction." The Court noted that judges need the power of contempt
in order to retain their authority both in the courtroom and in soci-
ety." The Court did recognize, however, that the fact that judges may
abuse such power necessitates procedural limitations to protect defen-
dants from arbitrary justice." Historically, the Court noted, the Su-
preme Court has attempted to strike a balance between these two
concerns by permitting judges to exercise their power with minimal
constraints when petty contempt threatens the order in the courtroom,
while placing the most constraints on their power when the court is
dealing with long-term, complex contempt. 86
76 Id. at 2562, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2647.
77 Id.
78 See id.
79 See Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. at 2557-59, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2643-44.
8° See id. at 2558, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2644.
81 Id.
R2 Id. The court noted that the Hicks case may reach a different conclusion regarding
suspended criminal sentences, but did not attempt to reconcile the two cases. Id. The most
probable reason for this is that the case at hand does not raise the issue of prison sentences.
83 See id. at 2559, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2645.
84 See Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. at 2559, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2645.
85 Id.
a' Id. at 2559-60, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2645.
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After reviewing its past handling of the issue, the Court enunciated
four categories of contempt and the respective procedures due each."
First the Court discussed the category of direct contempts in the
presence of the court.88 Trial courts may summarily adjudicate such
contempts to maintain order in the courtroom. 89 The Court's second
category consists of direct contempts that the judge delays punishing
until after the proceeding. 9° Such contempt requires notice and a
hearing because in such an action the judge can no longer argue that
maintaining order requires summary proceedings."' The third cate-
gory, according to the Court, comprises indirect contempts that im-
pede the court's ability to adjudicate the proceedings before 4, 92 or
those involving discrete, readily ascertainable acts. 93 A court should
deal with this category of contempt through civil proceedings because
of the limited need for extensive impartial fact finding in these cases."
The fourth category defined by the Court comprises indirect con-
tempts that involve out-of-court violations of complicated court orders
or injunctions.95 Contempts in this category require sophisticated fact
finding, noted the Court, and have minimal need of instantaneous
adjudication.° All of these circumstances, the Court maintained, re-
quire criminal procedural protections to guard the due process rights
of the defendant."
Applying this legal framework to the specific facts of the case, the
Court reasoned that because neither the parties nor any Virginia court
characterized the fines as compensatory, it must determine whether
they were coercive civil fines or criminal fines. 98 The Court acknow-
ledged the difficulty it faced in attempting to distinguish the fines
imposed from either determinate punitive fines or from initially sus-
pended fines, but refused to accept the petitioner's argument that the
Russell County Circuit Court's advance announcement of the fine
schedule made the fines coercive. 99 Rather, the Court analogized these
fines to general criminal laws that provide prior notice of the prohibi-
87 See id. at 2560-61, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2645-46.
" td. at 2560, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2645.
89 Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. at 2560, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2645.
" Id.
RI Id.
W2 See id., 146 L,R.R.M. at 2645-46, An example is the failure of one of the parties to comply
with discovery orders. Id.
g3 Id., 146 L.R.R.M. at 2646. An example is the turning over of a key. Id.
94 Bagwell, 114 S. Ct, at 2560, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2646.
as Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 2561, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2646.
98 1d.
99 Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. at 2562, 146 L,R.R.M. at 2647,
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Lion and the potential punishment." In holding that the fines were
criminal, the Court compared the fines to fixed, determinate, retroac-
tive fines that petitioners had no opportunity to purge, and empha-
sized the complicated nature of the injunction, the lengthy time period
covered and the magnitude of the fines.'°' The Court declared that to
protect the defendant's rights, the circumstances of this contempt
action necessitated the disinterested fact finding and even-handed
adjudication of a jury tria1. 102 The Court recognized that this decision
may obstruct the path of some judges' attempts to sanction widespread
indirect contempts." The Court stated, however, that the need to
promote and preserve respect for judges could not outweigh the im-
portance of protecting individuals from subjection to serious criminal
sanctions without the protection of due process.'"
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia stated that the Court need
not attempt to reconcile the different tests employed to distinguish
criminal and civil contempts because in this extreme case, all tests
would indicate that these contempt fines are criminal in nature." He
suggested that when the Court finally did need to reconcile the stand-
ards, such a reconciliation would require a careful examination of
historical practice in relation to modern judicial order." Justice Scalia
also suggested, however, that in the near future courts will need to
make adjustments to the contempt process because the modern judi-
cial order has evolved such that the historical distinctions no longer
app ly toy
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, concurred in
part and concurred in the judgment." Justice Ginsburg followed the
Gompers reasoning more closely than the majority and stated that to
call these fines civil simply because some may classify them as "coer-
cive" and "conditional" is to open the civil contempt category to all
possible sanctions." As the majority stated, the descriptive terms "co-




100 Id. at 2563, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2648.
104 Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. at 2563, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2648.
1 °5 1d. (Scalia, j., concurring).
10° See id. at 2563-65, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2648-50 (Scalia, J., concurring).
107 See id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
niti Id.
1°9 Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. at 2567, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2650 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
1111 See id. at 2566, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2650 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment),
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Ginsburg reasoned that the fact that the Virginia circuit court refused
to vacate the fines despite the settlement of the civil case indicates that
the court's purpose was to vindicate its authority.'" Therefore, basing
her decision on the definition set out in Gompers, Justice Ginsburg
found the fines criminal. 12
In sum, the United States Supreme Court held in International
Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell that in distinguishing
between coercive civil contempt fines and criminal contempt fines, a
court must look beyond the traditional standard established in Gom-
pers."' A court must also consider the necessity of a jury trial to effec-
tuate justice. 114 In Bagwell, the Court had difficulty categorizing the
prospective fines as either coercive or punitive according to the Gom-
pers standard."5 The Court stated, however, that the fines were more
closely analogous to fixed, determinate criminal fines." 6 In addition,
the Court reasoned that the complexity of the injunction, the duration
of the contumacy, and the magnitude of the fines made a jury trial
essential to protect the rights of the defendant."' Thus, the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Bagwell essentially requires courts
to grant defendants criminal procedure in any case involving wide-
spread, indirect contempts of complex injunctions unless the sanction
imposed will be a compensatory fine. 118
By considering the nature and circumstances of the alleged con-
tempt, the Bagwell Court liberalized the standard that courts apply to
distinguish between civil and criminal contempt of court.' ' 9 The under-
lying purpose of distinguishing between civil and criminal contempt of
court is to protect defendants from arbitrary decisions in cases where they
face serious criminal punishment. 129 The Bagwell decision helps to ensure
that defendants in most need of procedural protection receive it.' 2 I
In a case such as Bagwell, which blurs the distinction between puni-
tive and coercive fines, a court may encounter difficulty in determining
which procedure to grant the defendant according to the standard set
forth in Gompers and its progeny.' 22 Under Bag-well, however, the Gom-
111 Id. at 2567, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2651 (Ginsburg, j., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
112 See ed. (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
113 See id. at 2562, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2647.
114 See Bagwell, 114 S. Ct.. at 2562, 146 L.R.R.M. at 264718.




119 See. Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. at 2562, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2647.
120 See id. at 2563, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2648.
121 See id.
122 See id. at 2562, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2647.
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pers test is only a first step in determining the procedure a court should
accord a particular defendant. 123 The Court has added to this traditional
standard the new requirement that a court look at the defendant's
need for protection when determining what type of contempt proceed-
ing is necessary. 124 This new requirement will fine tune the standard in
a manner that will better reconcile it with its original purpose.
The Bagwell holding has important implications in the context of
labor disputes because it will affect most indirect contempt cases.' 25
The violation of an injunction against strike-related practices, for ex-
ample, is by nature an indirect contempt because all such acts or
omissions typically occur outside the courtroom.' 26 For this reason,
unless the fine imposed by the court is petty or compensatory, in all
labor disputes where the injunction issued is suitably "complex," the
court will consider the contempt action criminal and then must pro-
vide the defendant with criminal process.' 27
As a practical matter the Supreme Court in Bagwell has broadened
the category of contempt cases that are considered criminal. In the
future, criminal contempt cases will include both cases that are con-
sidered criminal because the sanctions imposed were punitive and
cases where the distinction between punitive or coercive sanctions is
blurred.' 28 In the latter cases, if a court finds that a serious contempt is
at issue, the need for disinterested fact finding and even-handed adju-
dication may be sufficient to categorize a contempt action as criminal.' 29
In conclusion, the Supreme Court in International Union, United
Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell held that in addition to categoriz-
ing the sanctions as coercive, compensatory or punitive, courts must
look at the objective need for a jury trial when determining the civil
or criminal nature of contempt.'" In so holding, the Court has signi-
ficantly expanded the category of contempt actions considered crimi-
nal and thus requiring a jury trial.''' This expansion means that courts
must categorize most contempts that arise in the context of labor
disputes as criminal, and thus provide the defendant in such cases with
all the procedural protections of the Sixth Amendment.'"
123 See id.
124 See Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. at 2563, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2648.
125 See id.
126 See id. at 2557 n.2, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2643 n.2.
127 See id. at 2563, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2648.
128 See id. at 2562-63, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2647-48.
126 See Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. at 2562, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2647.
15° Id., 146 L.R.R.M. at 2647.
131 See id.
132 U.S. CONS r. amend. VI; see Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. at 2562-63, 146 L.R.R.M. at 2647-48.
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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
I. STATUTORY RETROACTIVITY
A. *The Retroactivity of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and § 1981:
Rivers v. Roadway Express'
On November 21, 1991, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("CRA")
became law. 2 Congress enacted the CRA, in part, as a response to
several United States Supreme Court decisions that restricted the rights
of plaintiffs alleging discrimination.' The CRA did not, however, clearly
indicate when its provisions should come into effect. 4 As a result, courts
have differed over whether to apply the CRA or prior Supreme Court
rulings to cases or conduct arising prior to the CRA's passage.' The
Supreme Court's own decisions have presented two apparently contra-
dictory rules for determining whether a statute should apply retroac-
tively—one suggesting that a court should generally apply the law in
effect at the time of its decision, and the other suggesting an ancient
presumption against giving a statute retroactive effect.°
* By Duncan B. Hollis, Staff Member, BosToN COLLEGE Law Review.
1 114 S. Ct. 1510, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) 842 (1994).
2 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat.. 1071 (1991).
3 See CRA § 3(4). Section 3 provides in relevant part: The purposes of this Act are ... (4)
to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil
rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination." Id.; see also
Michele A. Estrin, Retroactive Application of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to Pending Cases, 90 MICH.
L. Rev. 2035, 2050-51, 2053 (1992); Brian Neff, Note, Retroactivity and the Civil Rights Act of
1991: An Opportunity for Reform, 2 UTAH L. Rev. 475, 479 (1993).
4 CRA § 402(a) provides, "Except as otherwise specifically provided, this Act and the amend-
ments made by this Act shall take effect upon enactment." 105 Stat. at 1099. This language has
several possible meanings; (1) die CRA only applies to cases where the conduct occurred after
its enactment; (2) the CRA applies to cases filed after its enactment; (3) the CRA applies to all
cases tried and decided after its enactment; (4) the CRA applies to all cases pending upon its
enactment. See Daniel Patrick Tokaji, The Persistence of Prejudice: Process-Based Theory and the
Retroactivity of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 103 YALE L.J. 567, 568 (1993).
5 For cases in which preceding Supreme Court rulings govern pre-enactment conduct, see,
e.g., Baynes v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 976 F.2d 1370, 1372, 1375, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 400, 401, 403 (11th Cir. 1992); Gersman v. Group Health Ass'n, Inc., 975 F.2(1 886, 900,
59 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1277, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Mozee v. American Commercial
Marine Serv. Co., 963 F.2d 929, 940, 58 Fair awl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) 1201, 1210 (7th Cir. 1992);
Fray v, Omaha World Herald Co., 960 F,2c1 1370, 1378, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 786, 793
(8th Cir. 1992); Vogel v. City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594, 597, 58 Fair Etnpl, Prac. Cas. (BNA)
402, 403 (6th Cir. 1992). For a case in which the CRA applies retroactively to pre-enactment
conduct, see, e.g., Davis v. City & County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1550, 61 Fair awl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 940, 451 (9th Cir. 1992).
6 See Estrin, supra note 3, at 2038.
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In 1974, in Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, the United States
Supreme Court held that a court must apply the law in effect at the
time it renders its decision, unless doing so would result in either
manifest injustice or contravention of specific statutory language or
legislative history.? In Bradley, the plaintiffs sought attorney's fees for
a successful school desegregation claim under a statute that became
law while their case was pending on appea1. 8
 The Supreme Court
reasoned that in the absence of manifest injustice, its precedents pro-
vided a presumption in favor of applying statutes retroactively to cases
pending prior to the law's enactment.g The Court thus identified three
criteria for determining if application of the law in effect at the time
of decision would create manifest injustice: (a) the nature and identity
of the parties, (b) the nature of the parties' rights and (c) the nature
of the impact of the change in law upon those rights. 1 °
Considering the effect of these criteria in the case before it, the
Supreme Court ruled it would not constitute a manifest injustice to
apply a statute authorizing the award of attorney's fees to a case
pending when the statute was passed." First, the Court noted that in
school desegregation cases, individuals acting as "private attorney[s]
general" on behalf of a class of children routinely opposed publicly
funded entities.' 2 The Court reasoned that applying statutes to assist
the former in their claim against the latter could hardly result in an
injustice.'' Second, according to the Court, the School Board had no
vested right to the funds allocated to it by taxpayers to pay attorney's
fees." Finally, the Court reasoned, the statute's application did not
pose an additional or unforeseeable substantive change to the School
7 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974).
8 See id at 705, 709.
9 Id. at 711, 716. First, the Court cited Chief justice Marshall's conclusion in United States v.
Schooner Peggy that if, subsequent to the judgment and before reaching the appellate level, a law
intervenes and positively changes the rule that governs, the law must be obeyed, particularly if
it involves 'natters of great national concerns. See Bradley, 416 U.S. at 711-12; see also United
States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 103, 105-07, 110 (1801) (U.S. Treaty with France
requiring return to France of vessels not yet definitely condemned applied to vessel whose status
was on appeal when Treaty was signed). Second, the Supreme Court pointed to Thorpe v. Housing
Authority of City of Durham as adopting a broad reading of Schooner Peggy by holding that even
where an intervening law does not explicitly recite that it is to be applied to pending cases, it is
to be given that effect. Bradley, 416 U.S. at 714, 715-16; see also Thorpe, 393 U.S. 268, 281-82
(1969) (general rule is that appellate court must apply law in effect at time it renders its decision,
with exceptions made only to prevent manifest injustice).
1 " Bradley, 416 U.S. at 717.
" Id. at 721.
12 Id, at 718.
18 See Id.
14
 Id. at 720.
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Board's obligations; it only increased the extent of damages for which
they were liable.'• The Court thus concluded that, applying existing
law, the plaintiffs were entitled to attorney's fees under the statute
passed while their case was pending on appeal.' 6
In 1988, however, in Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, the
United States Supreme Court concluded that the law does not favor
retroactivity; therefore, the Court would decline to construe congres-
sional enactments and administrative rules to have retroactive effect
unless their language specifically required this result.''' In Bowen, a
group of hospitals challenged the Secretary of Health and Human
Services' authority in 1984 to promulgate limitations on Medicare
reimbursements to health care providers for expenses incurred prior
to 1984.25 The Supreme Court reasoned that, in the absence of express
authorization from Congress, courts should not construe a statute to
permit an agency to adopt retroactive rules. 19 The Court therefore
determined that because the language of the authorizing statute evi-
denced no such congressional intent, the Secretary had no authority
to promulgate rules retroactively. 2° Thus, the Bowen Court concluded,
where no clear congressional intent exists, a statute delegating author-
ity to administrative agencies contains a presumption against its dele-
gating authority to legislate retroactivelyY
15 Bradley, 416 U.S. at 721.
18 Id. at 724. But see Bennett v. New Jersey, 470 U.S. 632, 639 (1985) (Bradley not to he read
as contradicting the principle that statutes affecting substantive rights and liabilities presumptively
have only prospective effect).
17 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).
18 Id. at 207.
19 See id. at 213-14.
20 See id. at 215-16. The Court reached this decision without mentioning Bradley or its
presumption in favor of applying the law in effect at the time of a decision. See Neff, supra note
3, at 487-88.
21 See Bowen, 488 U.S. at 208, 213-14; see also Kristine McAlister, Recent Developments,
Retroactive Application of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 45 VAND, L. REV, 1319, 1324-25 (1992). In
1990, in Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, the United States Supreme Court held
that where Congress clearly expressed its intent to apply a statute prospectively, that intent should
govern. 494 U.S. 827, 837-38 (1990). In Bonjorno, the plaintiff sought to use standards for
calculating postjudgment interest under a statute that passed while the case was on appeal. See
id. at 831-32. The Court reasoned that Congress intended the statute in question to apply
prospectively. See id. at 838. In reaching that conclusion, however, the Court recognized an
"apparent tension" between the standards referred to in Bradley (apply the law in effect at the
time of decision) and Bowen (congressional enactments and administrative rules will not be
construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires it). See id. at 836, 837 (citing
Bradley, 416 U.S. at 711 and Bowen, 488 U.S. at 208); see also Bonjorno, 494 U.S. at 841 (Scalia,
j., concurring) (declaring Bradley and Bowen in irreconcilable contradiction and urging Court
to endorse Bowen as consistent with age-old tradition of prospective lawmaking). The Court
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In 1989, in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, the United States
Supreme Court, addressing the issue of racial discrimination in em-
ployment, held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibited discrimination only
in the making and enforcement of contracts and did not prohibit racial
discrimination in all elements of the contractual relationship.22 Patter-
son involved a § 1981 suit by a black employee who claimed she was
harassed, rejected for promotion and eventually discharged, all be-
cause of her race. 28
 The Supreme Court reasoned that the plaintiff had
no cause of action under § 1981 for any of the alleged racial harass-
ment because it involved neither a refusal to make a contract nor an
impairment of her ability to enforce contract rights. 24 Thus, the Court
held that § 1981 provided a cause of action only in cases where the
formation or enforcement of contracts had been obstructed on ac-
count of race.23
In 1991, Congress passed the CRA, section 101 of which amended
§ 1981 to prohibit racial discrimination in all aspects of the contractual
relationship. 26
 This extension in scope of § 1981 in effect overruled
Patterson's prior limitation of § 1981, which restricted § 1981 to pro-
hibiting discrimination only in the formation and enforcement of
contracts.27
 Like the rest of the CRA, however, section 101 did not
declined, however -, to address that tension where the facts of the case before it demonstrated
clear congressional intent to apply the statute in question prospectively. See B0101110, 494 U.S. at
840.
22
 491 U.S. 164, 176, 49 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1814, 1820 (1989). At the time of
Patterson, § 1981 provided in relevant part: "All persons ... shall have the same right ... to make
and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens." 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988), amended by
Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 101, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
23 491 U.S. at 169, 49 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1817.
24 M at 179, 49 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1821. The Court did state that a refusal to
promote would be actionable under § 1981, but only if the promotion involved such a change
as to include art opportunity to enter into a new contract with the employer. Id. at 185, 49 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 1824.
23 See id. at 184, 49 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1823. Prior to Patterson, the protections
of § 1981 were believed to extend to all conduct occurring during the contractual relationship.
See, e.g., Runyon v. McCary, 427 U.S. 160, 168-69 (1976);Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421
U.S. 454, 459-60, 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 817, 819 (1975).
26 CRA § 101 provides in relevant part:
Section 1977 of the Revised Statute (42 U.S.C. 1981) is amended—
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsections:
"(h) For purposes of this section, the term 'make and enforce contracts' includes
the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the
enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual
relationship."
105 Stat. at 1071.
27 See Rivers v. Roadway Express, 114 S. Ct. 1510, 1515-16, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
842, 844-45 (1994).
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clearly indicate whether its amendment to § 1981 applied to cases
arising before the CRA's 1991 enactment. 28
In 1994, in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, the United States Su-
preme Court addressed its prior decisions in Bradley and Bowen with
respect to the CRA.29 The Court held that where a statute would
operate retroactively, a presumption exists that it cannot govern pre-
enactment conduct absent clear congressional intent." The plaintiff
in Landgraf claimed she had been sexually harassed by a fellow em-
ployee and that such harassment led her to quit her job)" The plaintiff
asserted that the expansion of relief available to victims of employ-
ment discrimination under CRA section 102 applied to her case, even
though it was on appeal at the time of the CRA's passage."
The Supreme Court reasoned that when a case implicates a fed-
eral statute enacted after the events in suit, a court must first deter-
mine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's temporal
reach." With respect to the 1991 CRA, the Supreme Court emphasized
the absence of specific retroactive language in the text of the statute
itself. 34 Turning to the CRA's legislative history, the Court determined
that legislators most likely agreed to disagree about whether and to
what extent the CRA would apply to pre-enactment conduct."" Thus,
28 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. Tints, relying on the presumptions expressed in
Bradley and/or Bowen, courts have differed over whether the CRA or Patterson governs the scope
of § 1981 for cases and conduct arising prior to the CRA's passage. Compare, e.g., Davis v. City &
County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1551, 1558, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 440, 451-52
(9th Cir. 1992) (holding text of CRA generally applies retroactively because two sections that are
specifically prospective imply rest of Act must apply retroactively); Baynes v. AT&T Technologies,
Inc., 976 F.2d 1370, 1373, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) 400, 401 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding
CRA applies only prospectively under either Bradley or Bowen presumptions); Gersman v. Group
Health Ass'n, Inc., 975 F.2d 886, 898-99, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1277, 1287-88 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) (holding CRA § 101 not applicable to conduct occurring before its enactment because
of effect on substantive rights which Bowen presumption prohibits; Bradley rule controls where
statute affects no substantive rights); Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, lnc., 965 F.2d 1363, 1373-74, 59
Fair Entpl. Prac. Gas. (RNA) 483, 492 (5th Cir. 1992) (applying Patterson interpretation of § 1981
by adopting Bowen presumption that CRA § 101 amendment to § 1981 not applicable to cases
pending on appeal prior to CRA's enactment); Fray v. Omaha World Herald Co., 960 F.2d 1370,
1378, 58 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) 786, 792-93 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding Patterson rule
applicable given evidence in legislative history of CRA suggesting Congress intended CRA to apply
prospectively).
29 See 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1496, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 820, 828 (1994).
34qd. at 1505, (14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 834-35.
31 Id at 1488, 64 Fair Empl. Prat:. Gas. (BNA) at 822.
32 Id.
" Id. at 1505, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 834.
m See Landgraf 114 S. Ct. at 1491-92, 1508, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 825, 837. The
text of the CRA's predecessor, the 1990 Civil Rights Act (which was vetoed by President Bush),
had contained such clearly retroactive language. id. at 1491-92, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas, (BNA)
at 825.
35 Id. at 1496, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 828.
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the Supreme Court concluded, Congress did not indicate how the CRA
would affect pre-enactment cases."
The Landgraf Court further reasoned that in the absence of an
expression of congressional intent, Bradley had not altered the well-es-
tablished presumption that a statute should not apply where it would
have a genuinely "retroactive effect."" The Court articulated its test for
"retroactive effect" as an examination of whether the statute's provi-
sions attached new legal consequences to events completed before its
passage." The Court recognized that not all statutes have a "retroactive
effect" simply because they are applied to cases arising from pre-enact-
ment conduct; some statutes could apply to pending cases without any
shift in legal consequences." Examining CRA section 102, however, the
Supreme Court determined that its introduction of a right to monetary
relief amounted to a new legal burden on defendant's conduct. 4° As a
result, the Court concluded that the plaintiff could not rely on CRA
section 102 for her 1986 claim of sexual harassment because the statute
would operate retroactively if applied to pre-1991 conduct. 41 Thus,
the Supreme Court in Landgraf decided that a general presumption
36 See id. at 1505, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 835. Moreover, the Court rejected the
argument that CRA § 402(b) and § 109(c), which were explicitly prospective, could create a
negative inference that the rest of the CRA applied retroactively. Id. at 1494, 64 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) at 827.
37 114 S. Ct. at 1503, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 833.
38 Id. at 1499, 64 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 830-31. In developing this test, the Court
relied on Justice Story's definition of a retroactive statute as one which takes away or impairs
vested rights acquired under existing law, creates new obligations, imposes a new duty or attaches
a new disability to past transactions. Id. at 1499, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 830 (citing
Society for the Promulgation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756, 767 (C.C.D.N.H. 1814)
(No. 13,156)).
39
 See Landgraf 114 S. Ct. at 1499, 1501, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (DNA) at 831, 832. The
Court listed a number of statutes such as those regulating prospective relief, those conferring or
ousting jurisdiction and those procedural rules that regulate secondary conduct as among the
class of statutes that could be applied to cases pending prior to their enactment. See id. at 1501-02,
64 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 832-33. The Court went on to indicate, however, that the mere
fact that a rule is procedural does not necessarily mean that it applies to every pending case. Id..
at 1502 n.29, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 833 n.29. Thus, the Court reasoned it did not
restrict its presumption against statutory retroactivity to cases where vested rights were affected.
Id. The Court concluded that the application of such procedural provisions will normally depend
on the case. Id.
4() See Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1505, 1506, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 835. The Court
did not hold, however, that all sections of the CRA must be applied prospectively; it reasoned
CRA sections need not be treated uniformly with respect to the issue of retroactivity. See id. at
1994, 1505,64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 827, 835. The Court then considered the retroactive
effect for each of the provisions plaintiff claimed applicable, concluding in each case that
application to cases arising prior to the passage of § 102 necessarily involved a retroactive effect.
See id. at 1505-06, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 835.
41 See id. at 1506-07, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 836.
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against the "retroactive" application of a statute always exists in the
absence of a clear statement by Congress to the contrary. 42
During the Survey year, in Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., the United
States Supreme Court held that CRA section 101, which amended
§ 1981 to prohibit discrimination in all aspects of the contractual
relationship, could not be applied to cases arising before the CRA's
enactment in 1991. 43 The Court reasoned that the same principles
articulated in Landgraf s analysis of CRA section 102 applied to CRA
section 101. 4' Moreover, the Supreme Court rejected an additional
argument in Rivers that statutes with a restorative purpose could apply
retroactively. 45 The Court determined that the fact that CRA section
101 had been enacted in response to Patterson did not supply sufficient
evidence of a clear congressional intent to apply that section to cases
pending before the CRA's enactment." The Supreme Court also re-
jected the argument that, even without an expression of congressional
intent, section 101 was the kind of restorative statute that presumptively
applied to pending cases. 47 Finally, the Supreme Court concluded that
although Congress can retroactively restore prior understandings of
statutes it believes the Court to have misconstrued, the Court will not
give statutes such effect unless Congress makes its intentions clearly
apparent.48
The petitioners in Rivers, Maurice Rivers and Robert C. Davison,
were African-American garage mechanics employed by Roadway Ex-
press, Inc. ("Roadway").4a On the morning of August 22, 1986, a super-
visor directed them to attend a disciplinary hearing later that day. 5°
Rivers and Davison refused to go to the hearing because they had not
received the notice required by their collective bargaining agreement. 51
The hearings resulted in a two-day suspension of both employees, who
later filed grievances and won full backpay.52 Shortly afterward, Road-
way scheduled another disciplinary hearing for Rivers and Davison,
42 See id. at 1498, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 830.
43 114 S. Ct. 1510, 1519-20, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 842, 848 (1994).
44 Id. at 1514, 64 Fair Fainpi. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 844.
45 See id. at 1515, 1518, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 844, 846-47,
46 Id. at 1517, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas, (BNA) at 846.
47 See id. at 1517-18, 64 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 846-47.
48 See Rivers, 114 S. Ct. at 1519, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 848.
49 Ilarvis v. Roadway Express, 973 E2d 490, 491, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 91, 91 (6th
Cir. 1992), affd sub nom. Rivers v. Roadway Express, 114 S. Ct. 1510, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(RNA) 842 (1994).
" Id. at 491-92, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 91.
51 Rivers, 114 S. Ct. at 1513, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 843.
52 id.
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which the employees also refused to attend, again on the grounds of
improper notice." Roadway discharged both Rivers and Davison on
September 26, 1986, for refusing to attend the hearings and for their
"accumulated work record." 54 On December 22, 1986, the employees
filed a § 1981 complaint in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio, alleging that they had been discharged from
Roadway because of their race and for insisting on the same procedural
protections afforded white employees."
On June 15, 1989, prior to the trial, the United States Supreme
Court announced in Patterson that § 1981 did not apply to conduct
occurring after the formation of a contract that did not interfere with
the right to enforce contractual obligations." The district court, relying
on Patterson, dismissed their claims, holding that § 1981 covered none
of the employees' discriminatory discharge claims because they did not
involve the formation or enforcement of a contract." On appeal, Rivers
and Davison argued that Patterson did not bar their complaint because
they alleged that their discharge from Roadway occurred in response
to their attempts to enforce the labor agreement, and thus fell under
Patterson's narrower reading of § 1981. 58 In the alternative, they con-
tended that CRA section 101, which was enacted while their appeal was
pending, should apply retroactively to their § 1981 claims, thereby
invalidating the district court's decision."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed
the district court, holding that the employees' allegations stated a claim
under § 1981.8° The Sixth Circuit determined that the employees'
allegations of retaliatory discharge for attempting to enforce a contrac-
tual right to receive equal notice fell within Patterson's interpretation
of § 1981 as a case of discrimination in the enforcement of contracts. 8 '
The court of appeals rejected, however, the employees' argument that
CRA section 101 should be applied retroactively. 82 The court reasoned
that it could not permit the application of section 101 to cases pending
prior to the CRA's enactment because it would adversely affect the
55 Id.
54 Harvis, 973 F.2d at 492, 61 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 92.
55 Rivers, 114 S. Ct. at 1513, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 843.
56 Id. at 1513-14, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 843 (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164, 49 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1814 (1989)).
57 Id. at 1514, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 843.
" Harvis, 973 F.2d at 492, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 92.
59 Id.
60 Id at 493, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 93.
61 Id at 493-94, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 93.
62 Id. at 497, 61 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 96.
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defendant's substantive rights and liabilities." The Sixth Circuit, there-
fore, concluded that § 1981 as interpreted by Patterson, not as amended
by section 101, governed cases pending prior to the CRA's passage. 64
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's
decision, holding that CRA section 101 did not apply to cases arising
before its enactment." The Court applied the congressional intent test
outlined in Landgraf to determine that the CRA's text provided no
indication that Congress intended the CRA to apply to pending cases."
The Court then concluded that, in the absence of an expression of
congressional intent, the presumption against statutory retroactivity
applied even more to CRA section 101 than it had to section 102;
whereas the latter merely altered the extent of a defendant's potential
monetary liability under Title VII, the former actually broadened the
categories of conduct subject to § 1981 liability."' By expanding the
conduct actionable under § 1981, the Court concluded that section
101 imposed new legal obligations that brought it within the class of
laws that Landgraf cited as presumptively prospective."'
The Court also rejected the employees' argument that, because
section 101 restored pre-Patterson understandings of § 1981, it should
apply to pending cases."' The employees claimed that section 101
applied to their case for two reasons: first, Congress's evident purpose
to restore pre-Patterson law also indicated its affirmative intention that
CRA section 101 apply to pre-enactment cases; and second, a general
presumption exists in favor of applying restorative statutes to cases
arising before their passage.'" The Court disagreed, concluding that
neither the CRA's text nor its legislative history revealed any congres-
61/ See Harvis, 973 F.2c1 at 497, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 95-96.
64 Rivers, 114 S. Ct. at 1514, 1519-20, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 849, 848 (1994).
65 Id. at 1519-20, 64 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 848.
' See id. at 1516-17, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 845-46; see also supra notes 33-36
and accompanying text.
67 Rivers, 114 S. Ct. at 1514-15, 64 Fair Empl. Prac, Cas. (BNA) at 844; see also Landgraf v.
USI Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1508, 64 Fair Empl. Prue. Cas. (BNA) 820, 836 (1994). Note,
however, that in concluding Section II, the Rivers Court writes, In short, § 102 has the effect
not only of increasing liability but also of establishing a new standard of conduct." 114 S. Ci at
1515, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 844 (emphasis added). This statement does not mesh
with the Court's conclusion in the preceding paragraph that § 102 did not alter the normative
scope of Title VIPs prohibition on workplace discrimination. See id. Therefore, given the Court's
preceding analysis of the distinctions between CRA § 101 and § 102, it would appear that for the
sentence to make sense it should read, ".. . § 101 has the effect not only of increasing liability,
but also of establishing a new standard of conduct."
68 See Rivers, 114 S. Ct. at 1514-15, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 844.
69 1d. at 1517, 1518, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 846, 847.
7° Id. at 1515, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 844,
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sional intention to restore retroactively pre-Patterson understandings
of § 1981.7 ' The Court reasoned that Congress's decision to alter a rule
of law does not by itself reveal whether Congress also intended to apply
that law retroactively to events that would otherwise be governed by a
judicial decision. 72
 Even assuming that Congress disapproved of Patter-
son and wanted section 101 to apply retroactively, moreover, the Court
still found no evidence in the 1991 CRA that indicated a clear expres-
sion of congressional intent to reach cases that arose before its enact-
ment." The Court concluded, therefore, that the mere fact Congress
passed section 101 in response to Patterson failed to demonstrate a
clear expression of congressional intent to overcome the presumption
against statutory retroactivity. 74
The Court dismissed the employees' contention that Congress
need not express its intent because section 101 is the kind of restorative
statute that presumptively applies to pending cases." The Court rea-
soned that its decisions recognized no such presumption in favor of a
retroactive application of restorative statutes, except in certain narrow,
error-correcting cases." Thus, despite the equitable appeal of the em-
ployees' argument that section 101's pre-Patterson understanding of
§ 1981 should govern, the Supreme Court concluded that section 101
71 Id. at 1517, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 846.
72 Id. at 1515, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 844-45.
73 Rivers, 114 S. Ct. at 1516, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 845. The Court compared the
silence of the 1991 CRA with the vetoed 1990 Civil Rights Act, whose text and legislative history
quite clearly revealed an intention to apply a pre-Patterson understanding of § 1981 to cases
arising prior to its enactment. See id at 1516-17, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 845-46 (noting
that 1991 CRA never refers to Patterson, that it only expands scope of relevant statutes, and that
evidence in 1991 legislative history suggests legislators failed to agree on question of retroactive
application).
74 Id. at 1517, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 846.
m Id. at 1517-18, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 846-47.
76 See id. at 1518, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 847. The Court distinguished Frisbie v.
Whitney (where a congressional statute did restore prior rights) because in that case Congress
had clearly expressed its intent to apply the statute retroactively, leaving open only the question
of its power to do so. Rivers, 114 S. Ct. at 1518, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 847 (citing
Frisbie v. Whitney, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 187, 192 (1870)); see also Frisbie, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) at 192
(rights of land occupants deprived of ownership when treaties granting that ownership were
voided could be restored by subsequent congressional statute). The Court also distinguished
Freeborn v. Smith, a case which, unlike § 101, involved an error-correcting statute that would have
been meaningless had it not been read to apply to pending cases. Rivers, 114 S. Ct. at 1518, 64
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 847 (citing Freeborn v. Smith, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 160, 173-75
(1865)); see also Freeborn, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) at 173-75 (statute admitting Nevada to Union that
failed to provide for jurisdiction over pending Nevada cases could be corrected by a subsequent
statute). The Rivers Court reasoned that § 101 was simply not the type of statute that would lack
an effect if not applied to pending cases. See 114 S. Ct. at 1518, 64 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
at 847.
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still fell within the general class of statutes that are presumptively
prospective. 77
Finally, the Rivers Court observed that its decision adhered to the
general principle that statutes operate only prospectively, while judicial
decisions operate retrospectively. 78 Given the hierarchical nature of the
federal court system, the Supreme Court reasoned that its decision in
Patterson constituted the authoritative interpretation of § 1981 and its
phrase "to make and enforce contracts," until Congress amended this
section with CRA section 101. 79 The Court ruled, therefore, that be-
cause of the standards set by Patterson, the application of CRA section
101 to conduct arising before its enactment would create liabilities that
had no legal existence before the CRA's passage." As such, the Su-
preme Court concluded that, without a clear expression of congres-
sional intent, section 101 could not apply to pre-enactment conduct
because it would violate the standing presumption against giving stat-
utes retroactive effect. 81
In an opinion concurring with the Court's judgments in both
Rivers and Landgraf Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Kennedy and
Thomas, agreed with the majority's holding, but disagreed with the use
of the CRA's legislative history to search for a clear statement of
congressional intent. 82Justice Scalia proposed that a statute's text alone
should determine whether Congress intends a statute to apply retroac-
tively." Justice Scalia also opposed the Court's deference to Bradley,
which he believed invented "an utterly new and erroneous" presump-
tion favoring the retroactive application of new statutes." Finally, Jus-
"See Rivers, 114 S. Ct. at 1517-18, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 846-47.
78 1d. at 1519, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 847,
79 See id. at 1519, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 848. The Court pointed out that when
it construes a statute, it decides what that statute has meant continuously since the date when it
became law. Id. at 1519 n.I2, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 848 n.12. Thus, Patterson did not
change the law established by the courts of appeal, but rather stated what § 1981 had always
meant and why the courts or appeal had misinterpreted congressional intentions, See id.
8° Id. at 1519-20, 64 Fair Empl, Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 848.
81 See id. at 1519-20, 64 Fair Etnpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 848; see also supra note 38 and
accompanying text (defining retroactivity).
82 Rivers, 114 S. Ct. at 1522, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas, (RNA) at 848 (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment). The newest member of the Court, Justice Stephen Breyer, has also urged caution in
relying on legislative history for statutory analysis. See generally Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of
Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. Rev. 845 (1992).
83 Rivers, 114 S. Ct. at 1522, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 848 (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment).
84 Id. at 1523, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 849 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)
(arguing that holding in Bradley had no basis in precedent); see also Kaiser Aluminum & Chem.
Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 840-59 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the Bradley
rule is wrong, and tracing line of precedents favoring presumption against statutory retroactivity).
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tice Scalia criticized the majority's definition of retroactivity because it
relied on a substance/procedure distinction that, he contended, re-
quired too many arbitrary exceptions." In place of that definition,
Justice Scalia suggested that, absent a clear congressional statement to
the contrary, the Court should never give statutes a retroactive effect,
the definition of retroactive being determined by the actual event that
a statute purports to regulate."
In dissent, Justice Blackmun argued that the Court, in its rush to
resolve tensions between Bradley and Bowen, rejected the most natural
reading of CRA section 101: that it applied to cases pending on appeal
on the date of the CRA's passage. 97 Justice Blackmun also asserted that
because this case arose under the broader, pre-Patterson interpretation
of § 1981, it would not violate the parties' expectations or vested rights
to apply these same standards now recognized again under section
101." Justice Blackmun reasoned that if a new law such as section 101
does not disturb the parties' vested rights or settled expectations, it
should apply to cases pending on that statute's enactment date."
After Rivers, the narrow reading of § 1981 established in Patterson
will govern all conduct occurring prior to the CRA's enactment, while
CRA section 101 will control all conduct occurring after that date ° 0
Although Landgraf properly held that the CRA's damage remedies
would have a retroactive effect if applied to pre-enactment cases be-
85 See Rivers, 114 S. Ct. at 1524, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 849-50 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment). In particular, justice Scalia contended that the exceptions the majority
made for not applying a procedural rule retroactively (e.g., statutes regulating filing of complaints
would not govern complaints already filed, new jury trial rule would not warrant retrial) make
no sense under the majority's definition of retroactivity because that definition is fundamentally
flawed. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
86 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). Thus, although most statutes regulate primary
conduct and hence will not be applied to trials involving pre-enactment conduct, Justice Scalia
reasoned, other statutes have different purposes and therefore regulate a different retroactivity
event. See id. at 1524-25, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 850 (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment). For example, Justice Scalia noted that a new rule of evidence governing expert
testimony seeks to regulate the conduct of trial and the event relevant to the retroactivity of the
rule is the introduction of testimony. See id. at 1525, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 850 (Scalia,
J., concurring in judgment). Thus, the rule will apply only to testimony in trials after the effective
date of the new rule. Id. at 1525, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 850 (Scalia, J., concurring
in judgment).
87 See id. at 1520, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 851 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1508-09, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 820, 840-41
(1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that presumption of retroactivity may be negatively
interred from specifically prospective provisions of CRA § 402(b) and § 109(c)).
See Rivers, 114 S. Ct. at 1520, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 851-52 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
89 See id. at 1521-22, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 852-53 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
90 See id. at 1519-20, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 848.
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cause of the new legal obligations it imposed on defendants, the deci-
sion in Rivers is more troubling. Even the Supreme Court recognized
that section 101 was a restorative statute, restoring to parties like
Maurice Rivers the rights they thought they had when the conduct
occurred. 9 ' Relying on the structure of the federal court system, how-
ever, the Supreme Court refused to give effect to those prior under-
standings because its own decision in Patterson did apply retroactively.92
The Court thus subjugated concerns with fairness and equity to con-
sistency in applying its established presumptions in favor of retroactiv-
ity for judicial decisions and against retroactivity for statutes." The
Supreme Court, therefore, refused to create an exception to its new
test for retroactive effect, leaving § 1981 plaintiffs like those in Rivers
with a more limited cause of action for conduct occurring anytime
prior to 1991.94
Beyond the scope of § 1981 cases, however, Rivers, in conjunction
with Landgraf, does much to resolve the confusion surrounding what
test a court should apply when a case implicates a statute enacted after
the violative conduct has occurred. The Supreme Court has now estab-
lished that courts must look first to the statute's text and legislative
history to determine whether Congress clearly intended the act to
apply in cases pending or conduct occurring prior to its enactment."
If congressional intent is clear, it governs the statute's temporal appli-
cation." Absent clear statements by Congress, the Court will hold to a
presumption against giving a statute retroactive effect; thus, Bowen has
become the general default rule." The Court in Rivers and Landgraf
did not overturn Bradley, however, but rather limited it to cases where
a statute would not have a "retroactive effect" if applied to pre-enact-
ment conduct." The result is a much clearer test for assessing the
temporal application of statutes where evidence of congressional intent
is absent.
The key question left unresolved by Rivers and Landgraf is how
will courts define "retroactive effect" in the future. The Court's sub-
stance/procedure definition of retroactivity (i.e., where laws creating
91 See id. at 1517-18, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 846-47,
92 See in at 1519, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 847-48.
93 See Rivers, 114 S. Ct.. at 1518, 1519, 64 Fair Empl. l'rac. Cas. (BNA) at 846, 847.
94 See id. at 1519-20, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 848.
95 See Landgraf 114 S. Ct. at 1505, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 834.
96 See, e.g., Rivers, 114 S, Ct. at 1519, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 848; Kaiser Aluminum
& Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 837 (1990).
97 See Rivers, 114 S. Ct. at 1514-15, 64 Fair Emp1. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 844.
98 See id; see also Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1501, 1503, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 832, 833.
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new legal burdens will become presumptively prospective, whereas
procedural rules and other laws not creating substantive rights will be
applied to all cases after enactment) seems to require exceptions that
Justice Scalia urges would be unnecessary if his test (i.e., searching for
the relevant event that the statute purports to regulate) were applied."
Regardless of which definition of retroactivity courts use, however, the
use of a single test will lead to much more consistent decisions than
those guided by the opposite presumptions under the rules of Bradley
and Bowen.m
By establishing a general presumption against statutory retroactiv-
ity, therefore, the Supreme Court's rulings in Rivers and Landgraf will
make it far easier for future plaintiffs and defendants to predict how
a new statute will affect pre-enactment conduct. Moreover, the Court
has shifted the burden onto Congress to establish whether a statute
should apply to pending cases or pre-enactment conduct. Landgraf and
Rivers have put Congress on notice that if it cannot agree to include
provisions giving a statute retroactive effect, the Court will not apply
new statutes affecting substantive rights retroactively. 101
In conclusion, Rivers v. Roadway Express establishes that the inter-
pretation of § 1981 set forth in CRA section 101 does not apply to cases
arising before its enactment. In such cases the narrower reading of
§ 1981 established by Patterson continues to control.'" This result rep-
resents an application of the Court's newly clarified presumption,
developed in Landgraf, against giving statutes retroactive effect.'" The
decision will deprive many plaintiffs alleging pre-Patterson discrimina-
tion under § 1981 of their causes of action even though the claims
appeared valid at the time the conduct occurred.'" At the same time,
after Rivers, a general presumption exists against giving statutes retro-
active effect, which will make it easier for plaintiffs, defendants and
Congress to assess an enacted statute's temporal effects.'" Only a clear
expression of legislative intent by Congress can now give a statute such
retroactive effect.'"
99
 See Rivers, 114 S. Ct. at 1524, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 850 (Scalia, J., concurring
in judgment); Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1499, 1501, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 830-31, 832.
1 °° See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988); Bradley v. School Bd. of
Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974).
101 See, e.g., Rivers, 114 S. Ct. at 1514-15, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 844; Landgraf,
114 S. Ct. at 1503, 1505, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 833, 834.
1 °2 See Rivers, 114 S. Ct. at 1519-20, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 848.
100 See id. at 1514-15, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 844.
104 See id. at 1517-18, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 846.
165 See id. at 1519-20, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 848.
165 See id. at 1519, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 848.
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IL AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE DOCTRINE
A. *Appropriateness of Summary Judgment for Employer in Action
Brought Under ADEA Based on After-Acquired Evidence of Employee's
Misconduct: McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co. 1
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA")
makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any em-
ployee or potential employee on the basis of age. 2 The statute aims to
promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather
than age and to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in the work-
place.s In evaluating claims of discrimination under the ADEA and
similar statutes, courts have recently struggled to determine the proper
role that after-acquired evidence should play in such lawsuits. 4
After-acquired evidence in an employment discrimination case
consists of evidence of the plaintiff's application fraud or job miscon-
duct that the employer discovered subsequent to the alleged discrimi-
nation.' The United States circuit courts' treatment of after-acquired
evidence in employment discrimination cases has differed.6 By the end
of the Survey year, the Supreme Court had not ruled on the appropri-
ate role of after-acquired evidence in employment discrimination liti-
* By David H. Abbott, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
9 F.3d 539, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 355 (6th Cir. 1993), rem d, No. 93-1543, 1995
U.S. LEXIS 699 (fan. 23, 1995).
2 29 U.S.C. § 623 (a) (1) (1988). The pertinent language of § 623 (a) is: "It shall be unlawful
for an employer—(I) to fail or to refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's age ... ." Id.
29 U.S.C. § 621(h) (1988).
See, e.g., Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., No. 93-3258, 1994 WL 396512 (3d Cir. Aug.
2, 1994); Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological Univ., 975 F.2d 302, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1249 (6th Cir. 1992); Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2c1 1174, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 997 (11th Cir. 1992); Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 48 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1107 (10th Cir. 1988).
5 See, e.g., Mardell, 1994 WL 396512, at *1. Such evidence is routinely discovered during the
employee's deposition. E.g., McKennon, 9 F.3d at 540, 63 Fair Empl. Prac Cas. (BNA) at 355.
6 Compare Summers, 864 F.2d at 708, 48 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1113 (after-acquired
evidence of employee misconduct for which employee would have been fired had employer
known of it was relevant to employee's claim of injury and precluded grant of any relief) and
Milligan-Jensen, 975 F.2d at 305, 59 Fair Empl. Prat:. Cas. (BNA) at 1251 (after-acquired evidence
of employee's application fraud which would have resulted in employee not having been hired
precluded employee from obtaining any relief) with Mardell, 1994 WL 396512, at *12 (after-ac-
quired evidence may not be considered at liability stage of employment discrimination suit, yet
is relevant and admissible at remedies stage) and Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1181, 59 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) at 1002-03 (after-acquired evidence does not operate as bar to employer's liability,
yet may be considered when determining appropriate remedies).
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gation; shortly thereafter, however, the Court resolved the conflict
among the circuits in McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co. 7
In 1988, in Summers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit delivered the
decision responsible for showcasing the issue of after-acquired evi-
dence. 5 The Tenth Circuit held that courts should award summary
judgment to an employer charged with discrimination if the employer
can prove that after-acquired evidence of the employee's misconduct
would have resulted in the employee's termination, had the employer
discovered the misconduct. 9 The court held that summary judgment
for the employer was appropriate even though the after-acquired evi-
dence was not the actual cause for the discharge.t° In Summers, a fifty-six
year old Mormon insurance claims adjuster brought suit against his
employer for both age and religious discrimination." Four years after
the alleged discrimination, while preparing for trial, the employer
discovered over 150 instances where the employee had falsified com-
pany records.' 2 The employer moved for summary judgment contend-
ing that, had the employer been aware of this misconduct at the time,
it would have terminated the employee immediately.'s The Tenth Cir-
cuit reasoned that the plaintiff had suffered no "injury" as a result of
the termination because he would have been legitimately fired had his
employer known of the misconduct at the time of its occurrence."
Accordingly, the circuit court affirmed the district court's award of
summary judgment to the employer.'' Although the court stated that
7 No. 93-1543, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 699 (Jan. 23, 1995).
8 864 F.2d at 700, 48 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1107.
9 Id. at 708, 48 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1113.
19 Id.
11 Id. at 702, 48 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1107. Summers brought his age discrimination
claim under 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988), and brought his religious discrimination claim under
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) and 3(a) (1988). Summers, 864 F.2d at 702, 48 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
at 1108.
12 Summers, 864 F.2d at 703, 48 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1108. During the course of
Summers' employment, the employer did learn that he had falsified some company records, and
warned Summers not to repeat that misconduct. Id. at 702, 48 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at
1108. It was not until after the discharge, however, that State Farm learned the extent of Summers'
falsifications, and that he had continued to falsify records even after receiving a warning from
company officials. Id. at 703, 48 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1108.
18 1d. at 703, 48 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 1109.
14 Id. at 708-09, 48 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1113.
18 Id., 48 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 1113. In reaching this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit
referred to the Supreme Court's reasoning in cases where an employer terminated an employee
for both legitimate and unlawful motives. Id. at 705-06, 48 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at
1110-11. In Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284 (1977), the Court held that
the employee cannot prevail in such "mixed motive" cases if the legitimate motive alone would
have sufficed to justify the employee's dismissal.
In addition to its reference to Mt. Healthy, the Tenth Circuit analogized the Summers case
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the after-acquired evidence acted to preclude a grant of relief for
alleged discrimination, the rule enunciated by the Tenth Circuit in
Summers effectively results in such evidence operating as a complete
defense to employer liability in discrimination cases)
In 1992, in Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co., the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit adopted a different approach
to after-acquired evidence, holding that such evidence was only rele-
vant with respect to determining the appropriate remedies available to
a plaintiff who had already prevailed in a trial on the merits of an
employment discrimination claim.''' In Wallace, the plaintiff brought
actions under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 18
 During the discovery process, the em-
ployer learned that the employee had lied on her employment appli-
cation in response to a question concerning past criminal convictions."
Armed with this new evidence, the employer moved for partial sum-
mary judgment on the wrongful discharge claim under the Summers
rule.28
While granting partial summary judgment to the employer with
respect to the plaintiff's claims for reinstatement, front pay and an
injunction, the Eleventh Circuit refused to consider such evidence as
a complete defense to liability, ruling that to do so would inappropri-
to a hypothetical involving a "masquerading company doctor." Summers, 864 F.2d at 708, 48 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1113. If a company doctor is fired on the basis of his age, race, religion
and sex, and the company, in defending a civil rights action, subsequently discovers that the
discharged employee was not a "doctor," the court concluded that the masquerading employee
would not he entitled to relief, and the employee in Summers, in the view of the Tenth Circuit,
was in no better a position. Id. This hypothetical has been oft-repeated by other courts applying
the Tenth Circuit's approach in Summers, See, e.g„ Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological
Univ., 975 F.2d 302, 304, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas, (BNA) 1249, 1250 (6th Cir. 1992); Johnson v,
Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409, 415, 57 Fair Empl. Prac, Cas. (BNA) 1363, 1367 (6th Cir.
1992).
IS
 See Summers, 864 F.2(1 at 708, 48 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1113. The Tenth Circuit's
holding in Summers has been described as the "complete defense" approach to the after-acquired
evidence doctrine due to the fact that, if after-acquired evidence is presented to the court and
there is no credible dispute as to whether the employer would not have hired or would have fired
the employee on the basis of such evidence, the issues of liability and whether or not the employer
actually engaged in unlawful discrimination become irrelevant—the employer must be awarded
summary judgment. Id.; see also Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins., 93-3258, 1994 WI., 396512, at '1'4
(3d Cir. Aug. 2, 1994),
17
 Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1181, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) 997,
1003 (11th Cir. 1992).
IS Id. at 1176, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 999. The Fair Labor Standards Act claims
were brought under 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(d) (1), 215(a) (2) and 215(a) (3), and the Title VII claims
were brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) (1) and 2000e-3 (a). Id.
19 Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1176-77, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 999. Specifically, the
employee indicated to the employer that she had no prior criminal convictions, whets in fact she
had been previously convicted for possession of cocaine and marijuana. Id.
20 Id. at 1177-78, 59 Fair Empl. Prac, gas. (BNA) at 999-1000.
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ately ignore the lapse of time between the employment decision and
the discovery of a legitimate motive for that decision. 2 ' The Eleventh
Circuit also expressed concern that the Summers rule might invite
employers to expend less effort in preventing discrimination, in that
they may escape liability altogether through the use of after-acquired
evidence of the employee's misdeeds. 22 In Wallace, then, the Eleventh
Circuit ruled that although after-acquired evidence is relevant to the
determination of relief due a successful plaintiff, it does not provide
an affirmative defense to liability for employment discrimination. 23
Similarly, in August of 1994, in Mardell v. Harleysville Life Insurance
Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit joined
the Eleventh Circuit in rejecting the Summers rule, holding that courts
should consider after-acquired evidence only at the later stage of an
employment discrimination suit when they determine remedies (the
"remedies stage"). 24 The plaintiff in Mardell alleged both age and
gender discrimination in a suit where the employer learned during the
discovery process that the employee had made several misrepresenta-
tions on her resume and job application concerning her education
and past experience.25 Due to these misrepresentations, the trial
court concluded that the employee had suffered no legally cognizable
injury and granted summary judgment to the employee on the basis
of this after-acquired evidence. 26 In addition to the evidence of the
employee's misrepresentations, the court based its decision on an
affidavit from the individual who hired the plaintiff stating that he
relied on the employee's resume and application and that, had he
known of the misrepresentations, he would not have hired her. 27 Lastly,
the court noted testimony from the plaintiffs supervisor indicating that
he would have fired her had he learned of her misrepresentations
during her employment. 28
2 ' Id. at 1181, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1002.
22 Id. at 1180, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1002.
23 1d. at 1181, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1002-03. Under the Eleventh Circuit's
analysis, after-acquired evidence concerning misconduct for which the employee would have been
terminated had the employer been aware of it operates as a matter of law to bar a successful
plaintiffs claim for reinstatement, front pay or an injunction. Id. at 1184, 59 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) at 1005.
24 No. 93-3258, 1994 WL 396512, at *1 (3d Cir. Aug. 2, 1994).
25 Id. at *2. Specifically, the employee had (1) claimed to possess a university degree when
in fact she had not completed all of the required coursework, and (2) exaggerated duties, terms
and periods of employment associated with her prior work history. Id. at *2-3,
2" Id. at *3.
27 id.
28
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The Third Circuit reversed the district court's order of summary
judgment, reasoning that the sole question to be answered at the initial
stage of a trial determining liability (the "liability stage") in an ADEA
or Title VII action is whether the employer discriminated against the
employee on the basis of an impermissible factor at the instant of the
adverse employment action. 29
 The Third Circuit also held, however,
that after-acquired evidence of application fraud or job misconduct is
relevant to at least some issues at the remedies stage, and is, therefore,
admissible at that point."
Conversely, in 1992, in Johnson v. Honeywell Information Systems,
Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, interpret-
ing Michigan law, held that in employment discrimination cases in
which resume fraud is discovered after discharge, summary judgment
for the employer is appropriate when the misrepresentation or omis-
sion was material, directly related to measuring the candidate for
employment, and when the employer relied upon the information in
making the hiring decision)" In Johnson, a field relations manager
brought suit for wrongful discharge and illegal retaliatory termination
under a state civil rights statute." During the course of discovery, the
employer learned that the employee had falsified her employment
application in several respects, including exaggerations of both her
formal education and past employment." The employer moved for
29
 Man/4 1994 WI.. 396512, at *1, *5. The Third Circuit repeated the concern of the
Eleventh Circuit that the Summers rule ignores the time lapse between the employer's action and
the discovery of a legitimate motive for that action. Id. at *5.
so
	 at *11-12. The Third Circuit expressed caution that, in considering after-acquired
evidence during the remedies stage of a trial, courts should exercise care to ensure that such
evidence does not affect the liability verdict. Id. at *12.
31 955 F.2d 409, 414, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1363, 1365 (6th Cir. 1992). The Sixth
Circuit. has stated that these three requirements must be satisfied in order for the after-acquired
evidence doctrine to be applied in resume and application fraud cases; the misrepresentation or
omission must he (1) material, (2) directly related to measuring the candidate for employment,
and (3) a factor which was relied upon by the employer in making the hiring decision. Id. These
requirements were an attempt by the court to ensure that employers would not simply comb
through a discharged employee's record for evidence of trivial misrepresentations in an effort to
avoid liability for an otherwise unlawful discharge. Id.
"Johnson, 955 F.2d at 411, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cat. (BNA) at 1363.
" Id. at 411-12, 57 Fair Dupl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1363-64. Specifically, the employee
claimed on her application form to have earned a college degree from a particular university,
while in fact she completed only four courses there. Id. Additionally, she claimed to have studied
at a second university, when in fact that university had no record of her enrollment. Id. Lastly,
the employee claimed to have been managing properties that she owned immediately prior to
her employment with the defendant, when in fact she owned no such properties, and had been
unemployed immediately prior to her hiring by the defendant. Id.
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summary judgment arguing that the misrepresentations provided a
complete defense to liability."
On the basis of Michigan appeals court precedent, the Sixth
Circuit concluded that the Michigan Supreme Court would admit
evidence of employee misconduct occurring prior to termination as
substantive evidence during the liability stage." Such evidence, the
court concluded, could give rise to just cause for termination even if
the former employer did not become aware of the misconduct until
after the discharge." Citing Summers, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that
if after-acquired evidence concerned material misrepresentations
upon which the employer relied in its hiring decision, then the evi-
dence established "valid and legitimate" reasons for termination, and
courts should grant summary judgment for the employer." Because
the employer established that it would not have hired the employee
and would have fired her had it been aware of the misrepresentations,
the court held that the employee deserved no relief, even if the em-
ployee could prove that the employer was guilty of unlawful conduct."
In another 1992 decision, Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological
University, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reiterated its commitment to the Summers rule by holding that an
employee who made material misrepresentations on her employment
application was not entitled to damages on her claims of sex discrimi-
nation and unlawful retaliatory termination." Despite the trial court's
determination that the employer had in fact engaged in unlawful
discrimination, the Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff's misrepresen-
tations barred her recovery as a matter of law.° In Milligan:Jensen, a
security officer omitted a "Driving Under the Influence" conviction
from her employment application.'" The court reasoned that, because
the employee would not have been hired, and would have been fired,
if the employer had been aware of the falsification, the employee
suffered no legally cognizable damage from the termination. 42 Conse-
34 Id, at 412, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1364.
33 Id. at 413, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1365.
38 Id. The Sixth Circuit relied on what was at the time an unpublished per curiam opinion
of the Michigan Court of Appeals. Id.; see Bradley v. Philip Morris, Inc., 486 N.W.2d 48 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1991). The court stated that its ruling was based on "common sense" as well. Johnson,
955 F.2d at 413, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1365.
"Johnson, 955 F.2d at 414, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1365.
38 Id. at 415, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1367,
39 9 75 F.2d 302, 303, 305, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1249, 1249, 1251 (6th Cir. 1992).
49 Id., 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1251.
41 Id. at 303, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1250.
42 Id. at 304-05, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1251. The trial court found that, although
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quently, the Sixth Circuit reversed the trial court's judgment for the
employee, holding that because the employee materially falsified her
application, she had suffered no damage as a result of the discrimina-
tion and unlawful termination, and therefore had no legitimate claim
to relief."
During the Survey year, in McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing
Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that
an employer charged with discrimination was entitled to summary
judgment upon a showing of after-acquired evidence of misconduct
that indisputably would have resulted in the plaintiff's discharge had
the evidence been discovered prior to the plaintiffs departure from
the company." In so holding, the Sixth Circuit further embraced the
Summers approach to after-acquired evidence in employment discrimi-
nation cases, expanding its reach from cases involving resume and
application fraud to litigation involving job misconduct. 45
 Furthermore,
the Sixth Circuit held that courts should apply Summers even in cases
where the employee's misconduct relates to her claim of unlawful
discrimination . 46
In McKennon, the Nashville Banner Publishing Co. (the "Nashville
Banner") terminated a sixty-two year old secretary who had worked for
the Nashville Banner for thirty-nine years. 47 The employee, Christine
McKennon, subsequently brought suit for age discrimination under
the ADEA. 48 Upon taking her deposition, the Nashville Banner learned
that McKennon had, during her employment, copied and removed
several confidential documents from the Nashville Banner's offices and
showed them to her husband. 49 The plaintiff asserted that she did this
the mere conviction itself would not have resulted in the employee's termination, the falsification
of the application would have resulted in her discharge. Id. at 304 n.1, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 1250 n.l.
43 See Milligan -Jensen, 975 F.2d at 309-05, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1251.
44 E3d 539, 543, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 355, 358 (6th Cir. 1993), moil, No. 93-1543,
1995 U.S. LEXIS 699 (Jan. 23, 1995),
43 Id. at 541, 543, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 356, 358.
46 1d. at 593, 63 Fair limp'. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 357-58. Although this sort of argument had
been raised in and rejected by other courts, this was the first instance in which the Sixth Circuit
addressed it. Cf. O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 784 F. Supp. 1466, 1467, 58 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 536, 538 (D. Ariz. 1992) (after-acquired evidence of employee's removal
and photocopying of his confidential personnel file acted to bar his recovery on claim of
discrimination, despite his assertion that his purpose was to gather information to prepare for
filing charge with Equal Employment Opportunity Commission).
47 McKennon, 9 F.3d at 590, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 355.
48 Id.
49 Id. The documents included a Payroll Ledger, a Profit and Loss Statement, notes, a
memorandum, and an agreement between the employer and one of its managing employees. Id.
at 540 n.1, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 355 n.l.
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in an effort to gather information regarding her job security, and to
obtain evidence regarding her anticipated impending wrongful dis-
charge on the basis of her age. 5°
Upon discovering this new information, the Nashville Banner sent
McKennon a letter stating that it would have fired her immediately
during her employment had it been aware of her misconduct. 5 ' The
Nashville Banner then moved for summary judgment on the basis of
the newly-acquired evidence of McKennon's misconduct." The em-
ployer's motion for summary judgment assumed, for purposes of the
motion, that it did unlawfully discriminate and would be liable to the
plaintiff, but for the fact that, before discharge, McKennon had com-
mitted misconduct that, if discovered at that time, would have resulted
in her dismissa1. 53
The Nashville Banner contended that under the Summers rule, as
adopted by the Sixth Circuit in Johnson and Milligan-Jensen, it was
entitled to summary judgment. 54 The district court found from the
testimony of the Nashville Banner's officers and McKennon's deposi-
tion that the company indisputably would have fired McKennon had
it known of the misconduct. 55 As a result, the district court granted
summary judgment for the Nashville Banner, reasoning that the plain-
tiff's misconduct provided adequate and just cause for her dismissal as
a matter of law. 56
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision and held that Summers
mandates summary judgment as a matter of law for an employer
charged with discrimination if evidence of the plaintiff's misconduct
surfaces after the discharge, and the employer can prove it would have
fired the employee based on that misconduct had the employer been
aware of it." The court followed the reasoning of Summers in acknow-
5° Id. at 540, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 355.
5] Id.
" McKennon, 9 F.3d at 541, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 355-56.
55 Id. in support of its motion, the Nashville Banner submitted sworn affidavits from several
of its executives stating that McKennon would have been discharged for such conduct. Id. at 541
n.3, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 356 n.3. Apparently, McKennon herself may have conceded
this at one point during her deposition. Id. This issue, however, was disputed on appeal. See Brief
for Petitioner to the United States Supreme Court at *24-25, McKennon v. Nashville Banner
Publishing Co., 1994 WL 385636 (1995) (No. 93-1543).
54 See McKennon, 9 F.3d at 541, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 355-56.
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 797 F. Supp. 604, 608, 59 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 60, 62-63 (M.D. Tenn. 1992).
56 Id., 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 63.
McKennon, 9 F.3c1 at 541, 543, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 356, 358. With respect
to McKennon's contention that her "misconduct" related to her claim of unlawful discrimina-
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ledging that even though the after-acquired evidence was not the cause
for the discharge, it was both relevant to and determinative of McKen-
non's claim of "injury" and precluded the grant of any relief. 58
 The
wisdom and fairness of this approach to after-acquired evidence in
employment discrimination cases has undergone vigorous challenge
in academic journals. 59
tion—and therefore the Summers rule should not apply to her case—the Sixth Circuit ruled that
such a nexus between the misconduct and the discrimination claim is irrelevant under the
Summers doctrine. Id. at 543, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 357-58. The employee claimed
that she copied and removed the corporate documents solely for her own protection in the event
the company terminated her for what she anticipated to be an unlawful reason. Id. at 540, 63
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 355. The McKennon court held that the particular nature of the
employee's misconduct makes no difference in the court's treatment of after-acquired evidence
unless the alleged misconduct is "protected" under the statute the employer has been charged
with violating. Id. at 543 n.7, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 358 n.7. Under the ADEA, if an
employee's alleged "misconduct" is within a category of protected conduct listed in the statute's
"opposition clause," the employer will be held liable for discriminatory actions taken as a result
of an employee's protected conduct. 29 U.S.C. § 623(d). Such protected conduct is confined to
an employee's opposition to unlawful discrimination under the ADEA, and to an employee's
participation and assistance in investigations performed pursuant to the ADEA. Id. In support of
its ruling, the Sixth Circuit cited two cases holding that copying and removing an employer's
confidential documents is not protected conduct under the opposition clause. McKennon, 9 F.3d
at 543 n.7, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 357 n.7; see jefferies v, Harris County Community
Action ASS'11, 615 F.2d 1025, 1036, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 974, 981 (5th Cir. 1980); O'Day
v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 784 F. Stipp, 1466, 1470, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
536, 538 (D. Ariz. 1992). The court determined that copying and removing confidential docu-
ments is not "protected" conduct under the ADEA, and therefore the relationship between
McKennon's misconduct and the alleged discrimination was irrelevant. McKennon, 9 F.3d at 543
n.7, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 358 n.7.
" McKennon, 9 F.3d at 541-42, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 356. Noting that it had
already adopted the Summers rule in cases of resume and application fraud, the court pointed
out that the rule was an even better fit in McKennon because both Summers and McKennon
involved job misconduct. M. at 542, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 357.
In addition to its reliance on Summers arid Sixth Circuit precedent, the court gathered
further support for its holding from a 1992 district court opinion in a factually similar case. Id.
The court cited with approval O'Day, where an employer discovered at deposition that a former
employee alleging that lie was discriminated against under the ADEA had removed and copied
elements of his personnel file from his supervisor's desk and showed portions of the material to
a co-worker. 784 F. Stipp. at 1467-68, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 536-37. In O'Day, the
United States District Court for the District of Arizona awarded summary judgment to the
employer once it found that there "was no question as to the outcome of [the employee's)
employment status" had the employer known of the misconduct: the employee would have been
fired. Id. at 1469, 1470, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 537, 539. The Sixth Circuit in McKennon
found that, as in O'Day, the statements of the employer's officials that the employee would have
been fired had the employer learned of the misconduct, absent any contrary evidence presented
by the plaintiff, supported summary judgment for the defendant. See McKennon, 9 F.3d at 543,
63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 357.
59 See, e.g., Rebecca H. White & Robert D. Brussack, The Proper Role of After-Acquired Evidence
in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 35 B.C. L. REV. 49, 53 (1993) ("The after-acquired
evidence doctrine in its current form amounts to an enormous loophole in the interpretation of
our civil rights laws that must be closed."); Ann C. McGinley, Reinventing Reality: The Impermissible
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On January 23, 1995, the United States Supreme Court unani-
mously reversed the Sixth Circuit's decision in McKennon, holding that
after-acquired evidence of wrongdoing that would have resulted in the
plaintiff's discharge is not a complete bar to recovery under employ-
ment discrimination statutes such as the ADEA. 6° Reasoning that such
laws are intended to deter discrimination and compensate its victims,
the Court concluded that allowing after-acquired evidence to operate
as a complete bar to recovery frustrates both of these statutory pur-
poses. 61 The Court ruled, however, that after-acquired evidence of the
plaintiffs misconduct which would have resulted in the plaintiffs
dismissal must be considered when determining the specific remedy
to be awarded in employment discrimination cases. 62
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy dismissed as erroneous the
Sixth Circuit's conclusion that after-acquired evidence of employee
misconduct can render the inquiry into allegations of employer dis-
crimination entirely irrelevant.° The Court distinguished cases such as
McKennon from "mixed motive" cases, in which both legitimate and
unlawful motives spur an employer's alleged discriminatory action."
Intrusion of After-Acquired Evidence in Title VII Litigation, 26 CONN. L. REV. 145, 161 (1993) ("The
Civil Rights Act of 1991 clearly does not permit the intrusion of after -acquired evidence as an
absolute defense . . ."); Gian Brown, Note, Employee Misconduct and the Affirmative Defense of
"After-Acquired Evidence," 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 381, 384 (1993) ("the majority approach to
wrongful discharge suits involving the affirmative defense of 'after-acquired' evidence is funda-
mentally flawed because it allows an employer to benefit from information that it discovered only
as a result of its discrimination"); Samuel A. Mills, Note, Toward an Equitable After-Acquired
Evidence Rule, 94 Cotust. L. REV. 1525, 1526 (1994) ("the 'complete defense' rule, initially set
forth by the Tenth Circuit in Summers . . . is unjust and inconsistent with the purposes of both
Title VII and the ADEA"); Kenneth G. Parker, Note, After-Aquired Evidence in Employment Dis-
crimination Cases: A State of Disarray, 72 Tex. L. REV. 403, 406 (1993) ("the proper treatment of
after-acquired evidence would never allow such evidence to affect employer liability"); Pauline
Yoo, The After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine, 25 COLUM. HUM. Rrs. L. REV. 219, 221 (1993) (the
Summers doctrine leads to "harsh, unjust results , .. [and] should be reexamined in order to
restore the goals of employment discrimination legislation"); Cheryl K. Zemelman, Note, The
After-Acquired Evidence Defense to Employment Discrimination Claims: The Privatization of Title VII
and the Contours of Social Responsibility, 46 STAN. L. REV. 175, 175 (1993) ("[the after-acquired
evidence] defense undercuts the purposes of Title VII by allowing employers to avoid responsi-
bility in those cases where discrimination was in fact a motivating factor in their employment
decisions"). For a rare contrasting view, see William M. Muth, jr., Note, The After-Acquired Evidence
Doctrine in Title VII Cases and the Challenge Presented by Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co., 968
E2d 1174 (11th Or. 1992), 72 NEB. L. REV. 330, 332 (1993) ("Future decisions will hopefully
serve to solidify the logically sound reasoning behind the after-acquired evidence doctrine,
leading to its general acceptance in courts throughout the nation").
50 No. 93-1543, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 699, at *8, *9.
°1 Id. at *11-13.
62 1d. at *16-18.
63 Id. at *9.
64 Id. at *14.
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The Court observed that in after-acquired evidence cases, under the
Summers doctrine, a court assumes for purposes of the summary judg-
ment motion that the employer in fact terminated the employee solely
for unlawful reasons. 65 Due to this key difference, the Court stated, the
Summers doctrine erred in treating after-acquired evidence cases analo-
gously to "mixed motive" cases." 6 "Mixed motive" precedent, the Court
explained, is inapposite in the context of after-acquired cases, and
therefore the Tenth Circuit inappropriately relied on it to bar the
plaintiff's recovery in Summers.°
Although holding that after-acquired evidence cannot be a de-
fense to employer liability, the Court concluded that evidence of em-
ployee misconduct may be relevant and admissible in the determination
of relief for victims of unlawful discrimination.6" The Court dismissed
the argument that the equitable doctrine barring recovery by plaintiffs
with unclean hands should bar the plaintiffs recovery in this case. 69 It
noted that that doctrine does not apply where Congress has authorized
broad equitable relief in an effort to accomplish important national
policies, such as the eradication of workplace discrimination. 70 The
Court concluded, however, that both common sense and the need to
preserve employers' lawful prerogatives in the usual course of their
business required courts to consider the possibility of employee wrong-
doing when fashioning appropriate equitable relief: 7' According to the
Court, employers may rely on such evidence to limit damages only
when the misconduct would have resulted in the employee's termina-
tion had the employer become aware of it. 72
Although unwilling to promulgate a general rule with respect to
relief to be awarded in after-acquired evidence cases, the Court held
that in cases such as McKennon, where an employer proves that the
employee would have been discharged at the time of the misconduct
had the employer discovered it, neither reinstatement nor front pay is
an appropriate remedy." Back pay, on the other hand, may be awarded
in such instances. 74 In computing back pay, McKennon instructs courts
to measure such compensation from the date of the unlawful discharge
ss McKennon, No. 93-1543, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 699, at *14-15.
e6
67 la
66 Id. at *16.
69 Id. at *16- 17.
McKennon, No. 93-1543, 1995 U.S, LEXIS 699, at *16-17.
71 M. at *17-19.
72 Id. at *20-21.
75 Id. at *18,
74 Id. at *19,
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to the date the employer discovered the "after-acquired" information
and could have lawfully terminated the employee. 75
The United States Supreme Court, through its invalidation of the
Summers approach to after-acquired evidence, has removed a substan-
tial obstacle to the effective enforcement of the ADEA and other
statutes enacted to eliminate discrimination in the workplace:76 As the
Court noted, the two paramount purposes of employment discrimina-
tion statutes are to deter violations of the law and to compensate
victims of unlawful discrimination." By affording an employer the
opportunity to avoid all liability, the Summers treatment of after-ac-
quired evidence as a complete defense to discrimination claims re-
duced the deterrent effect of employment discrimination statutes and
risked denying compensation to victims of illegal discrimination. 78
The Court in McKennon correctly emphasized that at the liability
stage of an employment discrimination lawsuit, the sole relevant issue
is the legality of the employer's motivation at the time of the employ-
ment decision. 79 After-acquired evidence concerning the employee's
background or conduct is irrelevant and should be inadmissible at that
stage.8° It is, however, both reasonable and appropriate for courts to
preclude the grant of certain remedies, such as reinstatement or in-
junctive relief, in instances where an employer has discovered evidence
of the plaintiff's application fraud or job misconduct, and can prove
that it would have rejected or fired the plaintiff on those grounds. 8 '
The Court's placement of the burden of proof on the defendant
ensures that victims of discrimination will be entitled to full relief in
all but the more serious instances of employee wrongdoing. 82 On the
other hand, other remedies such as declaratory relief, attorney's fees,
partial back pay, compensatory damages for emotional distress and
punitive damages, if otherwise available under the relevant statute,
properly remain open for the court's consideration. 83
McKennon, No. 93-1543, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 699, at *19-20. The Court further stated that
courts may consider extraordinary equitable circumstances affecting the legitimate interests of
either party in their determination of appropriate relief. Id. at *20.
76 See, e.g., Mardell v. Harleysville Life Insurance Co., No. 93-3258, 1994 WL 396512, at *10
(3d Cir. Aug. 2, 1994) ("the Summers approach . . . frustrates the paramount objective of Title
VII and ADEA, to deter violations of the law").
77 See id. at *10, *11.
78 McKennon, No. 93-1543, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 699, at *19-20.
79 See id. at *15.
" See id.
61 See id. at *14.
" Id. at *20.
99 See McKennon, No. 93-1543, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 699, at *19-20; Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co.,
968 F.2d 1174, 1182-83, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 997, 1003-04 (11th Cir. 1992).
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The Court's treatment of after-acquired evidence upholds the
legal rights of the employer to make legitimate employment decisions,
yet still provides appropriate relief to victims of unlawful discrimina-
tion." In circumscribing the use of after-acquired evidence to the
remedies stage of employment discrimination lawsuits, the Court's
decision in McKennon succeeds in drawing a boundary between the
preservation of an employer's lawful managerial role and the compen-
sation of an individual who suffered discrimination." For these rea-
sons, the Supreme Court correctly ruled that the Sixth Circuit's ap-
proach to the after-acquired evidence in McKennon was fatally flawed
in failing to distinguish between a discriminatory employer's liability
and an employee's entitlement to particular forms of relief.
Although McKennon's invalidation of the Summers rule is a major
step forward, the decision may not adequately resolve all issues sur-
rounding the role of after-acquired evidence." For example, the deci-
sion may not provide sufficient safeguards to ensure that juries pre-
sented with evidence of the plaintiffs misconduct do not respond to
such information by refusing to award damages other than back pay
limited to the period from the unlawful termination to the employer's
discovery of the wrongdoing.° Similarly, the ability of employers to "cut
off' back pay awards—and potentially limit overall recoveries—by pro-
ducing after-acquired evidence will likely result in their routine under-
taking of extensive discovery." Although the opinion in McKennon
encourages courts to utilize the awarding of attorney's fees and Rule
11 sanctions to prevent discovery abuse, it is unclear whether such
measures will in fact be implemented regularly and uniformly." Lastly,
the degree of employers' discovery will be matched by employees'
discovery efforts intended to prove that the employer would not have
in fact terminated the plaintiff for the misconduct.'" Such comprehen-
sive discovery by both parties may increase the costs of litigating dis-
crimination claims.''
In sum, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
in a decision subsequently reversed by the United States Supreme Court,
84 See, e.g., White & lirus.sack, supra note 59, at 95,
85 See Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins., No. 93-3258, 1994 WL 396512, at *11 (3d Cir. Aug. 2,
1994); see Wallace, 968 F.2(1 at 1181, 59 Fair Etnpl. l'rac. Cas. (13NA) at 1003.
86 For early reactions from the bar to the Supreme Court's decision in McKennon, see Aaron
M. Grossman, Damages Are Reduced in Discrimination by Worker's Misconduct, LAW. WKLY. USA,
Jan. 30, 1995, at 1.
87 1d at I S.
88 Id.
88 McKennon, No. 93-1543, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 699, at *20-21.
•(' Grossman, supra note 86, at 13.
91 Id.
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held in McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co. that after-acquired
evidence mandates summary judgment for an employer charged with
discrimination under the ADEA, so long as the employer demonstrates
that the employee would have been discharged had the misconduct
surfaced while the employee remained employed by the company.92
The Supreme Court rejected the Sixth Circuit's treatment of after-ac-
quired evidence, holding that such information does not completely
bar an employee's claim or recovery under the ADEA. 93 Although
McKennon invalidates the Summers "complete defense" approach to
after-acquired evidence, the decision requires courts to consider such
evidence when ordering specific remedies, provided the employer
proves that the employee would have indeed been terminated for the
misconduct had the employer been aware of it.'" If the employer
satisfies this burden of proof, McKennon articulates a general rule that
the plaintiff is not entitled to either reinstatement or front pay, and
that back pay should be calculated from the date of the unlawful
termination to the date that the employer discovers the employee's
wrongdoing.95
HI. FEDERAL INCOME TAX CONSEQUENCES
A. * Tax Status of Damages Awarded Under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act: Schmitz v. Commissioner' and Downey v.
Commissioner2
Section 61(a) of the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") defines gross
income as all income from whatever source derived. 5 IRC section
104(a) (2) excludes from gross income damages a taxpayer receives,
either as settlement or trial award, in compensation for personal inju-
ries or sickness.' The regulations promulgated under section 104(a) (2)
narrow the scope of excluded damages to those received through the
prosecution or settlement of an action based on "tort or tort type
rights."' Thus, in determining the tax status of damages received under
92 9 F.3d 539, 543, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 355, 358 (6th Cir. 1993), rev'd, No. 93-1543,
1995 U.S. LEX1S 699 (1995).
McKennon, No. 93-1543, 1995 U.S. LEX1S 699, at *8, *9.
94 Id. at *9, *18, *20.
95 Id. at *18-20.
* By Elizabeth A. Taylor, Staff Member, BosTotg COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
34 F.3d 790, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1195 (9th Cir. 1994).
2 33 F.3d 836, 65 Fair Empl. Pntc. Cas. (BNA) 1192 (7th Cir. 1994).
3 26 U.S.C. § 61(a) (1988).
4 26 U.S.C. § 104(a) (2) (1988).
5 26 C.F.R. § 1.104-1(c) (1994).
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the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 6 courts must
consider whether ADEA claims reflect the characteristics of tort-like
causes of action and are therefore excluded from gross income by
section 104(a) (2). 7
In 1986, in Threlkeld v. Commissioner, the United States Tax Court
held that section 104(a) (2) excluded from gross income all compen-
satory damages received in settlement of a malicious prosecution claim. 8
The taxpayer in Threlkeld did not report as gross income settlement
damages he received for injury to his professional reputation deriving
from a malicious prosecution claim." The court reasoned that because
section 104(a) (2) excludes damages received as compensation for per-
sonal injuries, the court's sole inquiry should be whether the underly-
ing claim was one for "personal injuries."'" The court further reasoned
that this action for malicious prosecution constituted an action for
personal injuries because it allows recovery for injury to reputation and
because the law of Tennessee, where the plaintiffs brought the action,
characterizes malicious prosecution as a personal tort action." Thus,
the court held that the underlying cause of action was tort-like within
the meaning of the regulations promulgated under section 104(a) (2)
and therefore that the taxpayer could exclude from gross income the
damages he received.' 2
In 1990, in Rickel v. Commissioner, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit applied the reasoning of Threlkeld and
held that section 104(a) (2) excluded from gross income damages
received in an ADEA action.'s In Rickel, a taxpayer did not report as
gross income two payments of a settlement he received in an ADEA
suit against his former employer.' 4 The court analogized age discrimi-
nation to a personal injury because the employer's discrimination
constituted an injury to the individual rights of the person. 15 The court
held, therefore, that section 104(a) (2) excluded all damages flowing
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
7 See, e.g., Redfield v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 940 E2d 542, 547, 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1991); Pistillo v, Commissioner, 912 F.2d 145, 148, 55 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1219, 1221 (6th Cir. 1990); Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655, 658, 52 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1389, 1391 (3d Cir. 1990).
8 87 `EC. 1294, 1308 (1986).
9 Id. at 1297.
to Id. at 1299.
11 Id. at 1307.
12 Id. at 1308.
'900 F.2d 655, 664, 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1389, 1395 (3d Cir. 1990).
14 Id, at 657, 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 1390.
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from this age discrimination action because of the tort-like nature of
the underlying claim.' 6
Similarly, in 1990, in Pistillo v. Commissioner, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that section 104(a) (2)
excludes age discrimination damages." In Pistillo, a taxpayer did not
include in his gross income the amount he received as settlement of
an ADEA claim against his former employer. 18 Following the reasoning
of Threlkeld and Rickel, the court focused on the nature of the claim
to determine if the underlying cause of action was tort-like.' 9 The court
allowed that the injury of lost wages is not as "personal" as the physical
or emotional injuries resulting from other torts.° Nevertheless, it rea-
soned that the underlying cause of action for which plaintiffs receive
lost wages is tort-like because it seeks to compensate for indignities,
insults and invasions of individual rights. 2 ' Therefore, the court held
that section 104(a) (2) excluded damages received by the taxpayer in
settlement of his age discrimination suit as damages received on ac-
count of personal injuries. 22
In 1991, in Redfield v. Insurance Co. of North America, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit joined the Third and
Sixth Circuits in excluding a settlement amount in an age discrimina-
tion suit from a person's taxable income. 25 In a suit brought under the
ADEA and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, a federal
district court in the Ninth Circuit awarded the taxpayer economic,
emotional distress and punitive damages. 24 The taxpayer's former em-
ployer withheld taxes from the payment of the economic damages
portion of the award and the taxpayer refused to acknowledge satisfac-
tion of the judgment, arguing that it was not taxable income.25 The
Ninth Circuit analogized ADEA actions to other federal discrimination
causes of action, which many courts have held to be actions sounding
in tort, and concluded that ADEA actions are tort-like. 26 The court
further reasoned that the nature of a claim under the ADEA is tort-like,
rather than contractual, because a claim can arise even in the absence
I 6 /d. at 663-64, 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1395.
17 912 F.2d 145, 148, 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1219, 1221 (6th Cir. 1990).
113 Id, at 147, 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1220.
" See id. at 149-50, 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1222-23.
20 See id. at 150, 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1223.
21 See id.
22 Pistillo, 912 F.2d at 150, 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1223.
23 940 F.2d 542, 547, 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1991).
24 Id. at 544, 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 977.
25 Id.
211 Id. at 546, 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 979.
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of a written employment contract.° Therefore, the Ninth Circuit ex-
cluded ADEA damages from gross income under section 104(a) (2)
because they flow from a tort-like cause of action. 28
In 1992, the United States Supreme Court shifted the focus of
analysis drastically, in United States v. Burke, holding that section 104(a) (2)
does not exclude back pay awards received in settlement of Title VII
claims.29 The taxpayer in Burke filed suit under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, alleging that her employer discriminated unlawfully
on the basis of sex in paying salaries." The parties reached a settlement
and the employer withheld federal income tax from the amount it paid
to the taxpayer.si
The Court reasoned that because the remedies awarded are cen-
tral to the definition of torts, courts should focus on the nature of the
remedies available under a particular statute in determining the tax
status of damages awarded under such statutes." The Court concluded
that because the remedies provided under Title VII did not compen-
sate a plaintiff for any of the traditional harms associated with torts,
such as pain and suffering, emotional distress or harm to reputation,
a claim under Title VII was not tort-like." Thus, the Court held that
section 104(a) (2) does not exclude Title VII damages from gross in-
come."
In decisions applying Burke to ADEA cases, the federal courts have
split over whether damages awarded in ADEA suits constitute taxable
gross income." The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of California and the United States Claims Court distinguished Burke,
holding that ADEA claims are more tort-like than Title VII claims and
27 See id.
28 Redfield, 940 F.2d at 547, 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 979.
25 See 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1874, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1323, 1329 (1992). Before the
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Title VII limited available remedies to back pay,
injunctions and other equitable relief'. See Burke, 112 S. Ct., at 1872 n.8, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(RNA) at 1327 11.8. All references are to the "tinamencled" Title VD.
mid. at 1868-69, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1325.
31 Id. at 1869, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1325.
52 See id. at 1871-72, 58 Fair Einpl. Prac. Cas. (11NA) at 1326-27.
33 Id. at 1873-74, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1328-29.
34 Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1874, 58 Fair Einpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1329.
35 See, e.g, Shaw v. United States, 853 F. Stipp. 1378, 1382, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (11NA)
961, 964 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (holding ADEA damages not excludable); Rice v. United States, 834
F. Stipp. 1241, 1245, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (11NA) 1189, 1192 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (holding ADEA
damages excludable), affil 35 F.Scl 571 (9th Cit .. 1994); Maleszewski v, United States, 827 F. Stipp.
1553, 1557, 62 Fair Ettipl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 327, 330 (N.D. Fla. 1993) (holding ADEA damages
not excludable); Bennett v. United States, 30 Cl. Ct.. 396, 401, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1375, 1379 (1994) (holding ADEA damages excludable).
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thus section 104(a) (2) excludes them from gross income." In contrast,
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida
and the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama
followed Burke, holding that the relief available under the ADEA was
essentially the same as that afforded to Tide VII plaintiffs and, there-
fore, section 104(a) (2) does not exclude ADEA damages from gross
income."
In 1993, in Rice v. United States, the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California held that section 104(a) (2) ex-
cludes ADEA damages." The jury in Rice awarded the plaintiff general
and liquidated damages under the ADEA." The plaintiff and his wife
reported as part of their 1988 gross income the general damages, but
not the liquidated damages.° The taxpayers then sought a refund of
the taxes they paid on the general damages. 4 ' The court analyzed the
available remedies under the ADEA and contrasted them with those
available under Title VII, the statute at issue in Burke, to determine if
the underlying claim redressed a tort-like personal injury. 42 The court
rejected the Federal Government's proposal that ADEA liquidated
damages constitute a contractual remedy for economic harm.43 In-
stead, it reasoned that the characterization of ADEA liquidated dam-
ages by other courts as either compensatory or punitive evinced a
similarity to traditional tort remedies." The court concluded that be-
cause of its provision for liquidated damages and its provision for a
jury trial, the ADEA, unlike Title VII, "sounds basically in tort" and
therefore section 104(a) (2) excludes all damages awarded under the
ADEA 45
"Rice, 834 F. Supp. at 1245, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1192; Bennett, 30 Cl. Ct. at
401, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1379.
37 Shaw, 853 F. Supp. at 1382, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 964; Maleszereski, 827 F.
Supp. at 1557, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 330.
ml 834 F. Stipp. at 1245, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1192.
"Id. at 1242, 63 Fair Empl. l'rac. Cas. (BNA) at 1190. The ADEA provides for general
damages in the amount of unpaid wages and overtime compensation and liquidated damages of
an equal amount in "cases of willful violations." 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).
4° Rice, 834 F. Supp. at 1242-43, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1190.
41 Id. at 1243, 63 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1190.
42 See id. at 1244, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1191.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 1244-45, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1191-92 (citing Fortino v. Quasar Co.,
950 F.2d 389, 397-98 (7th Cir. 1991); Powers v. Grinnell Corp., 915 F.2d 34, 41-42 (1st Cir. 1990);
Reichman v. Bonsignore, Brignati Mazzotta, P.C., 818 F.2d 278, 281-82 (2d Cir. 1987)).
45 Rice, 834 F. Supp. at 1245, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1192 (quoting United States
v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1874, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1323, 1328 (1992)).
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Similarly, in 1994, in Bennett v. United States, the United States
Claims Court held that section 104(a) (2) excludes ADEA settlement
payments for back pay and liquidated damages." In Bennett, taxpayers
sought refunds of federal income taxes they paid in 1986 on a settle-
ment payment in an age discrimination class action lawsuit against
United Airlines. 47 The court rejected the Federal Government's argu-
ment that because ADEA plaintiffs may not recover many of the reme-
dies available to tort claimants, such as emotional distress and pain and
suffering damages, the ADEA creates a contractual claim." The court
reasoned that the ADEA, through awards of back pay and liquidated
damages, provides a remedial structure consistent with traditional tort
liability and, therefore, it redresses a tort-like personal injury." The
court further reasoned that the availability of a jury trial, which exists
in tort cases, adds to the tort-like nature of a claim under the ADEA
and distinguishes this case from a Title VII claim such as Burke.5° For
these reasons, the court held that section 104(a) (2) excludes ADEA
settlement payments. 5 '
In contrast, in 1993, in Maleszewski v. United States, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Florida held that
taxpayers could not exclude amounts received in settlement of an
ADEA claim under section 104(a) (2). 52 In Maleszervski, the taxpayers
sought a refund of federal income taxes they paid on an age discrimi-
nation settlement award from Chrysler Corporation." The court rea-
soned that the relief available to a successful ADEA claimant essentially
mirrored that afforded to Title VII claimants, with the exception that
ADEA plaintiffs can sue for liquidated damages, and under Burke,
therefore, plaintiffs may not exclude ADEA damages from gross in-
come." The court reasoned that the provision for liquidated damages
did not sufficiently distinguish ADEA claims from Title VII claims
because the inclusion of the liquidated damages provision in the ADEA
does not convert every ADEA award into "personal injury" damages
for tax purposes. 55 Unlike tort damages, the court reasoned, liquidated
damages do not serve to compensate the victim; rather they are de-
45 30 CI. Ct. 396, 401, 65 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (RNA) 1375, 1379 (1999).
47 Id. at 398, 65 Fair Emil]. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1376.
" Id. at 400, 65 Fair Ernpl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 1377.
49 Id. at 399, 65 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1377.
sa
51 Bennett, 30 Cl. Ct. at 401, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1379.
52 827 F. Supp. 1553, 1557, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 327, 330 (N.D. Fla. 1993).
" Id. al 1555, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 328.
"See id. at 1556, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 329.
55 Id. at 1557, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 329.
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signed to deter willful violations of the ADEA.56 Consequently, the
court held that the ADEA does not redress tort-like personal injuries
for purposes of section 104(a) (2) and the taxpayer could not exclude
from gross income the amount received as damages in an ADEA
claim. 51
Similarly, in 1994, in Shaw v. United States, the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Alabama adopted the reason-
ing of Maleszewski by holding that plaintiffs may not exclude from gross
income ADEA liquidated damages. 58 The taxpayer in Shaw sought a
refund of the federal income tax he paid on the liquidated damages
portion of an ADEA award against Auburn University. 59 The court
reasoned that despite the provision for liquidated damages, the reme-
dial scheme of the ADEA is merely a method for awarding lost benefits
and wages." The court held that because these liquidated damages
only punish and deter willful violators of the Act rather than compen-
sate a victim of a tort, damages awarded under the ADEA are not
damages resulting from personal injury and, therefore, section 104(a) (2)
does not exclude them from gross income.°
In 1994, in Hawkins v. United States, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit developed a test for determining whether
taxpayers may exclude damages under section 104(a) (2). 62 Although
Hawkins involved a suit for breach of good faith and fair dealing, the
Ninth Circuit has since applied the Hawkins test to ADEA claims." The
Hawkins court held that damages in a suit for breach of good faith and
fair dealing do not compensate for personal injuries and consequently
taxpayers may not exclude them from gross income under section
104(a) (2).64
In Hawkins, the taxpayers recovered compensatory and punitive
damages from Allstate Insurance Company for breach of good faith
and fair dealing. 65 The taxpayers initially reported the punitive dam-
ages as gross income, but later filed an amended return, claiming that
they could exclude the punitive damages under section 104(a) (2). 66
56 Id. at 1556, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 329.
Itlaleszewski, 827 F. Supp. at 1557, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 330.
5H853 F. Supp. 1378, 1382, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 961, 963-64 (M.D. Ala. 1994).
56 Id. at 1379, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 961.
6" Id. at 1382, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 963-64.
61 Id., 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 964.
62 30 F.3d 1077, 1082 (9th Cir. 1994).
65 See Schmitz v. Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790, 792, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1195, 1196
(9th Cir. 1994).
61 Hawkins, 30 F.3(1 at 1084.
65 Id. at 1079.
66 Id.
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The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the language of section 104(a) (2)
concerning "damages received on account of personal injury" could
refer to all damages recovered in a personal injury lawsuit, or it could
refer to only those damages that purport to compensate the taxpayer
for personal injuries. 67 The court reasoned that because punitive dam-
ages punish a tortfeasor's egregious conduct, rather than compensate
for personal injuries, courts do not necessarily award them "on account
of personal injury. 68
The court created a two-part test for determining whether section
104(a) (2) excludes damages.°° First, the court must determine if the
underlying claim is tort-like within the meaning of Burke; then, the
court must decide if the damages flowing from that claim compensate
for a personal injury and thus are awarded "on account of a personal
injury." In Hawkins, the parties agreed that the taxpayer's lawsuit for
breach of good faith and fair dealing was a tort-like action; thus, the
court addressed only the issue of whether the punitive damages had
some compensatory purpose. 71 The court held that because the puni-
tive damages only punish the tortfeasor and do not serve to compen-
sate the plaintiff for personal injury, section 104(a) (2) does not ex-
clude them. 72
During the Survey year, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, in Schmitz v. Commissioner, and the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Downey v. Commissioner, split over
whether section 104(a) (2) excludes ADEA damage awards from gross
income.75
 In both cases, the taxpayers had received from United Air-
lines ADEA settlement payments for back pay and liquidated damages,
and had reported as gross income only the back pay portions of the
payments. 74
 The Ninth Circuit, applying the two-part Hawkins test, held
that the ADEA created a tort-like cause of action which compensates
for a personal injury and that section 104(a) (2) excludes ADEA liqui-
dated damages from gross income. 75 Conversely, the Seventh Circuit,
applying Burke, held that section 104(a) (2) does not exclude ADEA
°7 Id at 1080.
GB See id.
Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1082.
"See id.
71 Id. at 1080.
72 See id at 1084.
73 See Schmitz v. Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790, 796, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1195, 1200
(9th Cir. 1994); Downey v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 836, 840, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 1192,
1195 (7th Cir. 1994).
74 See Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 791, 6.5 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1196; Downey, 33 E3(1 at 837,
65 Fair Empl. Prac, Gas. (RNA) at 1192.
75 Schmitz, 34 KM at 796, 65 Fair Empl. Prue. Cas. (BNA) at 1200.
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damages because they do not compensate for the traditional elements
of a personal injury:76
In Schmitz, John Schmitz received from United Airlines, his former
employer, $115,050 in settlement of his age discrimination claims."
The settlement agreement categorized half of this payment as back pay
and half as ADEA liquidated damages.78 Schmitz and his wife filed a
joint federal income tax return on which they reported the back pay
portion of the settlement but not the liquidated damages portion!'
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue ("Commissioner") issued a
notice of deficiency, alleging that the entire amount was taxable." The
Schmitzes first filed a tax court petition arguing that section 104(a) (2)
excluded the liquidated damages portion of the settlement from gross
income." Later, they amended their complaint arguing that they could
exclude both the back pay and the liquidated damages. 82 The Tax
Court held that section 104(a) (2) excluded the entire settlement."
The Commissioner appealed this decision to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit."
The Ninth Circuit applied the two-part test it created in Hawkins
for determining whether section 104(a) (2) excludes from gross in-
come damages received in a lawsuit." The court first looked at whether
the underlying cause of action was tort-like." The court noted that until
the Burke decision, the case law firmly established that ADEA lawsuits
were tort-like.87 It further noted that these cases relied on the Threlkeld
court's holding, which the Supreme Court amended in Burke." Thus,
the court stated, after Burke, a statute must not only redress an invasion
of individual rights, as the Threlkeld court held, but also must evidence
a tort-like conception of injury and remedy before plaintiffs can ex-
clude the damages."
76 Downey, 33 F.3d at 840, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1195.





82 Schmitz, 34 R3c1, at 791, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 11911.
88 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 792, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1196.
86 See id.
87 Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 792, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1196-97.
" See id. at 792, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) ai 1197.
89 See id.
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In applying part one of the Hawkins test, deciding whether an
ADEA claim was tort-like within the meaning of Burke, the court fo-
cused on the ADEA provisions for jury trials and for liquidated dam-
ages." The court analogized the jury trials and liquidated damages
available under the ADEA to what ordinary tort plaintiffs may receive."'
Because jury trials are available in tort cases and because liquidated
damages resemble tort damages for non-pecuniary losses by compen-
sating plaintiffs beyond lost wages, the court concluded that the ADEA
is tort-like under Burke.92
The court disagreed with the Commissioner's assertion that AREA
liquidated damages represent only punitive damages and are not analo-
gous to traditional compensatory tort damages such as pain and suf-
fering or emotional distress." Although conceding that ADEA liquida-
ted damages might have a punitive purpose, the court reasoned that
such a purpose coexists with compensatory goals."' The court also
rejected the Commissioner's argument that ADEA actions arise out of
contract rights and therefore cannot be tort-like for the purpose of
section 104(a) (2). 09 The court further reasoned that because the duty
not to discriminate exists regardless of the parties' contractual relation-
ship and because the ADEA applies not only to firing and promotion
decisions, but also to hiring decisions when no contract exists, an
action under the ADEA is more tort-like than contract-like." For these
reasons, the court held that under part one of the Hawkins test, the
ADEA creates a tort-like cause of action.•'
The Ninth Circuit turned next to the second part of the Hawkins
test, whether plaintiffs receive ADEA liquidated damages "on account
of personal injuries." Examining section 104(a) (2), the court agreed
with the Commissioner that the "on account of language implies that
taxpayers may not exclude damages unless the damages have some
compensatory purpose and bear some relationship to the taxpayer's
underlying personal injury. 9'9 The court disagreed, however, with the
Commissioner's argument that the Schmitzes received liquidated dam-
ages "on account or United Airlines' willful misconduct rather than
9° Id. at 793, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (RNA) at 1197.
91 See id. at 794, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1198.
92 See Schmitz, 34 Ead at 793-94, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1197-98.
93
 See id. at 793, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1197.
94 See id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 793, 65 Fair Emil'. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1198.
"Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 794, 65 Fair Empl, Prac. Gas. (RNA) at 1198.
118 Id.
Id.
410	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 35:305
"on account of" their personal injuries.'" The court reasoned that
because liquidated damages were traditionally awarded to compensate
victims for damages that were too difficult to prove, they represent
compensation for the victim, not punishment of the tortfeasor. 10' The
court added that Congress would not have labeled these damages
"liquidated" if it intended them to be punitive.'" The court further
reasoned that liquidated damages do not lose their compensatory
purpose merely because they are available only in cases of willful
discrimination.'" Thus, having concluded that ADEA claims are tort-
like and liquidated damages arising out of those claims compensate
for personal injury, the court held that section 104(a) (2) excludes
ADEA liquidated damages from gross income.'"
In a concurring opinion, Circuit Judge Trott, although agreeing
with the result of the majority's decision, disagreed with the majority's
adoption of the two-part Hawkins test.'" Instead, he argued, the court
should have focused only on whether an ADEA claim is a tort-like cause
of action, the first part of the Hawkins test.'" He asserted that if the
majority found that claims under the Act were tort-like, a taxpayer
should be able to exclude all damages he or she received on account
of those claims. 107
By using the Hawkins two-part test, Circuit Judge Trott argued, the
majority made an artificial distinction between ADEA liquidated dam-
ages and punitive damages in order to find the former "received on
account of personal injury" in the language of section 104(a) (2). b08 He
argued that ADEA liquidated damages resemble punitive damages
because they are only awarded in cases of willful violations.'" He found
support for this argument in Ninth Circuit case law, which has consis-
tently treated ADEA liquidated damages as punitive damages."° There-
fore, by applying the Hawkins rule, which states that section 104(a) (2)
does not exclude punitive damages from gross income, Circuit Judge
1 °° Id.
l° 1 Id.
1 °2 Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 795, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1199.
t03 Id. The Conference Report for the 1978 Amendments to the ADEA states that liquidated
damages compensate the aggrieved party for non-personal losses arising out of a willful violation
of the ADEA. Id. at 796, 65 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1200.
104 Id, at 796, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cos. (RNA) at 1200.
1 °5 1d.
106 Id. at 796-97, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 1200.
1 °7 Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 797, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 1200.
168
 See id,
10° M. at 797. 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 1201.
lit Id.
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Trott argued that the majority should have found ADEA liquidated
damages not excludable." Instead, he asserted, the majority drew a
fallacious distinction between liquidated and punitive damages merely
in order to find liquidated damages excludable under the Hawkins
test. 12 He rejected the majority's rationale that ADEA liquidated dam-
ages serve both a compensatory and punitive purpose, stating that
under Ninth Circuit law, liquidated damages serve no compensatory
purpose." He argued that the majority could have avoided making
this distinction had it merely ended its analysis after finding the un-
derlying claim tort-like." 4 Therefore, Circuit Judge Trott disagreed with
the majority's application of the Hawkins test to ADEA liquidated
damages, but concurred that section 104(a) (2) should exclude these
damages. ] `'
In the Seventh Circuit, in Downey v. Commissioner, Burns Downey
received $120,000, divided equally between back pay and liquidated
damages, from United Airlines as settlement of an age discrimination
claim against his former employer."'' He and his wife reported only the
back pay portion of the settlement on their joint federal income tax
return and excluded the liquidated damages portion of the settle-
ment."' The Commissioner claimed the entire award was taxable and
filed a deficiency in the amount owed as tax on the liquidated dam-
ages."' The Downeys filed a petition in the Tax Court, claiming an
exception for both the liquidated damages and back pay portions of
the settlement.' I9 In its final opinion, the Tax Court held that the ADEA
"evidenced a tort-like conception of injury and remedy" for purposes
of Burke, and that the Downeys could exclude all of their damages from
gross income.'" The Commissioner appealed to the Seventh Circuit.' 21
The Seventh Circuit followed Burke in overturning the Tax Court's
decision by focusing its analysis on the nature of ADEA damages. 122
The court interpreted the rule of Burke as requiring that a statute
in Id. at 798, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1201,
112 Schmitz, 34 E3d at 798, 65 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1201.
113 1d. Under Ninth Circuit law, ADEA liquidated damages do not compensate for the loss of
the use of money, emotional distress, or pain and suffering. Id.
114 See id. at 797, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1200.
115 Id. at 796, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1200.





121 Downey, 33 F,3d at 837, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1192.
122 See id. at 839, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 1194.
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provide compensatory damages for traditional elements of personal
injury, such as pain and suffering or emotional distress, in order to
constitute a tort-like personal injury and receive tax exempt treatment
under section 104(a) (2).m It noted that litigants under the ADEA
cannot recover the broad range of compensatory damages that char-
acterize tort-like causes of action, but instead are limited to only back
pay and liquidated damages.'" Therefore, the court reasoned, unless
ADEA liquidated damages compensate for the traditional elements of
a tort-like injury, it would be bound by Burke to hold that section
104(a) (2) does not exclude ADEA damages. 125
The Seventh Circuit noted that courts of appeals have split over
whether ADEA liquidated damages are punitive or contractual but
concluded that whatever the appropriate characterization, ADEA liq-
uidated damages do not compensate for the traditional elements of a
personal injury claim.' 26 Thus, the court held that section 104(a) (2)
does not exclude such damages from gross income. 127
In light of the Supreme Court's holding in Burke that section
104(a) (2) does not exclude back pay awards received in settlement of
Title VII claims, the ruling of Downey is more sound than the ruling
of Schmitz. 128 Burke clarified what constitutes a tort-like cause of action
for the purposes of section 104(a) (2).'" Following Burke, a court may
not base its determination solely on the underlying injury which a
statute seeks to redress.'" Instead, a court must examine the remedial
scheme of the statute to determine if it provides compensation for
traditional elements of personal injury, such as emotional distress or
pain and suffering."'
The Seventh Circuit, in Downey, applied the Burke rule accurately
and held that the ADEA is not tort-like and, therefore, a taxpayer may
not exclude from gross income damages received thereunder.'" The
remedial scheme under the ADEA provides only for awards of back




126 Down9,--, 33 F.3(1 at 840, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1194-95 (7th Cir. 1994).
127 74 at 840, 65 Fair Empl, Prat. Cas. (BNA) at 1195.
L28 See United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1874, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1323,
1329 (1992).
128 See id, at 1870-71, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1326.
l" See id at 1872, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 	 at 1327.
III See id.
182 See Downey v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 836, 840, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1192, 1195
(7th Cir. 1994).
199 See id. at 839, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1194.
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Downey court correctly concluded that neither type of award compen-
sates the victim for the traditional elements of personal injury required
under Burke.' 34
 An award of back pay merely compensates the victim
for wages and benefits that he or she would have received but for the
employer's discrimination: 35
 Liquidated damages have been charac-
terized by circuit courts as either punitive or contractual,'" but in any
event do not compensate for the traditional elements of personal
injury such as pain and suffering or emotional distress. 137
Regardless of its inaccurate application of the Burke holding, the
Ninth Circuit's holding in Schmitz presents problems in light of that
circuit's conclusions in Hawkins.' 38 As Circuit Judge Trott notes in his
concurrence in Schmitz, liquidated damages resemble punitive dam-
ages because they are only available in cases of willful violations of the
ADEAP" Thus, ADEA liquidated damages fail part two of the Hawkins
test, which requires that even after a finding of a tort-like cause of
action, the damages must have been awarded "on account of" personal
injury for section 104(a) (2) to apply.'"" Punitive damages by definition
punish the tortfeasor, rather than compensate the victim for traditional
elements of personal injury: 4 ' Therefore, the Ninth Circuit erred not
only by misapplying the holding in Burke to find that the ADEA creates
a tort-like cause of action, but also in characterizing ADEA liquidated
damages as compensatory rather than punitive.' 42
In summary, the Ninth Circuit, in Schmitz, and the Seventh Circuit,
in Downey, split over whether section 104(a) (2) excludes ADEA dam-
age awards from gross income.'" The Ninth Circuit, applying the
two-part test it created in Hawkins, held that the ADEA created a
tort-like cause of action and that taxpayers may exclude ADEA liquida-
ted damages from gross income because they are received "on account
of personal injury: 44
 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit, applying Burke,
held that ADEA damages do not compensate for the intangible ele-
134 See id. at 840, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1195.
155 See Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1873, 58 Fair Ernpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1328 (referring to back
pay awards under Title VII).
136 See Downey, 33 Fad at 839, 65 Fair Ernpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1194.
137 See id. at 839, 65 Fair Ernpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1195.
158 See Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077, 1084 (9th Cir. 1994).
136
 Schmitz v Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790, 797, 65 Fair Empl. Prat:. Cas. (BNA) 1195, 1201
(9th Cir. 1994).
140 See id. at 792, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1196,
141 Id. at 798, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1202.
142 See id. at 796, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1200.
143 See Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 796, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1200; Downey v. C0111111irr
sinner, 33 F.3d 836, 840, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) 1192, 1195 (7th Cir. 1994).
144 Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 796, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 1200.
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ments of personal injury and taxpayers may not exclude them under
section 104(a) (2). 145
IV. GENDER DISCRIMINATION
A. *Sexual Harassment—Shifting the Focus Away from the Victim's
Response and Searching for a Standard of Employer Liability: Karibian
v. Columbia University'
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") prohibits an
employer from discriminating against an employee on the basis of
gender.2
 Sexual harassment in the workplace falls within the purview
of Title VII and constitutes employment discrimination. 5 A plaintiff
may bring a claim of sexual harassment under two theories: (1) quid
pro quo and (2) hostile work environment. 4
 Quid pro quo sexual
harassment occurs when an employer conditions employment deci-
sions upon an employee's submission to or rejection of unwelcome
sexual advances.' Sexual harassment under a hostile work environment
theory arises when unwelcome sexual conduct, including comments,
gestures or physical contact, is sufficiently pervasive to alter the em-
ployee's condition of employment and create an abusive environment.'
Prior to the Survey year, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit asserted that the plaintiff must establish actual
economic damages in a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim.' Addi-
tionally, although most courts agree that an employer is held strictly
liable for damages in quid pro quo cases, the standard for imputing
145 Dawney, 33 F.3d at 840, 65 Fair Einpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1195.
* By Andrew P. Borggaard, Staff Member, BosTom COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1
 14 F.3d 773, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1038 (2d Cit..), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2693
(1994).
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988). Title VII states, in part, that it shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any individual with respect to terms,
conditions or privileges of employment because of such individual's sex. Id.
5
 Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1822, 1826
(1986). The Court reasserted that position when it issued its 1993 decision in Harris v. Forklift
Sys., Inc. See 114 S. Ct. 367, 370, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 225, 227 (1993).
4
 Mentor, 477 U.S. at 65-66, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1826.
5 E.g., Karibian, 14 F.3d at 777, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1042.
6 See, e.g., Mentor, 477 U.S. at 67, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1827.
7 See, e.g., Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Cir., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 62, 58 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 310, 312 (2d Cir. 1992); Carrero v. New York City Hons. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 577, 51
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 596, 602 (2d Cir. 1989).
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liability to an employer in hostile work environment cases remains
unclear.'
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court, in Meritor Savings Bank
v. Vinson, first held that a complaint of sexual harassment based on a
hostile work environment theory stated a claim under Title V11. 9 In
Meritor, the plaintiff sued her former employer, alleging that her branch
manager sexually harassed her during her employment by coercing
her into multiple occurrences of sexual intercourse.'" The plaintiff
argued that the intercourse was coercive because she feared she would
lose her job if she did not consent." The plaintiff, however, never
notified the bank of the alleged harassment despite the employer's
express policy against discrimination. 12 The Meritor Court recognized
the plaintiffs claim of a hostile work environment despite the plain-
tiff's failure to prove economic damages.' 3 The Court asserted that Title
VII and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
guidelines regarding sexual harassment do not require proof of actual
or tangible damages." The Court reasoned that the use of the phrase
"terms, conditions or privileges of employment" in 42 U.S.C. § 2000—
e-2(a) (1) evidenced Congress's intent to address all types of unequal
treatment of men and women in the workplace and not just those that
included actual economic loss.'' Thus, the Court held the alleged
conduct actionable under Title VII because its pervasiveness sufficiently
altered the plaintiff's working environment and created an abusive
atmosphere. 16
The Meritor Court, however, failed to issue a clear standard for
employer liability in hostile work environment cases.' 7 Refusing to hold
all employers absolutely liable for all cases of sexual harassment by
their supervisors, the Court stated that the extent of an employer's
liability will depend on the particular employment relationship and the
8 See, e.g., Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1829; Karibian, 14 F.3d
at 779, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1043.
9
 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 73, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1829.
Id. at 60, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1824.
II Id.
12 Id. at 61, 40 Fair Empl. Prac, Cas. (BNA) at 1824. The plaintiff argued that she construc-
tively notified the bank of sexual harassment because she informed her supervisor that his sexual
advances were unwelcome. See id. at 70, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1828.
13
 Id. at 67-68, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 1827.
14 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64-65, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1826.
15 Id. at 64, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1826.
16 Id. at 67, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (DNA) at 1827.
17 See id. at 72, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1829; Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d
773, 779, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1038, 1043 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2693 (1994),
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job requirements of the alleged harasser in light of general agency
principles."' Thus, the Meritor Court held that employers are not strictly
liable in hostile work environment cases."
In 1989, in Carrera v. New York City Housing Authority, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the plain-
tiff stated a valid quid pro quo claim of sexual harassment because
her supervisor denied tangible job benefits after she rejected his sex-
ual demands. 2° In Carrera, the plaintiff's supervisor subjected her to
repeated sexual advances.! ]
 After the plaintiff complained and her
employer commenced official action to remedy the harassment, the
plaintiffs supervisor began evaluating her work as unsatisfactory, and
ultimately demoted her. 22
 Based on these facts, the Second Circuit
concluded that the plaintiff's supervisor denied the plaintiff tangible
job benefits, including impartial training and evaluation, as an adverse
consequence of her rejection. 2' Because the plaintiff established that
her supervisor had predicated tangible job benefits on acceptance of
his sexual demands, the court held that the plaintiff stated a valid quid
pro quo claim.24
In 1990, in Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corrections Department, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit declined to hold
the employer liable for an employee's hostile work environment sexual
harassment because the employee was not acting within his scope of
Meritar, 477 U.S. at 71-72, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1829. Thus, the Court
reasoned that Congress intended to limit the acts of employees For which an employer is liable
under Title VII by defining employer to include any of its agents in 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(b). Id.
at 72, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1829.
The Mentor Court also noted inconsistency between the EEOC guidelines on sexual harass-
ment and the EEOC's amicus curiae brief. Id. at 71, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. C.as. (BNA) at 1829. The
EEOC Guidelines impose liability on an employer for the acts of its agents without regard to the
employer's notice. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1994). The EEOC argued in its brief, however, that an
employee's failure to take advantage of an established procedure for filing sexual harassment
complaints insulates the employer from liability unless the employer had actual knowledge of a
sexually hostile work environment. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 71, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at
1828-29.
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 73, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1829.
'20 890 F.2d 569, 579, 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 596, 603 (2d Cir. 1989). The Second
Circuit concluded that the district court correctly predicated the employer's liability on the quid
pro quo claim despite the existence of hostile work environment elements. See id.
21 Id. at 573, 51 Fair Empl. Prac, Cas. (BNA) at 598.
22 Id. at 573-74, 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 598-99. Prior to the employer's report
on the alleged harassment, the supervisor's evaluation rated the plaintiff as satisfactory. Id. at
574, 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 599.
2 t Id. at 579, 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 603.
24 See id. The Second Circuit recognized that the plaintiff was, in part, denied tangible job
benefits because of a hostile work environment. See id. Moreover, the court stated that many
sexual harassment cases will not fit neatly into one category or the other. Id.
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employment or on behalf of the employer and the employer took
prompt remedial action upon notice. 25 In Hirschfeld, a correctional
officer sexually harassed the plaintiff, a secretary and co-worker, by
making unwelcome attempts to kiss and hug her. 26 The Tenth Circuit
concluded that the harassing employee was not acting within the scope
of his employment when he sexually accosted the plaintiff. 27
Additionally, the Tenth Circuit determined that the employer
immediately took adequate remedial action once informed of the
alleged harassment. 28 Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit concluded that
the correctional officer did not purport to act on behalf of the em-
ployer and the agency relationship did not aid in his furtherance of
the sexual harassment. 29 Thus, the Tenth Circuit declined to hold the
employer liable for its supervisor's hostile work environment sexual
harassment because the supervisor perpetrated the harassment neither
within the scope of his employment, nor on behalf of the employer,
and because the employer properly remedied the problem."
In 1992, in Katcher v. Rosa and Sullivan Appliance Center; Inc., the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the
employer is not liable in a hostile work environment case unless it
failed to either provide a reasonable avenue for complaint or respond
upon notice of sexual harassment. 31 In Kotcher, the plaintiffs' supervi-
sor allegedly subjected the plaintiffs to multiple episodes of vulgar
comments and gestures." Once notified of the harassment, the em-
ployer immediately started an investigation and transferred and de-
moted the harassing supervisor." The Second Circuit reasoned that an
employer neither tolerates nor condones a sexually abusive work envi-
ronment if it provides the necessary procedures to file a harassment
complaint and acts promptly and adequately upon notice of harass-
25 9 1 6 F.2d 572, 577-80, 54 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 268, 272-74 (10th Cir, 1990).
26 Id. at 574, 54 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 269-70.
27 Id. at 577, 54 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 272.
28 Id. at 577-78, 54 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 272-73. The employer immediately
conducted an investigation, and upon confirmation of the harassment, demoted the correctional
officer. Id. at 577, 54 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 272.
29 Id. at 579-80, 54 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas, (BNA) at 274.
"See Hirschfeld, 916 F.2d at 577-80, 54 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (RNA) at 272-74.
31 957 F.2d 59, 63, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 310, 312-13 (2d Cir. 1992). The Second
Circuit did not refute the district court's determination that the employer's response to the
complaint was sufficient. Id. at 63, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 313. The Second Circuit,
however, expressed reservation that the employer's response was perhaps a sham and remanded
the case for further factual findings. Id.
32 Id. at 61, 58 Fair Etnpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 311.
99 Id. at 62, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 311.
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ment.34 Thus, the Kotcher court held that the employer is not liable in
a hostile work environment case for the acts of its supervisors, unless
the employer fails to provide a reasonable procedure for employer
notification or fails to remedy the harassment once notified. 35
In 1992, in Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held an employer not liable for its
supervisor's creation of a sexually hostile environment, despite the
supervisor's use of apparent authority to perpetrate the harassment,
because the employer responded adequately and promptly after notice
of the harassment. 38 In Kauffman, the plaintiffs supervisor repeatedly
commented about and attempted to touch the plaintiff's breasts. 37 The
employer terminated the supervisor within a day of receiving notice of
the harassment. 38
 In addition, the employer had a written policy against
sexual harassment and encouraged use of its grievance procedure. 38
The Kauffman court rejected the employer's argument for appli-
cation of the respondeat superior standard to determine employer
liability." The Sixth Circuit noted that such a standard applied to
co-worker, rather than supervisor-employee, harassment cases.'" The
Sixth Circuit asserted that the initial question was whether the harass-
ment took place within the scope of the supervisor's employment."
Even if it had, the Kauffman court concluded that the employer would
still insulate itself from liability if it responded adequately upon notice
of the harassment." The Sixth Circuit reasoned that this standard for
employer liability fits more consistently with the purpose of Title VII,
which defines "employer" as including any of its agents. 44 Thus, the
Kauffman court held that although the supervisor's harassment was
within the scope of his employment, the employer's immediate dismiss-
34 See id. at 63, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 312-13.
35 See id.
36
 970 F.2d 178, 184, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 606, 611 (Gth Cir. 1992).
37 1d. at 180-81, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 608.
38 Id. at 181, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 608.
39 Id. The plaintiff testified that she knew nothing of the employer's sexual harassment
policy and had never seen a copy of it displayed on the premises' bulletin boards or message
centers. Id.
4° Id. at 183, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 610. The respondeat superior standard
requires the plaintiff to prove that the employer knew or should have known of the harassment
and failed to respond adequately. Id. (quoting Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 621,
42 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 631, 638 (6th Cir. 1986)).
41 Kauffman, 970 F.2d at 183, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 610.
42 Id. at 184, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 611.
43 1d.
44 Id.
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al of him upon notice of the harassment exhibited sufficient response
to absolve the employer of liability.°
During the Survey year, in Karibian v. Columbia University, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that actual
economic loss is not required by Title VII to state a valid quid pro quo
claim of sexual harassment.° The Karibian court also held that when
a supervisor uses actual or apparent authority to facilitate acceptance
of his sexual advances by a subordinate, the employer is strictly liable
by virtue of the supervisor's use of the existing agency relationship. 47
In Karibian, the plaintiffs supervisor allegedly forced her to consent
to a sexual relationship by threatening loss of certain job benefits. 48
Addressing the quid pro quo claim, the Second Circuit reasoned that
requiring actual economic damages focuses too much on the harassed
employee's reaction to sexual advances.° According to the court, the
relevant question instead should be whether a supervisor predicated a
tangible employment benefit on the acceptance by an employee of that
supervisor's sexual advances." As to the second issue, the Karibian
court observed that holding an employer strictly liable under a quid
pro quo theory when a supervisor used the existing agency relationship
to facilitate sexual harassment, but not holding the employer liable in
the same circumstances under a hostile work environment theory
represented an inconsistency. 5 ' Thus, the court held that when a su-
pervisor uses his or her actual or apparent authority to perpetrate
sexual harassment, the employer is absolutely liable. 52
In Karibian, the plaintiff's supervisor, Mark Urban ("Urban"),
allegedly coerced the plaintiff, an employee of Columbia University
("Columbia"), into a sexual relationship by telling her that she "owed
him" for all that he did for her." The plaintiff alleged that she acqui-
esced to Urban's demands because she feared she might lose her job
if she refused.54
 The relationship lasted at least fifteen months before
the plaintiff officially notified Columbia of Urban's alleged harass-
45 m.
46 14 F.3d 773, 778, 63 Fair
Ct. 2693 (1994).
47 1d, at 780, 63 Fair Empl.
48 Id. at 776, 63 Fair Empl,
46 Id. at 779, 63 Fair Empl.
813 Id. at 778, 63 Fair Empl.
61 Karibian, 14 F.3d at 781,
62 Id. at 780, 63 Fair Empl.
63 Id. at 776, 63 Fair Empl.
64 Id.
Ernpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1038, 1042 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1044.
Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1040.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1043.
Prac. Cris. (BNA) at 1042.
63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1045.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1044.
Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1040.
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ment. 55
 Columbia forced Urban to resign shortly thereafter." Several
months later, the plaintiff filed a Title VII sexual harassment claim in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. 57
The Second Circuit addressed the quid pro quo and hostile work
environment claims separately. 58 First, the Karibian court reversed the
district court's dismissal of the quid pro quo claim, holding that a
plaintiff need only show that an employment term was conditioned
upon submission to an unwelcome sexual advance to establish a quid
pro quo claim of sexual harassment." Relying on Meritur, the Second
Circuit commented that actual loss is not a prerequisite of a quid pro
quo claim because neither Title VII nor the EEOC guidelines limit
Title VII claims to those involving economic or tangible discrimina-
tion." The Second Circuit reasoned that requiring actual economic
damages incorrectly emphasized the reaction of the harassed em-
ployee instead of the conduct of the alleged harasser. 8' Thus, the
Second Circuit held that quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when-
ever the complainant's supervisor links tangible job benefits to the
acceptance or rejection of sexual demands. 62
In so holding, the Second Circuit rejected Columbia's argument
that Kotcher and Carrero require the plaintiff to demonstrate actual
economic loss. 65
 The Second Circuit concluded that Columbia improp-
55 See id. at 776, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 1040-41, On two separate occasions during
the relationship with Urban, the plaintiff indicated to counselors working for Columbia that she
feared retaliation from Urban if she rejected him. Id. at 776, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at
1040. Columbia started no investigation, however, because the plaintiff requested confidentiality
from the counselors. Id. The university was not officially informed until fifteen months after
Karibian first met with Columbia's counselors when the plaintiff confronted a director of her
department about her concerns that Urban would fire her. Id. at 776, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 1041.
se Karibian, 14 F.3d at 776, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1041. Once notified, Columbia
officials confronted Urban, who asserted that the relationship was completely consensual. Id.
Although Columbia never opined on the credibility of either party's characterization of the
relationship, the university forced Urban to resign for undisclosed reasons. Id.
57 Id. The district court dismissed the plaintiff's quid pro quo claim because she failed to
establish an actual economic loss resulting from the sexual advances made towards her. Karibian
v. Columbia Univ., 812 F. Supp. 413, 416, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 66, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1993),
reed, 14 F.3d 773 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2693 (1994). The district court also addressed
the hostile work environment theory. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
58 Karibian, 14 F.3d at 777, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1042.
59 Id. at 779, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1043.
6° Id. at 778, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1042.
61 Id. at 779, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1043. The court of appeals further stated that
requiring actual economic damages would unfairly punish those victims of sexual harassment
who do not successfully resist unwelcome sexual advances. Id. at 778, 63 Fair Erupt. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 1042.
62 Id. at 779, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1043.
" Karibian, 14 F.3d at 778-79, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1042-43.
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erly relied on Kotcher because Kotcher involved a hostile work environ-
ment claim and thus, the court considered any dicta therein regarding
quid pro quo claims not binding." The Second Circuit conceded that
Carrera was a quid pro quo case.65
 The Second Circuit, however, factu-
ally distinguished Carrera from Karibian because the Carrero plaintiff
refused her supervisor's advances, while the Karibian plaintiff submit-
ted. 66 The Karibian court commented that, in refusal cases like Carrero,
the plaintiff can usually show adverse consequences and actual eco-
nomic loss as a result of refusing to acquiesce to sexual demands.° The
Second Circuit asserted, however, that adverse employment decisions
should not be required in every case of quid pro quo harassment
because such a requirement focuses undue attention on the victim's
response instead of the harasser's conduct.68
 The Second Circuit held
that the focus in a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim should be
on whether an employment term was conditioned upon an employee's
submission to an unwelcome sexual advance. 69
 Thus, the Second Cir-
cuit concluded that if Urban predicated favorable work assignments,
raises and promotions on the plaintiff's continued acquiescence to his
sexual advances, he committed quid pro quo sexual harassment."
The Second Circuit also reversed the district court's hostile work
environment ruling in favor of Columbia. 71 The Second Circuit held
that an employer is strictly liable in a hostile work environment case if
the employer's supervisor uses actual or apparent authority to facilitate
the harassment or if the agency relationship between employer and
supervisor aided the harassment, 72
 The Second Circuit acknowledged
64 Id. at 778, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1043. In Katcher; the court of appeals had
stated that a plaintiff in a quid pro quo case must establish that she rejected a sexual advance by
her supervisor, and was therefore denied an actual economic benefit. Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan
Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F,2rl 59, 62, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 310, 312 (2d Cir. 1992).
65 Karibian, 14 F.3d at 778, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1043.
66 See id.
67 Id. at 778, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1042-43. The Second Circuit therefore con-
cluded the Karibian decision was not inconsistent with the Carrero standard. Id. at 778-79, 63
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1043.
68 Id. at 779, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1043.
1.4/ Id. at 778, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1043.
Karibian, 14 F.3d at 778, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1042.
71 See id. at 779-80, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (I3NA) at 1043-44. Relying on Kotcher, the district
court dismissed the plaintiff's hostile work environment claim because she could not prove that
Columbia failed to either provide a reasonable avenue for complaint or act upon notice of the
harassment. See Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 812 F. Stipp. 413, 416, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
66, 68 (S.D.N.'Y. 1993) (quoting Kotcher, 957 F.2c1 at 63, 58 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 312),
rev'd, 14 F.3d 773 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2693 (1994). The district court rejected the
plaintiff's argument that she notified Columbia when she had her confidential meetings with the
university's counselors about Urban's conduct. Id. at 416-17, 61 Fair Erni)]. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 68.
72 Karibian, 14 F.3d at 780, 63 Fair Etnpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1044.
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that courts have consistently held the employer strictly liable in quid
pro quo cases. 78
 When decisions made by a supervisor affect the eco-
nomic status of an employee, the supervisor acts on behalf of the
employer, and the supervisor and the employer become the same
entity in the employee's perspective. 74 According to the Second Circuit,
holding Columbia strictly liable for quid pro quo harassment but not
holding it liable when the same conduct created a hostile work envi-
ronment claim created a jarring anomaly. 75
The Second Circuit rejected Columbia's argument that it could
not be liable under a hostile work environment claim because it satis-
fied the Kotcher standard by providing proper complaint procedures
and acting promptly upon notice." The Second Circuit stated that
conforming to the Katcher requirements does not automatically shield
the employer from liability." More specifically, the Karibian court quoted
Kotcher itself to show that the Katcher standard should not necessarily
apply in all cases. 78 The Second Circuit distinguished Katcher from
Karibian by likening the Katcher facts to co-worker harassment." The
Second Circuit indicated that agency principles protected employers
from liability in those co-worker cases absent notice or failure to act
upon notice because the harasser uses neither actual nor apparent
authority to perpetrate sexual harassment. 8° In contrast, the Karibian
court noted that the plaintiff in the instant case alleged that the
supervisor did use actual or apparent authority to create a hostile work
environment.8 '
Relying on Hirschfeld and the Restatement (Second) of Agency,
the Second Circuit concluded that an employer is absolutely liable if
one of its supervisors uses delegated authority to create a discriminatorily
abusive work environment under common law principles of agency. 82
73 Id.; see also Katcher, 957 F.2d at 62, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 312; Carrero v. New
York City Haus. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 579, 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 596, 603 (2d Cir. 1989).
74 Karibian, 14 F.3d at 780, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1044-45 (quoting Katcher, 957
F.2d at 62, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 312). The Karibian court also cited Carrera. Id., 63
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1044 (citing 890 F.2d at 579, 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at
603 (when harasser holds out employer's benefits as incentive to acquiesce to sexual demands,
he or she acts as and on behalf of company)).
78
 Karibian, 14 F.3d at 781, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1045.
7° Id.
77 Id. at 780, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1044.
78 See id.
79 See id. at 781, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1045.
8°
 Karibian, 14 E3d at 781, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1045.
m See id. at 780, 63 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1044.
82 Id. (citing Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corrections Dept, 916 F.2d 572, 577-80, 54 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 268, 272-74 (10th Cir. 1990); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1),
(2)(d) (1958).
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Thus, the Second Circuit held that the employer should be subject to
absolute liability because the plaintiff's supervisor used actual or ap-
parent authority to create the sexually hostile work environment."
The Karibian decision attempts to minimize the importance of
whether a sexual harassment victim consents to or rejects sexual advances
by an alleged harasser.84
 By instead emphasizing whether the sexual
advances were unwelcome by the victim, Karibian refutes Katcher's
requiring a plaintiff to show a denial of tangible job benefits as a
consequence of rejecting sexual advances made by the harasser." Fur-
thermore, Karibian strikes a more equitable balance in the burdens
borne by the harasser and the victim by not requiring proof of actual
damages. Otherwise, as implied by the Karibian court, when the victim
consents to the sexual advances and thereby avoids adverse employ-
ment decisions, the victim is automatically presumed to have welcomed
the sexual advances in question."
The Karibian decision, however, possibly creates different stand-
ards for refusal and consent cases with respect to actual versus threat-
ened damages. The Second Circuit stated that Karibian was consistent
with Carrera because the Carrero language is limited to refusal-type cases. 87
Carrero required that the plaintiff establish adverse consequences as a
result of rejection of the supervisor's unwelcome sexual advances."
Thus, Karibian could be interpreted as still requiring plaintiffs in refusal
cases to show actual damages. Under such an interpretation, the Sec-
ond Circuit treats a victim in a refusal case differently than a victim
who consents to unwelcome sexual advances. Contrary to the theme
of Karibian, the focus consequently shifts from the issue of whether the
sexual advances were unwelcome back to whether the victim rejected
or consented to the sexual advances in order to determine if the
plaintiff must establish actual damages.
The Karibian decision initially may be lauded for clearly estab-
lishing that strict liability be imposed on the employer when a super-
visor uses actual or apparent authority in creating a sexually abusive
environment.89 By following a strict liability standard similar to that
applied by the Tenth Circuit in Hirschfeld, an employer may not avoid
" Id.
84 See id. at 779, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1043.
85 See Karibian, 14 F.3d at 778-79, 63 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1045.
°6 See id. at 779, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1045.
87
 Id, at 778-79, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1043.
88
 Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 579, 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
596, 603 (2d Cir. 1989).
89 See Karibian, 14 F.3d at 780, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1044; Hirschfeld v. New
Mexico Corrections Dept, 916 E2d 572, 577-80, 54 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 268, 272-74
(10th Cir. 1990).
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liability by responding promptly and adequately to a sexual harassment
complaint." Consequently, institution of a strict liability standard in
supervisor-created hostile work environment cases may create an even
greater incentive for employers to provide proactive devices to spot
and prevent sexual harassment before it occurs.
The Karibian decision may, however, ultimately face substantial
criticism. First, Karibian places an extremely onerous burden on the
employer. The employer has virtually no way to protect itself under
Karibian if a supervisor creates a sexually hostile environment." This
seems particularly unfair given the sometimes covert and subtle nature
of hostile work environment sexual harassment.
Second, Karibian may further motivate employers to cover up
incidents of sexually abusive environments because of the resulting
legal liability. Karibian's strict liability standard, making an employer's
response to harassment complaints irrelevant, impels the employer to
hinder an employee's attempt to seek redress for a reported incident
of hostile work environment sexual harassment. 92
 The employer may
decide that responding appropriately will cost more than covering up
reported sexual harassment or hindering an employee's attempt to
sue." Thus, instead of responding quickly and adequately, employers
may opt to cover up incidents of sexual harassment.
As an alternative to the Karibian decision, the Kauffman standard
used by the Sixth Circuit may further the purposes of Title VII more
effectively. Unlike the strict liability standard, the Kauffman standard
motivates the employer to respond promptly and adequately to com-
plaints of sexually abusive work environments because by doing so, the
employer avoids Title VII liability." Thus, the employer has no incen-
tive to cover up supervisor-created hostile work environment harass-
ment. Moreover, the Kauffman standard does not affect the employer's
incentive to take proactive measures in preventing sexual harassment.
In enacting Title VII, Congress intended to strike at the entire spec-
trum of unequal treatment of men and women in the workplace."
90




 See generally id. at 780-81, 63 Fair Empl, Prac, Cas. (BNA) at 1044-45.
° Although outside the scope of this Note, the prospect of punitive damages may provide a
disincentive to an employer's decision not to respond accordingly. The employer, however, may
view the potential of punitive damages as merely another factor in its cost-benefit analysis
regarding how to properly respond to a sexual harassment complaint. Thus, the possibility still
exists that the employer will perceive the risk of punitive damages as less costly than the prospect
of strict liability and will decide to cover up rather than remedy complaints of sexual harassment.
94
 Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 184, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 606, 611
(6th Cir. 1992).
Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1822, 1826
(1986).
March 19951
	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 425
Giving an employer incentive to cover up sexual harassment does not
satisfy such intent.
The United States Supreme Court avoided issuing a clear standard
for employer liability in hostile work environment cases in Meritor in
1986. 96
 As a result, lower courts are split on when and if strict liability
should apply.'' Regardless of which hostile work environment standard
better suits the purposes of Title VII, the United States Supreme Court
must intervene and establish a consistent standard on this issue.
In summary, the Second Circuit in Karibian held that where an
employee submits to unwelcome sexual demands of a supervisor, the
plaintiff need not establish actual, rather than threatened, economic
damages in a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim. 98
 Karibian, how-
ever, may still be interpreted as requiring that actual damages be
proven when a plaintiff rejects sexual advances of his or her supervisor.
The Second Circuit also held in Karibian that an employer is strictly
liable for a hostile work environment created by its supervisor if that
supervisor used actual or apparent authority to perpetrate sexual har-
assment." Though the Karibian strict liability standard further moti-
vates employers to proactively prevent hostile work environment sexual
harassment, it also may give them incentive to cover up, rather than
remedy, reported incidents of such harassment.
V. PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION
A. * The Pregnancy Discrimination Act: Troupe v. May Department
Stores Co.'
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from
discriminating against individuals on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex or national origin. 2
 In 1978, Congress added the Pregnancy Dis-
96 Id. at 72, 40 Fair Empl. Prac, Cas. (BNA) at 1829.
97 See, e.g., Karibian, 14 F.3d at 780, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1044; Kauffman, 970
F.2d at 184, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 611; Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corrections Dep't,
916 F.2d 572, 577-80, 54 Fair Empl. Pratt. Cas. (BNA) 268, 272-74 (10th Cir. 1990).
98
 See. Karibian, 14 F.3d at 779, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1043.
99 /d. at 780, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1044.
* By Kathleen M. Wall, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 20 F.3d 734, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 512 (7th Cir. 1994).
2
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988), The relevant section states in part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against. any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin . .
Id. § 2000e-2(a)( I).
426	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 (Vol. 35:305
crimination Act to Title VII, clarifying that discrimination on the basis
of sex includes pregnancy discrimination. 3
 Because this amendment is
relatively new, the courts are still testing the boundaries of pregnancy
discrimination within the meaning of Title VII.'
In 1976, prior to the amendment of Title VII, in General Electric
Co. v. Gilbert, the United States Supreme Court held that a disability
plan, which excluded pregnancy-related disabilities from its coverage,
did not discriminate against female employees. 5 General Electric of-
fered a plan that paid sixty percent of an employee's normal earnings
for non-occupational sicknesses, except those related to pregnancy.6
The Court reasoned that the structure of the plan was not a pretext to
discriminate against women.' First, the Court noted that because, un-
like other disabilities, women usually became pregnant by choice, it
was not facially discriminatory to exclude pregnancy from coverage. 8
In addition, the Court emphasized that most insurance plans covered
certain risks while excluding others and that this plan covered men
and women for all the same risks.' The Court stated that, absent
evidence that the plan had more monetary value for men than for
women, it could not be discriminatory.''' Thus, the Court concluded
3 See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 670, 32 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) I, 2 (1983). The amended definition section provides that Id he terms 'because
of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
The dual purpose of this amendment was to overrule the decision made by the United States
Supreme Court in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1657 (1976), and to guarantee equal treatment to pregnant women in the workplace. Sarah E.
Wald, Judicial Construction of the 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment to Title VII: Ignoring
Congressional Intent, 31 AM. U. L. REV. 591, 599-600 (1982).
4 See, e.g., International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206, 55 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) 365, 374 (1991); Troupe, 20 F.3d at 738, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
at 515; EEOC v. Ackerman, Hood & McQueen, Inc., 956 E2d 944, 948, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 114, 117 (10th Cir. 1992). One author noted that in most areas of the law, discrimination
has been defined by the courts "on a piecemeal basis" and predicted that the same trend would
appear in pregnancy discrimination litigation. Jane Rigler, Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co. v. EEOC and Sex Discrimination Under Title VII: Some Questions Answered, Others Remain,
88 DICK. L. Rev. 357, 358 (1984).
5
 429 U.S. 125, 145-46, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1657, 1666 (1976).
6 Id. at 128, 13 Fair Empl. Pr-ac. Cas. (BNA) at 1659.
7
 Id. at 136, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1662.
g Id.
9
 Id. at 138, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1663.
i° General Electric, 429 U.S. at 138, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1663. The Court
explained that because the same disabilities were covered for all employees, the plan was equally
beneficial for men and women. Id. If pregnancy were included, then the women would actually
be receiving more benefits than the men. See id.
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that employers who denied disability benefits for conditions related to
pregnancy did not violate Title VII."
In 1978, Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act ("PDA"),
which provided that Title VII sex discrimination included discrimina-
tion on the basis of pregnancy and related medical conditions.' 2 This
amendment effectively overruled General Electric." In 1983, in Newport
News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, the United States Supreme
Court held that a disability plan violated Title VII, even though it fully
covered female employees.i 4
 The defendant amended its plan in 1979
so that all employees received the same benefits, but created a differ-
entiation between male and female spouses of employees by limiting
benefits for pregnancy-related conditions.'" The Court began its analy-
sis by explaining that, under the PDA, distinctions based on pregnancy
are facially discriminatory. 16
 Next, the Court reiterated the purpose of
the PDA, to ensure the same treatment for pregnancy-related condi-
tions as other medical conditions. 17 Thus, the Court determined that
by refusing to fully insure pregnant spouses, the employer discrimi-
nated against its male employees in violation of Title VII.'s
In 1991, in International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., the
United States Supreme Court further defined the scope of the PDA by
holding that an employer could not prevent a female employee from
taking a particular job to protect potential children from health risks. )9
The defendant's battery manufacturing process exposed employees to
lead.° Because of the potential dangers to pregnant workers, the de-
fendant instituted a policy that excluded women capable of bearing
"Id. at 145-46, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1666.
" See Newport News, 462 U.S. at 670, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 2.
Wald, .supra note 3, at 598.
14
 462 U.S. at 685, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cat. (BNA) at 8.
15 Id. at 672, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 3. The plan paid for surgical procedures,
necessary services, a semi-private room for up to 120 days, the first $750 of reasonable hospital
charges including nursing care, X-rays, drugs and other services, and 80% of the cost of hospital
services exceeding $750 for employees during hospital stays. Id. at 672 n.6, 32 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) at 2 n.6. The same plan was in effect for spouses, except that for pregnancy-related
hospitalization, it only paid the reasonable charges for anesthesiology and delivery and up to
$500 for other hospital charges. Id.
16 1d. at 684, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 7.
' 1 1d. The court explained that because the spouses of male employees were not covered as
fully as the spouses of female employees, the female employees were getting a more favorable
insurance plan. See id. at 683, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 7. This type of disparity is exactly
what Congress was trying to prevent when it passed the PDA. See id. at 684, 32 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) at 7.
"Id. at 685, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 8.
1t 499 U.S. 187, 206, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 365, 374 (1991).
29 Id. at 190, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 368.
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children from any work station where high levels of lead had been
reported. 21
 Because the policy clearly differentiated on the basis of
gender, the Court explained that it would have to be based on a bona
fide occupational qualification in order to satisfy the PDA. 22 The Court
defined a bona fide occupational qualification as an objective standard
that is relevant to an employee's ability to complete tasks essential to
the job. 23
 According to the Court, although an employer may legiti-
mately prevent a pregnant employee from working if it may harm a
third party, an employer may not legitimately use the safety of an
employee's fetus as an excuse for not hiring a woman capable of
bearing children." The Court concluded that unless pregnancy actu-
ally prevented women from fulfilling their duties, an employer could
not exclude them from particular positions."
In 1992, in EFOC
 v. Ackerman, Hood & McQueen, Inc., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that an employer
who made accommodations for employees with medical problems in
the past must make accommodations for pregnant workers as wel1. 26
The plaintiff, an executive secretary who usually worked overtime,
became pregnant and began experiencing fatigue, nausea and head-
aches. 27
 She gave her supervisor a doctor's note, which recommended
that she work only forty hours each week. 28 After the plaintiff told her
employer that she intended to follow that recommendation, the em-
ployer fired her for insubordination." The court maintained that,
rather than a comparison between the employer's actions toward men
as opposed to women, the correct comparison was between pregnant and
non-pregnant employees. 30 Because the employer had allowed non-
pregnant employees to alter their schedules to accommodate medical
conditions, the court reasoned that the employer treated pregnant
employees differently by not allowing them to do the same.s' Conse-
21 Id. at 191-92, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 368.
22
 See id. at 198-200, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 371-72.
23 See id. at 201-03, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 372-73. Thus, an employer may
terminate a pregnant employee if conditions related to pregnancy might interfere with the safety
of customers or other third-parties. See id. at 202, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 372-73.
24 See Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 202, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 372.
25 Id. at 206, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 374.
26
 956 F.2d 944, 948149, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 114, 117-18 (10th Cir. 1992).
27 Id. at 945146, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 115.
28 Id. at 946, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 115.
29 Id., 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 116.
3° Id. at 948, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 117.
81
 Ackerman, 956 F.2d at 949, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 118.
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quentiy, the court concluded that the employer's treatment of the
plaintiff violated the PDA 52
During the Survey year, in Troupe v. May Department Stores Co., the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed the
issue of how far an employer must go to accommodate a pregnant
employee." The court held that Title VII allowed an employer to fire
a pregnant employee who repeatedly arrived late for work, even if the
employer's motivation was to save the costs of maternity leave." The
Seventh Circuit concluded that the PDA was not "a warrant for favor-
itism.""
The plaintiff, Kimberly Hern Troupe, began working for Lord &
Taylor as a part-time saleswoman in 1987, moving to full-time work in
1990. 56
 In December of 1990, Troupe requested and received a return
to her part-time position because of her severe morning sickness."
Despite her shift to afternoon hours, Troupe continued to suffer from
morning sickness and either arrived late for work or left work early on
nine out of twenty-one days." Her supervisor gave her a verbal warning,
followed by a written warning in February of 1991. 59 After being late
three consecutive days in March, Lord & Taylor placed her on proba-
tion for sixty days." During her probation, Troupe arrived late eleven
more days.'" Finally, Lord & Taylor fired her on June 7, the day before
she planned to begin her maternity leave. 42 At the trial, Troupe testified
that her supervisor told her that the company fired her because they
thought that she would not return after she had her baby.°
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment be-
cause the plaintiff failed to provide any direct evidence of discrimina-
tion.'" In an opinion authored by Chief Circuit Judge Posner, the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision, but rejected the district court's
32 Id. at 948-49, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 118.
33 See 20 ESd 734, 738, 64 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 512, 515 (7th Cir. 1994).
'4 Id.
35 Id.
38 Id. at 735, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 513.
37 Id.
38




42 1d. at 735-36, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 513.
43 Troupe, 20 F.3d at 735-36, 64 Fair Etnpl. Prac, Cas. (BNA) at 513.
" Id. at 736, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cat. (BNA) at 513. The court explained that the discrimi-
natory intent of the employer or its agents would have to he clear with no need to draw infer-
ences. Id.
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reasoning.45 According to the Seventh Circuit, a plaintiff may prove
intentional discrimination either by direct evidence or circumstantial
evidence from which inferences of discrimination could be drawn.° The
court listed three types of circumstantial evidence that may help prove
a Title VII case: 1) suspicious timing and ambiguous statements; 47 2)
evidence regarding the treatment of similarly situated employees; 48 or
3) evidence that the plaintiff was otherwise qualified and that the
employer's reason for dismissal was a pretext.49 The court recognized
that although each of these types of evidence may be sufficient by itself
to prove a case of intentional discrimination, a plaintiff also may
present them together." Noting that Troupe did not present any evi-
dence involving similarly situated employees or pretext on the part of
the employer, the court reasoned that she would need to show either
direct evidence of discrimination or examples of circumstantial evi-
dence that added up to discrimination in order to prove her caseP
Troupe offered two pieces of circumstantial evidence in her fa-
vor." First, Lord & Taylor fired her the day before her maternity leave
began although, once she returned, the reason for her tardiness would
have been resolved." Second, her supervisor had told her that she was
being fired because no one expected her to return from maternity
leave.54 Troupe offered these two facts as proof that the reason behind
her dismissal was that she might not return after having her baby."
The court explained that, because Troupe alleged that the defen-
dant was motivated by a fear that she would not return to work, the
main issue on appeal was whether termination of a pregnant employee
to avoid paying the costs of maternity leave is prohibited by the PDA. 56
The court reasoned that although Title VII requires a finding that the
45 See id. at 738-39, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 515-16.
46 Id. at 736, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 513-14.
47 Id. According to the court, the ambiguous statements may be oral or written and may even
be directed at other employees in the protected group. Id., 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at
514. The court noted that this type of evidence is the one most commonly found in cases of
intentional discrimination because "employers have taught their supervisory employees not to
put discriminatory beliefs or attitudes into words oral or written." Id.
46 Troupe, 20 F.3d at 736, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 514. The court noted that this
type of evidence may be either statistical or anecdotal. See id.
49 Id.
5° Id.
31 See id. at 736-37, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 514.
52 Id. at 737, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 514.
53 Troupe, 20 F.3d at 737, 64 Fair Empl. Prac, Cas. (BNA) at 514.
" Id., 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 515.
55 Id.
Id.
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employer dismissed the plaintiff based on her membership in a pro-
tected class, it does not protect against a financially motivated dismiss-
a1.57 The court reasoned that dismissing a pregnant employee because
she may not return to work is not discriminatory unless non-pregnant
employees are retained under similar circumstances." Although Troupe
may have a case for breach of contract, the court concluded that she
could not show that Lord & Taylor discriminated against her on the
basis of pregnancy."
The court rejected the argument made by some feminists that
employers should make accommodations for pregnant women to put
them on an equal footing with their co-workers." One scholar has
suggested that because women who reproduce are placed at a disad-
vantage when compared with men who reproduce, employers must
give women the opportunity to compete as equals.° The court dis-
agreed with this stance and stated that the appropriate comparison
group for pregnant employees should be non-pregnant employees with
medical disabilities. 62 The court concluded that employers need not
make any special accommodations for pregnant employees unless non-
pregnant employees receive similar accommodations." The court also
noted that an employer may legitimately confirm an employee's inten-
tion to return to work before supplying any disability leave benefits.°
Consequently, the court noted that the outcome of the case may
have been different if Troupe had shown that the defendant had given
better treatment to a non-pregnant employee beginning a disability
leave." Troupe conceded that she was continually tardy throughout
57 See id. at 738, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 515. The court gave the example of a
"hypothetical Mr. Troupe" who was dismissed while he was preparing to take an extended leave.
Id. "If Lord & Taylor would have fired our hypothetical Mr. Troupe, this implies that it fired Ms.
Troupe not because she was pregnant but because she cost the company more than she was worth
to it." Id.
Troupe, 20 F.3d at 738, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (13NA) at 515.
55
6° Id.; Hernia Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, I BERKELEY WOMEN'S
L.J. I, 27 (1985).
61 Kay, supra note 60, at 26, Kay asserts that it would be "unjust to place the consequential
disadvantages of reproductive conduct only upon women." Id. Kay suggests that by making
accommodations for a woman in areas where perlOrinance is affected by pregnancy, her "equality
of opportunity" will be preserved until the end of the pregnancy. See id. at 26-29.
6.2 See Troupe, 20 F.3d at 738, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 515. The court's comparison
group would include both men and women who suffered from temporary disabilities. See id.
63 See id., 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 515.
t'4 Id. The court made this statement in refiTence to Title VII only, and not to employees
with employment contracts. See id. at 737, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 514.
"See id. at 738-39, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 515-16.
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her pregnancy.° According to the court, Title VII did not require the
employer to retain Troupe if she could not perform her duties because
of her pregnancy.° With no evidence that the defendant had acted
more leniently toward other tardy employees, the court concluded that
the plaintiff could not prove that her employer had violated Title VII.'
The court held that the PDA does not mandate better treatment for
pregnant employees than for other employees with medical problems
unrelated to pregnancy.°
Judge Posner limited the PDA with his opinion in Troupe to a point
where he may have controverted the congressional goals behind the
passage of the Act. By holding that a financially motivated dismissal
does not violate Title VII unless it is directed solely at pregnant em-
ployees, the Seventh Circuit is allowing a subtle form of sex discrimi-
nation to flourish." If an employer decides that it makes good business
sense to terminate all employees who plan to take paid leaves because
they may not return to their positions, then the employees will prob-
ably want to avoid situations in which they risk termination. Thus, the
employer can pressure women into avoiding pregnancy for fear of
losing their jobs. In contrast, because employees have no control over
illnesses and accidents, an employer's anti-leave policy will not affect
whether they become disabled by a condition other than pregnancy."
By putting constraints on a woman's choice to become pregnant, the
employer violates the policy goals of the PDA."
In addition, the court is essentially forcing a plaintiff like Troupe,
who believes that her dismissal was prompted by economic concerns,
to present comparison evidence in order to prove discrimination."
The court distinguishes the present case from Ackerman, where the
plaintiff demonstrated pregnancy discrimination by presenting clear
examples of disparate treatment in comparison to non-pregnant em-
ployees. 74 The court noted that this emphasis on comparative evidence
66 Id. at 737, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 514.
67 Troupe, 20 F.3d at 737, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 514.




71 See Kay, supra note 60, at 36.
72 See Wald, supra note 3, at 591, 599-600.
73 See Troupe, 20 F.3d at 738-39, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 515-16.
74 See id. at 738, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 516; EEOC v. Ackerman, Hood &
McQueen, Inc., 956 F.2d 944, 949, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 114, 118 (10th Cir. 1992)
(employer did not allow secretary to reduce her overtime even though similar exceptions had
heen made For employees with other medical conditions).
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could make it difficult for a plaintiff in the absence of comparisons,
but decided to reserve that issue until it arose in the context of a case. 76
Troupe's attorney may have lost the case by arguing that the
suspicious timing of her dismissal and the ambiguous statement made
by her supervisor pointed to a financially motivated dismissal rather
than pregnancy discrimination. 76 When the court examined the evi-
dence, it explained that it would not discuss whether Lord & Taylor
reacted directly to the pregnancy or morning sickness by dismissing
Troupe because that interpretation was never presented by Troupe's
lawyer." Thus, Troupe's evidence may have been an example of the
first type of circumstantial evidence described by the court, and it may
have been sufficient to create an issue for trial. Instead of discussing
the evidence in that light, the court concluded that "her failure to
present any comparison evidence doomed her case." 78
Troupe may not have explicitly argued that she was dismissed on
the basis of her pregnancy because she equated it with a dismissal to
save disability benefits. The notion that it is economically unsound to
pay maternity leave benefits to a pregnant employee is discriminatory
because it assumes that women with children will not be committed to
their jobs. 7° The court's decision allows an employer to terminate
pregnant women because they will cost more money as long as the
employer would react similarly in the case of a non-pregnant worker.
It is difficult, however, to separate this seemingly egalitarian reasoning
from the fact that women will recognize that if they do not get preg-
nant, they will be able to keep their jobs. If employers are allowed to
continue such practices, then women will continue to be penalized for
exercising their right to have children.
In summary, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held that the PDA permits an employer to dismiss a pregnant
employee who is late for work even if the dismissal is motivated by the
employer's desire to save money. 80 The court recognized that a plaintiff
75 Troupe, 20 F.ad at 738-39, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 516. Because Troupe never
claimed that it was impossible for her to find a comparison group, this issue did not pertain to
the present case. Id. at 738, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 516.
76 See id. at 737, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 515.
77 See id., 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 514-15. Since Troupe's lawyer never made this
argument, the court refused to consider it. Id., 64 Fair Empl. Prue. Cas. (BNA) at 515.
78 Id. at 739, 64 Fair Empl. Prac, Cas. (BNA) at 516.
79 See Reva B. Siegel, Note, Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
1978, 94 YALE L.J. 929, 956 (1985) ("Where tradition has presumed the incompatibility of
pregnancy and employment, the PDA now substitutes a countervailing presumption of compati-
bility.").
8° See Troupe, 20 F.ad at 738-39, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 515-16.
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may present either direct or circumstantial evidence as proof of dis-
crimination under the PDA. 8 ' The court stated, however, that a finan-
cially motivated dismissal can only be considered discriminatory when
an employee can show that employees with medical conditions other
than pregnancy have been treated differently. 82 This result does not
conform to the intent of the PDA because it will force women to choose
between keeping their jobs and having children.
81 Id. at 736, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 513-14.
82 See id. at 738-39, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 515-16.
